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This small scale research study explores psychotherapists’ experience of medical 
model thinking on their practice delivered in the two separate settings of GP 
surgeries and private practice. The study’s key philosophical theme is the difference 
between modern and postmodern perspectives and how they might manifest 
themselves in social practices (such as medical interviews), knowledge creation and 
the practice of psychotherapy.  The researcher locates the concepts key to the 
research in existing literature in terms of theory, research studies and their historical 
development – this latter being in support of the use of a Foucauldian discourse 
analytic method which is selected as that which best supports a social 
constructionist, postmodern approach to research. Parker’s method of using the 
research interview as a text-in-progress is explained and implemented, with eight 
participants being interviewed twice by the researcher. A discourse analytic 
framework which draws on defined theoretical resources was applied. The findings 
from the two part study show that for those participants working in primary care the 
GP/patient relationship has at least four key impacts on psychotherapy delivered in 
that setting and that for those working in a private setting it is through their 
relationships with individual GPs and psychiatrists that participants’ have constructed 
the biggest impact of medical model discourse on their practice and perhaps more 
importantly on their clients. Links are made to the literature reviewed concerning 
notions of the power of doctors and ideas for future research focused on the 
prevalence of ‘splitting’ in the UK are discussed. The researcher concludes with 
some thoughts about the fact that whilst the medical models’ invisibility and taken-for-
granted nature for participants working within a primary care setting was more severe 
than expected, it was discursively constructed as having less of a wide-ranging 
impact on the participants in private practice. The importance of remaining awake to 
the influence of the medical model is discussed particularly during a cultural moment 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this introduction the researcher will describe how the idea for a study into 
psychotherapists’ experience of medical model thinking working in different settings 
first emerged and was subsequently developed. Some philosophical ideas central to 
the research as a whole are introduced and the chapter is concluded with an 
overview of the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 The Question 
The idea for the initial focus of this research first emerged through the researchers’ 
experience in working as a trainee therapist in a GP surgery. The researcher was 
initially very aware of the physical aspects of the medical setting – working in the 
surgery building itself, using a room often used by GPs full of medical paraphernalia 
(trying to hide as much as possible of it before receiving a client) and using a 
computer system which described the days appointments as the researchers’ ‘clinic’. 
Over time the researcher became more aware of some more subtle aspects – the 
way some clients expected them to understand the effects of the drugs they had 
been prescribed, being quick to place them in the role of expert to whom they should 
describe their symptoms in order that help may be given more effectively “rather than 
just sit here and cry” (verbatim). To the researcher as a therapist whose work is 
influenced by elements of Rogers, existentialism and other more postmodern ideas 
within what has been called a post-existential cultural moment (Loewenthal, 2011), 
these expectations seemed to be coming from a very different place philosophically 
and inevitably became part of the work of therapy itself, sometimes explicitly, always 
implicitly. 
The researcher therefore became interested in exploring other therapists’ potential 
experiences of the medical model, starting with those also working in this type of 
setting and so conducted an initial study into the potential impacts on psychotherapy 
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delivered in a primary care setting arising from the patients’ relationship with the GP. 
(This specific interest had been piqued not only by how some clients expressed their 
expectations when starting counselling, but also by how some GPs spoke of their 
work when ‘off-duty’ in the staff room at the surgery.) In essence the first part of the 
study asked whether there is something about the way GPs and their patients 
interact inside a medical discourse that is then transmitted or carried into the 
counselling relationship. 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapters four and five, amongst the findings of 
this initial phase of research was the notion that regardless of their original theoretical 
training, the language and ideas expressed by the participating therapists reflected 
core elements of medical model thinking. The completion of the first phase of 
empirical research coincided with the researcher setting up their own private practice 
which gave rise to a growing personal awareness that even in this setting the medical 
model’s influence remained very much in evidence in a variety of ways (including, for 
example, the requirement of most third party payers to provide a ‘diagnosis’ and 
‘treatment plan’ on their forms, or the need to specify what ‘conditions’ you offer help 
with when advertising in certain therapeutic directories). This experience confirmed 
the idea of focusing the second half of the two-part study on an exploration of 
psychotherapists’ experience of the influence of a medical model discourse in the 
explicitly non-medical model setting of private practice. Whilst the researcher 
recognises the difficulties with comparing or generalising findings from any studies 
(let alone two such small scale studies), they were interested to see what picture 
emerged of therapist’s experiences from the different settings in terms of areas of 
commonality and difference. 
The first part of the study was conducted using the title; “Is the medical model 
infectious? How, if at all, is psychotherapy provided in a GP surgery affected by the 
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relationship a patient has with their GP?  It is important to note that the use of the 
term ‘medical model’ in this question refers to the dominant conceptual model used in 
medicine (as opposed to the medical model as applied to psychotherapy). Of 
necessity in the second part of the study, “Exploring the influence of the medical 
model discourse on psychotherapists working in private practice” the concept of the 
medical model discourse is broadened to consider how it has been used over time to 
understand emotional distress (also known as psychopathology) in both medicine 
and in psychotherapy. The two studies were conducted over a period of three years. 
Whilst it was not the intention of the researcher to test a particular hypothesis but 
rather to explore other therapists’ accounts of their experiences, the researcher has 
subsequently recognised that the wording of the questions used in both parts of the 
study has implied that it might be possible to discern the impact of the GP/patient 
relationship or the influence of the medical model from all the other influences on a 
therapeutic encounter and that the world works in such a simple cause and effect 
way. These issues stem from a perceived philosophical conflict which underpins both 
the question itself and the choice of how the research would be conducted. In 
essence, the idea for the research has emerged from a perceived philosophical 
difference between the position of the therapist/researcher (postmodern) and that of 
the GP setting and the wider dominant cultural medical discourse (modern). What 
follows therefore is a brief outline of these ideas in order to contextualise the study as 
a whole. 
1.2 Conflicting philosophies – modernism v postmodernism 
As is more explicitly discussed in chapter two, ‘the medical model’ in medicine is a 
short hand term used to describe the dominant Western approach to professional 
medicine which is underpinned by a modernist understanding of the world. Leonard 
(1997:5) describes modernism “as having been founded intellectually on a belief in 
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the power of reason over ignorance, order over disorder and science over 
superstition as universal values with which to defeat the old orders”.  Ontologically, 
reality is assumed to be “objective and singular, apart from the researcher” 
(Cresswell, 1994:5). There is a fundamental belief in the idea “of progress as 
possible, probable or necessary” (Lyotard in Leonard, 1997:7). In terms of language, 
modernity’s knowledge claims “are based upon the idea that language performs the 
function of representation … Things are named as a way of grasping hold of reality” 
(Leonard, 1997:9). The individual “…the subject of modernity…rests upon an 
assumption of the existence of an essential, self-directing individual person” 
(Leonard, 1997:33). This was partly based upon Descartes (1982 (1697)) work in 
which he had “enthroned the thinking Subject as the arbiter of certain knowledge, 
when he famously declared, ‘cogito ergo sum’ or ‘I think therefore I am’” (Heartfield, 
2006:27). This view gave “primacy to consciousness and reason” and “postulated the 
human being as a mind free to ponder an ‘outside’ world, a mind housed in a 
machine-like body” (Loewenthal & Snell, 2003:3) assuming a fundamental difference 
between these kinds of matter (in a doctrine known as ‘mind-body’ or Cartesian 
'dualism’).  In combination in modernism there is a view of an independent reality 
which is accurately represented by and described through language and in which 
causes and effects can be measured and categorised in objective experiments by 
autonomous individuals.  
In contrast, postmodernism questions the assumption of an independent objective 
reality and instead considers how reality is “subjective and multiple” (Cresswell, 
1994:5). Social constructionists argue that “through deconstruction we are able to 
see our knowledge and beliefs as historically and culturally specific products” 
(Leonard, 1997:23). As social constructionism will be referred to throughout this 
piece of research, the researcher will briefly explain that, according to Gergen 
(1985:266-8) “Social constructionist inquiry is principally concerned with explicating 
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the processes by which people come to describe, explain or otherwise account for 
the world (including themselves) in which they live” and highlights the fact that 
“descriptions and explanations of the world themselves constitute forms of social 
action”.  Critically in postmodernism, through the ideas of Saussure and Lacan, 
language itself is seen as “fundamentally a social institution, it precedes us, we are 
born in to it…words, in other words, also speak us” (Loewenthal and Snell, 2003:65). 
Meaning is seen as highly subjective and transient and in place of the certainties of 
modernism, “Uncertainty about the future… is the only thing we can be certain about” 
(Leonard, 1997:27). The autonomous subject of modernism is replaced in 
postmodernism by the heteronomous subject – the idea that humans are always 
‘subject to’ - to social forces, the unconscious, the power of others and ultimately and 
most simply according to Levinas (1989), we are subject to and responsible for the 
Other.  In summary, from a postmodern view, reality is subjective, culturally and 
historically constructed and mediated through language in which meanings can slip 
and slide and as a result the basis of knowledge itself is brought into question.   
In terms of the research questions asked, therefore, it might be regarded as overly 
simplistic to assume that it might be possible for a therapist to isolate impacts from 
either the GP/patient relationship or a concept as broad as a medical model 
discourse - “the therapeutic relationship is an interpersonal and dialogical process 
and a complex holistic phenomenon that cannot be dismantled into component, 
linear causal parts” (Schmitt Freire 2006:328). This issue will be discussed further in 
chapter five. 
As these ideas have implications not only for the practices of medicine and therapy 
but also for the nature of research as a knowledge creating enterprise, they are 
explored in more detail as part of a review of the literature relevant to the question 
and in relation to the selection of the chosen methodological approach. 
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The researcher will now briefly explore what is meant by Foucault’s notion of 
discourse as it is fundamental to this thesis in terms of both the methodology used 
and the entire frame of the second part of the study. 
1.3 Foucault and Discourse 
Whilst Foucault rejected the label of postmodern for his work he did define it as a 
critique of modernity (Lupton,1987) and many of the range of possible components of 
postmodern thinking outlined above can be found in his ideas. 
Foucault (1969:121) defined a discourse as being “constituted by a group of 
sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements …the law of such a series is…a 
discursive formation”. Leonard (1997:2) sees discourses in this sense “as linguistic 
systems of statements through which we speak of ourselves and our social world”.  
Parker et al (1995:10) summarise that “Foucault’s work has been invaluable in 
drawing attention to the way language is organized around different systems of 
meaning which offer positions of power to certain categories of people and 
disempower others. These systems of meaning are discourses.” (Parker et al, 
1995:10) 
Using an approach referred to as genealogy, which “disturbs formerly secure 
foundations of knowledge and understanding” (Hook, 2005:8) Foucault’s objective in 
his work was to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1982:208) and he argued that certain 
dominant discourses have the power to constitute, to bring into being, certain objects 
and subjects. “For Foucault, the subject is constituted through discourse rather than 
having a prediscursive existence” (Bunton & Peterson, 1997:3). The notion that 
seeing the world through a discursive lens potentially signals the death of the subject 
is an important idea that will be returned to in chapters two, three and five. 
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Foucault therefore attempts to deconstruct “such unities as ‘science’ or ‘literature’” 
and to “tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems that 
they pose; to recognise that they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which 
other questions may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster of 
questions” (Foucault, 1969:28-9). One such apparent unity he saw was medicine. In 
the Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) Foucault lays out his epistemology, seeking to 
explain what constitutes such discursive unities – whilst the definitions above focus 
on language and what it does in constituting objects and subjects, the discursive field 
he describes also includes the broadest context in terms of who is speaking, from 
what institution, with what authority based on what knowledge? Clinical medicine, 
therefore, must be regarded as “the establishment of a relation, in medical discourse, 
between a number of distinct elements, some of which concerned the status of 
doctors, others the institutional and technical site from which they spoke, others their 
position as subjects perceiving, observing, describing, teaching etc” (Foucault, 
1969:59).  
It should also be noted that dominant discourses are as important in terms of what 
they do not say as in what they do: “The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no 
more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this ‘not-said’ is a 
hollow that undermines from within all that is said” (Foucault, 1969:28). With 
particular reference to the discourse of madness he suggests that “the constitution of 
madness as mental illness at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence 
of a broken dialogue…and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect 
words…in which the exchange between madness and reason was made. The 
language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been 
established only on the basis of such a silence. I have not tried to write the history of 
that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence” (Foucault, 1967:xii).  As he 
later went on to say in 1969, in attempting any historical analysis of the development 
 14 
of a discourse, the question thus becomes “how is it that one particular statement 
appeared rather than another?” (Foucault, 1969:30). 
It is imperative, therefore, to pay attention to the broader discursive context of any 
one discourse. As Foucault (1969:74) summarises; “Well to the fore is the role played 
by the discourse being studied in relation to those that are contemporary with it or 
related to it. One must study therefore the economy of the discursive constellation to 
which it belongs.” In chapter two, therefore, it will be important for the researcher to 
examine the literature regarding the relationship between the discourses of the 
medical model in medicine, psychiatry and psychotherapy. 
Finally in this chapter, the researcher will outline the overall structure of the rest of 
the thesis. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
In chapter two the researcher defines the key terms used in the questions for each 
part of the study, explains the rationale for the selection of five key conceptual areas 
to form the content of a literature review and presents the findings of that review. The 
areas covered are as follows; first, the medical model in medicine especially as it is 
found in primary care, including the idea of this as a discourse;  second how this 
discourse has impacted the development of the GP/patient relationship; third, models 
for understanding human distress, focusing on evolving versions of the medical 
model, which includes how the doctor/ patient relationship has developed within the 
field of ‘mental health’ and how it has historically intersected with the practice of 
psychotherapy; fourth, medical model discourses within psychotherapy itself 
including key alternatives proposed at a meta-theoretical level and finally a summary 
of literature which offers postmodern critiques of the medical model in all its guises. 
The literature review includes both theory and research and, in support of the method 
chosen for the research, a brief historical analysis of each concepts’ development. 
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The third chapter is devoted to exploring the possible choices of methodology and 
how the chosen method was then implemented for the study. The researcher 
concludes a case for looking to qualitative rather than quantitative research options 
and from those describes the rationale for selecting a version of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis.  The researcher then provides an outline of the specific 
methodology selected together with a description of the steps actually adopted for 
the research (from Parker, 1992, 2005).  
In order to analyse data generated through Parker’s methodology, the researcher 
was required to identify the theoretical resources which would form the basis of an 
analytic framework. These were identified as being; Foucault’s ideas on power and 
its relationship to knowledge and how this manifests itself in medical practices and 
institutions; the presence or absence of medical model language and discourses in 
relation to therapy and notions of autonomy and heteronomy as expressed in 
humanistic and postmodern literature. 
Those who support postmodern, ideological research in fact place importance on the 
twin hopes that research can be a catalyst in “increasing consciousness about issues 
of power and oppression, and—for the ideological and critical perspectives in 
particular—the potential of the research to create change” (Morrow, 2005:545). The 
selection of the method used in the research has very much reflected and reflexively 
influenced this awareness of the potential of research to effect change.   
In chapter four, the stages of the analysis are made clear and presented alongside 
the discursive findings which are, for part one, grouped into four sets; one in terms of 
the therapeutic setting, two competing sets of “official” discourses and a set of 
“unofficial” discourses. For the second part of the study the findings are grouped into 
three sets; again one in term of the setting and two competing sets of discourses and 
their associated subject positions.  
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Finally, in chapter five, the researcher reflects on the research as a whole and offers 
a critique which aims to highlight its strengths and weaknesses. This encompasses a 
more detailed discussion of the findings in terms of how they relate to the literature 
reviewed in chapter two, a review of the method used, what has been learned by 
both the researcher and the participants and concludes with some ideas for further 
research.  
Having given a brief introduction to the research study and set out the structure of the 




















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter has two main purposes – the first is to define the key terms used in the 
research question - as words are often ambiguous it is important in any piece of 
research that the researcher clarify their understanding and usage of particular 
terms. The second is to give an overview of the existing literature relevant to the 
research conducted. The researcher recognises the breadth of the subject under 
scrutiny and has therefore targeted the most relevant areas for a systematic review 
of the literature in terms of both theoretical writings and research studies undertaken. 
It is also important to note that the literature review has necessarily been influenced 
by Foucault’s notion of discourse for two reasons; first the research question for the 
second part of the study is specifically framed in terms of this idea; second 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is the chosen methodology for both parts of the 
study (the rationale for which and detail of is covered in chapter three). According to 
Parker (2005:91), “the preparation for a piece of qualitative research using discourse 
analysis needs to include historical analysis of how the forms of language in question 
have come to organize certain social bonds…so that analysis of language in a piece 
of text does not treat it as if it came out of nowhere (and) …so that the text is put in 
the context of actual ‘social bonds’ or power relations”. The researcher therefore 
attempts to locate the key concepts to this research in terms of both theory and 
research and trace their development through an (albeit brief) historical analysis.   
2.1 Definition of terms 
As this research has been operationalized as two studies, the researcher has 
included a definition of terms for each one. For the first study, which asked the 
question “Is the medical model infectious? How, if at all, is psychotherapy provided in 
a GP surgery affected by the relationship a patient has with their GP? “the researcher 
defines the key terms in the following way: 
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(i) The medical model: refers to the dominant ‘professional’ biomedical 
approach to Western medicine as it might be described in the practice of 
medicine (including biological psychiatry) as opposed to how it might be 
applied to the field of psychotherapy. A distinction is drawn, however, 
between the medical model and the wider model of science in which it is set. 
(ii) Infectious is used deliberately in two ways – most obviously in terms of an 
“emotion, opinion, etc: likely to be passed on to others” (Chambers Dictionary, 
2010), but also in a deliberately ironic sense in relation to the medical model, 
the idea of a disease or person infected with a disease that “may be 
transmitted” to others.  
(iii) Psychotherapy for the purposes of this report, means both counselling and 
psychotherapy and the term therapist has been used throughout to denote a 
psychotherapist or counsellor (in line with BACP’s response to the HPC 
consultation process (Aldridge, 2010)).  
(iv) A GP denotes a General Practitioner within the NHS in the UK. The Royal 
College of General Practitioners definition is that “(GPs) are best defined by 
the unique nature of the doctor-patient relationship”(www.RCGP.org.uk) 
(v) A surgery: To the dictionary definition of this as ”the place where a [GP] sees 
their patients and carries out treatment” (Chambers Dictionary, 2010), the 
researcher adds ‘and where a patient may access a variety of services which 
their GP may refer them to, including therapy’.  
(vi) “The relationship a patient has with their GP” is intended to imply not only 
singular relationships of one patient to one GP, but also recognises that a 
patient may routinely see several GPs including locums – by extension 
therefore it is a relationship a patient has with any GP and with GPs in 
general (it should be remembered that psychotherapists are also GP patients 
in their own right). When a patient walks into a consulting room to see a GP 
for the first time they are not doing so free from any expectation or 
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assumption. As Willig (2008:113) explains “from within a biomedical 
discourse, those who experience ill-health occupy the subject position of ‘the 
patient’, which locates them as the passive recipient of expert care within a 
trajectory of cure”.  
For the second study, ‘Exploring the influence of the medical model discourse on 
psychotherapists working in private practice’“, the researcher defines the key terms in 
the following way: 
(vii) Influence: is used in the sense of ‘the power of producing an effect, 
especially unobtrusively…; domination, often hidden or inexplicable;’ 
(Chambers Dictionary, 2010)  
(viii) The medical model discourse: this is intended to refer to the discourses of 
medical models used in both medicine (see above) and in psychotherapy 
(see below), where a discourse is used in the Foucauldian sense as ‘the way 
language is organized around different systems of meaning which offer 
positions of power to certain categories of people and disempower others’ 
(Parker et al, 1995:10). What is important therefore is how things are spoken 
of, who by and from what position (see also chapter one). In terms of content, 
briefly, “in its clinical mode, this dominant model of medical reasoning implies: 
diseases exist as distinct entities; that those entities are revealed through the 
inspection of “signs” and “symptoms”; that the individual patient is a more or 
less passive site of disease manifestation; that diseases are to be understood 
as categorical departures or deviations from “normality”” (Atkinson, 
1988:180). The medical model discourse in psychotherapy alternatively is 
essentially formed around an analogy, “a descriptive schema borrowed from 
the practice of medicine and superimposed on the practice of psychotherapy” 
(Elkins, 2009:67-71).  An exploration of the subtleties of these discourses 
forms a significant part of the review of literature to follow. 
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(ix) Psychotherapist: see (iii) above 
(x) Private Practice: For the purposes of this research this term refers to the 
work of a psychotherapist who is primarily self-employed i.e. not substantially 
employed as a therapist by any organisation (particularly medical) nor 
required to adhere to any ways of working other than those a) associated with 
accrediting bodies ethical frameworks or b) they have chosen for themselves.  
Having defined the terms of the research question, the researcher will now present 
the findings from the review of the relevant literature.  
 
2.2 An overview of the literature 
In conducting the literature search the researcher devised a search plan based on a 
structure recommended by the BACP (Brettle, 2008) and which used a combination 
of data sources, including (but not limited to) the on-line databases PsycINFO, 
PsycARTICLES, PsycBOOKS and on-line e-journal archives, most notably the BMJ 
Journals Collection, SAGE Journals on-line and Informaworld (Routledge). In 
addition, reference lists from relevant articles proved to be significant sources of 
leads for further reading.  
The literature review considers what has already been written about the medical 
model and its manifestations in doctor / patient and client / therapist relationships.  It 
covers five key areas and as discussed literature regarding theory, research and the 
historical development of the concept are covered in each section;  
(i) the medical model in medicine, focusing especially on primary care 
(ii) how this discourse has impacted the development of the GP/patient 
relationship (in order to consider how the power dynamics inherent in that 
relationship might be carried into psychotherapy) 
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(iii) literature detailing the history of models for understanding human distress 
(also known as psychopathology), focusing on evolving versions of the 
medical model, which includes how the doctor/ patient relationship has 
developed within the field of ‘mental health’ and how it has historically 
intersected with the practice of psychotherapy  
(iv) literature regarding medical model discourses within psychotherapy itself 
including key alternatives proposed at a meta-theoretical level, in order to 
further understand what has been written about the range of possible ways in 
which the medical model may be experienced by participants 
(v) Finally, a summary of literature which offers postmodern critiques of the 
medical model in all its guises is presented. This has been included in order 
to contextualise participants’ possible interpretations of their experiences of 
the medical model and because as we have seen in chapter one, the entire 
study is framed in terms of a perceived conflict between modern and 
postmodern approaches played out in the surgery and in the therapy room. 
2.2.1 The medical model in medicine 
This section will consider the literature concerning the medical model in medicine (or 
the biomedical model) and its relationship to science for two reasons; the first is to 
understand how patients may experience their interactions with GPs and how this 
might subsequently influence therapy; the second is that this will then contextualise 
notions of the medical model used in both in psychotherapy and in conceptions of 
human distress more broadly. 
It has become apparent during the literature search that the concept of a 
homogenous ‘medical model’ in medicine is an illusion (Atkinson; 1988, Helman; 
1994, Siegler & Osmond; 1974). In addition, whilst in the sociological and 
anthropological literature the dominant discourse surrounding ‘biomedicine’ as the 
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professional, scientific, modernist face of health care is discussed at length, there are 
also those discourses which focus on other significant elements of the social 
provision of health care. These include the ‘popular’ sector, which includes the family 
as the most primary arena for health care delivery and the ‘folk’ sector, which is 
comprised of other non-professional health care providers (Helman; 1994, Engel; 
1977, Pilgrim and Rogers, 1993). In fact Engel (1977:319) contends that “the 
biomedical model is [also] now the dominant folk model of disease in the Western 
world”. The idea that Western culture has become a “psychiatric society” is also 
noted by Handy (1987:165) and as Parker et al (1995:70) note “It no longer seems 
sensible to talk of ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ concepts as separate things since the 
distinction between them is not so much in the kinds of discourse used by speakers 
but rather the position from which they speak”.  It was therefore recognised by the 
researcher that this may add to the problematic task (in the first part of this study) of 
making a distinction between impacts on the therapeutic encounter stemming from 
the GP/patient relationship and the patient’s own internal conceptions of the practices 
of medicine and counselling, as they both may be grounded in the biomedical model. 
This idea is in fact the reason for pursuing the second part of the study which 
explores the influence of the medical model beyond the medical setting.  
Amongst those writers who focus on the dominant ‘professional’ biomedical approach 
to Western medicine, Siegler and Osmond (1974:3), suggest that” The division of 
medicine into clinical medicine, public health medicine, and what we have called 
science medicine is extremely old”. Briefly, public health medicine has as its goal “the 
prevention of disease and the promotion of health for a given population” (Siegler & 
Osmond, 1974:120), “the goal of the scientific medical model is…to acquire 
knowledge about human anatomy and physiology and about the cause, prevention 
and treatment of diseases” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:123) whilst clinical medicine is 
a practical art, the goal of which is to “treat patients for illnesses; restore them to 
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health if possible; otherwise prevent illness from getting worse. Reduce blame by 
conferring [the] sick role” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:18). The theoretical literature 
primarily considered here is that which focuses on the third of these models in terms 
of its clinical manifestations, philosophical underpinnings in science (drawing on 
ideas from the scientific medical model), and a Foucauldian genealogy of how it has 
come to exist in its current form (in terms of practice, power and knowledge).   
As referenced in the definition of terms, Atkinson’s (1988:180) definition focuses on 
this model of clinical medicine in concluding that “In its clinical mode, this dominant 
model of medical reasoning implies: diseases exist as distinct entities; that those 
entities are revealed through the inspection of “signs” and “symptoms”; that the 
individual patient is a more or less passive site of disease manifestation; that 
diseases are to be understood as categorical departures or deviations from 
“normality””. In his much referenced paper Engel (1977:322-3) adds that “The 
biomedical model...encourages by-passing the patient's verbal account by placing 
greater reliance on technical procedures and laboratory measurements”. This is also 
described by Good & Good (1981) and Helman (1994:103) who summarises that 
““Increasingly modern medicine has come to rely on diagnostic technology to collect 
and measure clinical ‘facts’”. Gordon (1988:25) goes on to note the bias inherent in 
this model towards action; “To “move” nature, one must not “think so”, one must “do 
so”, that is, manipulate it physically”. In combination, we arrive at an active, 
modernist, clinical model consisting of inspection, investigation, diagnosis, and 
treatment aimed at the cure or relief of disease or injury. 
The role of science was central to the rise of modernism (Gordon, 1988; Lupton 
1987; Parker at al, 1995) and according to Foucault (1973:197) medicine played a 
key part in the development of the necessary detachment required for the role of the 
observer / scientist. He argued that “from the integration of death into medical 
 24 
thought is born a medicine that is given as a science of the individual”. He went on to 
explain that “Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes an as object of 
science, he grasped himself within his language, and gave himself, in himself and by 
himself, a discursive existence, only in the opening created by his own elimination” 
(Foucault, 1973:196-7).  
As Heartfield (2006:23) notes “Foucault’s point is that the human sciences did not 
discover Man, as an empirical fact, waiting to be investigated. Rather, he argues, 
these very scientific discourses themselves brought Man into being“. Foucault 
therefore argues that medicine was of great importance to the constitution of the 
sciences of man, an importance that was “not only methodological, but ontological, in 
that it concerns man’s being as object of positive knowledge”. This idea also surfaces 
in Armstrong’s (1997:21) summary that the notion of the individual as a container of 
disease; “is one form in which individual identity begins to make its appearance on 
the Western stage…the deployment of the clinical gaze forms an integral part of our 
individual experience and identity”.  
This is potentially an important idea to recognise in that some later thinkers (Ahn & 
Wampold, 2001; Kihlstrom, 2002; Reznak, 1991) have suggested that scientific 
method can be appropriately used in psychotherapy without needing to align itself 
with biomedical thinking. If, however, there is something inherent in the idea of 
studying the self as object that has been derived from medicine, can scientific 
method ever escape the influence of a medical model? Is the gaze part of science? 
(The notion of the clinical gaze will be returned to in the next section as part of a 
consideration of power in the consulting and therapy rooms). 
Taylor (1985:4) also states that “behind and supporting the impetus to naturalism [or 
“science”] stands an attachment to a certain picture of the agent…It shows us as 
capable of achieving a kind of disengagement from our world by objectifying it”. Ideas 
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of how these assumptions impact the GP / patient relationship will be discussed later 
in this chapter. This idea of disengagement is echoed by Gordon (1988:32): “the 
western philosophical and scientific traditions have long assumed that detachment 
provides the purest window to truth…Thus to arrive at real knowledge we must alter 
ourselves – move back, distance ourselves from values, local bias, and particular 
interest by taking a universal standpoint, one which is disengaged from everyday life. 
Knowing then is distinct from being according to naturalism”. These distinctions are 
highly relevant in considering how doctors interact with their patients, both in terms of 
relational distance and expectations in terms of individual responsibility.  
Gordon adds that “The history of medicine is frequently understood to be a 
cumulative progression towards the unfolding of truth about nature’s diseases. The 
belief in primarily one truth, which is best captured in the neutral language of 
numbers, is strong” (Gordon, 1988:29).  Ideas about the role of numerical evidence in 
the doctor / patient interview are explored in the next section which considers the 
literature relating to the relationship between GPs and their patients.  
 
2.2.2 The GP / Patient Relationship 
For the purposes of this study the researcher is interested in understanding what has 
been written and researched about the nature of this relationship specifically in 
connection with the medical model and / or the medical discourse. Are there any 
potential impacts on the patient in terms of how they might be encouraged to be and 
act? Are there general expectations of doctors that might get carried through into a 
subsequent relationship with a counsellor? 
The researcher has therefore conducted a literature review within this definition and 
has found a combination of both theoretical writings and research studies from a 
variety of fields, most notably sociology, medical ethics and psychotherapy. There 
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appears to be some consensus around how this relationship has developed in the 
West in terms of models of interaction which are directly related to developments in 
medicine. Moore et al (2005:182) describe four models starting with the “Paternalistic 
Model [which] is essentially duty based, with the physician's role emphasizing four 
fundamental principles: beneficence, fidelity, nonmaleficence, and confidentiality”. 
This seems broadly comparable with Shorter’s (1991:29) “traditional doctor” and both 
authors suggest this model was dominant until the 1920’s and as Moore et al 
(2005:182) explain, rested on the fundamental principle of “guardianship in which the 
physician acts in what he or she judges to be the patient's best interest largely 
independent of others' input”. The patient is “expected to answer physicians' 
questions honestly and accurately and to comply with physicians' treatment 
recommendations, even if they disagree with them”. 
Moore et al (2005:182) then go on to describe the emergence of an “Expert” model 
which while encompassing the same four principles of the Paternalistic model saw 
“an emergent emphasis on physicians' education, technical knowledge, and 
professional certification”. This is paralleled by the model of the “modern doctor” 
whose new found expertise rested on developments in anatomy (Shorter, 1991). 
Interestingly, Engel (1977:320), citing Rasmussen, suggests that “the Church’s 
permission to study the human body included a tacit interdiction against 
corresponding scientific investigation of man's mind and behavior” thus helping to 
firmly establish mind body dualism in Western medicine (an idea which, it is argued 
by Fratteroli (2001), is becoming increasingly marginalised within biological 
psychiatry.) 
The next major development in the doctor /patient relationship came after world war 
two with the beginning of the widespread use of penicillin, broad spectrum antibiotics 
and drugs able to treat inflammation. For Shorter (1991:183) these postmodern 
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(chronologically speaking) doctors were “imbued with a relentless new enthusiasm 
about their ability to cure organic disease”. Roter and Hall (2006:4) note this drug 
revolution “led medicine toward a mainly organic picture of disease, as something to 
be combated with drugs. The battle lines were drawn between the doctor and the 
aberrant molecules, and the patient was often left on the sidelines. Thus the world 
saw the birth of the “biomedical” model of disease and medicine’s diminished interest 
in the patient’s experience of illness”. 
These developments, it is claimed, set in motion two key changes in the context in 
which the relationship between the doctor / patient is played out – the medical 
interview: the first was the increase in the use of biochemical tests and their 
numerical outcomes; second the reduction of the importance of history taking and 
other forms of communication (Shorter; 1991, Roter and Hall; 2006, Helman; 1994).  
The changes to the medical consultation are the subject of much analysis with all the 
authors concluding that it was at this juncture that the role of emotion and the 
therapeutic value of attention giving by the doctor were critically deemphasized, 
certainly in the UK. In his study of medical efficacy, White, as quoted by Roter and 
Hall (2006:13) maintained that “about a quarter of all benefits to be derived from 
medical care [should be] attributed to the therapeutic effect of talk”.  In decentring the 
role of communication, therefore, it is argued that significant damage was done to the 
value of the doctor / patient consultation.  Shorter (1991:252) summarises by saying 
“I am not blaming family doctors for not attempting formal psychotherapy…I am 
blaming them for ignoring the informal psychotherapeutic power of the consultation 
itself… the healing power of the consultation lies in the catharsis that the patient 
derives from telling his story to someone he trusts as a “healer””. This idea would 
seem to be supported by the literature that has concluded that there is a therapeutic 
effect created simply by a GP being seen to take a patient’s concerns seriously by 
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referring them for therapy, regardless of whether that therapy is then taken up 
(Snape et al, 2003, Munjal et al, 1994). More recent studies have confirmed the value 
not only that patients place on a trusted, consistent relationship with a GP (Fogarty, 
2001; Frederiksen, Kragstrup, Dehiholm, & Lambertsen, 2010; Shaw, Ibrahim, Reid, 
Ussher, Rowlands, 2009 and Skirbekk, Middlethon, Hjortdahl, & Finset, 2011) and 
the importance of GPs taking the time to listen and understand the meaning patients 
place on their experiences,(Jagosh, Boudreau, Steinert, MacDonald & Ingram, 2011; 
Llorca, 2009) but also the therapeutic value of doing so in terms of patient adherence 
to treatment recommendations (Stavropoulou, 2011). There are even now studies 
into the neuroscience behind the effect that the therapeutic relationship can have in 
its own right (Benedetti, 2011). But perhaps, as Frattaroli (2001:62) suggests, doctors 
are attracted to a more emotionally neutral way of working precisely because the 
“Medical Model insulates the physician from the anxiety of his own human condition. 
It emphasises the difference and the distance, between doctor and patient”. 
Roter and Hall (2006:5) consider the impacts of the changes detailed above on 
patients and conclude that they “are thought to defend themselves against feelings of 
overwhelming complexity, demoralization, and helplessness by recourse to 
idealization or denigration of the physician”. Is it possible that this form of defence 
could be carried into a psychotherapeutic relationship?  
Stein (1985:4) considers the doctor / patient relationship specifically from a 
psychoanalytic viewpoint in great depth. The role of the unconscious also appears to 
be supported by the suggestion from Goldberg and Bridges, cited by Herrington at al 
(2003:265) that “patients might be conditioned to under-report emotional distress due 
to the historical stigma of psychological problems; unlike physical problems where 
the patient feels that a pain is real. They also suggest that this may cause patients to 
unconsciously somatise their psychological problems”. Lipsitt (2005:1) argues that 
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such patients are “perhaps the most difficult challenge for the primary care physician. 
Physicians who are trained essentially in the biomedical model feel ill-equipped to 
diagnose, manage or treat these patients”. 
The relationship between a GP and their patient and in particular how GP’s might 
approach such patients was something explored in great detail by the psychoanalyst 
Michael Balint in the 1950’s and 60’s (working with his third wife, Enid, also an 
analyst). He noted that there was something about the way that a doctor’s own style 
or personality interacted with his training in medicine that resulted in the development 
of a unique but fixed way of dealing with patients peculiar to each doctor. He called 
this the “Apostolic mission or function [which] means […] that every doctor has a 
vague, but almost unshakeably firm, idea of how a patient ought to behave when ill” 
(Balint, 1964:216). Whilst his research methodology was not based on a medical 
model (using group meetings of GPs facilitated by psychiatrists) perhaps inevitably 
given his training as a biochemist, he framed his underlying question very much in 
those terms: “Our chief aim was a reasonably thorough examination of the ever 
changing doctor patient relationship, i.e. the study of the pharmacology of the drug 
"Doctor"” (Balint, 1964:4). One of the study’s conclusions was that “It was almost as if 
every doctor had revealed knowledge of what was right and what was wrong for 
patients to expect and to endure, and further, as if he had a sacred duty to convert to 
his faith all the ignorant and unbelieving among his patients” (Balint,1964:216) which 
seems to start to say something about the power relationship involved. Hinshelwood 
(1997:265) went on to undertake "a full examination of the ethics of influencing 
another human being” and examines in details the influence of medical ethics on the 
therapist / analysand relationship. He concludes that whilst there is clearly power 
involved, “there is a difference between an act of treatment upon a non-consenting 
patient that overrides his power and autonomy (a psychic act) and an interpretation 
that directly puts into his hands the wherewithal (a psychic fact) to augment his own 
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power and autonomy through being more integrated within himself. (Hinshelwood, 
1997:2523) 
Foucault, who considers how “power is embodied in the day-to-day practices of the 
medical profession within the clinic” (Turner, 1997:xiv), also seems to be saying 
something about how the medical discourse operates both consciously and 
unconsciously, verbally and preverbally: “Clinical experience – that opening up of the 
concrete individual for the first time in Western history to the language of rationality, 
that major event in the relationship of man to himself and of language to things – was 
soon taken as a simple, unconceptualized confrontation of a gaze and a face, or a 
glance and a silent body; a sort of contact prior to all discourse, free of the burdens of 
language, by which two living individuals are ‘trapped’ in a common, but non-
reciprocal situation” (Foucault, 1973:xiv-xv).   
Another commentator, Armstrong (1997:21) adds that “the deployment of the clinical 
gaze forms an integral part of our individual experience and identity” picking up on 
Foucault’s belief that, as previously mentioned, “the subject is constituted through 
discourse” (Bunton and Peterson, 1997:3). The idea that the medical discourse 
operates preverbally potentially has profound implications for therapy delivered in an 
overtly medical setting. As Burman and Parker (1993:157) note “although power is 
certainly (re)produced in discourse, power is also at work in the structural position of 
people when they are not speaking. Power relations endure when the text stops”. 
In an attempt to understand the power of the doctor Siegler & Osmond (1974) 
develop the notion of “Aesculapian authority” which is a term they ascribe to 
Paterson (1957) which refers to a particular kind of authority he argued to be 
possessed by someone perceived as a doctor. This authority is seen to have three 
components; sapiential authority which “means the right to be heard by reason of 
knowledge or expertness. Such authority resides in the person and not in any 
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position that he may occupy” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:93); moral authority, which is 
understood as “the right to control and direct by reason of the rightness and 
goodness according to the ethos of the enterprise” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:94); and 
“charismatic authority, the right to control and direct by reason of God-given 
grace…In Western culture the charismatic element in medicine has to do with the 
possibility of death and with the impossibility of fully assessing the doctor’s 
knowledge” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:9). The notion of Aesculapian authority seems 
to combine elements of both the ‘expert’ and ‘traditional’ doctor already described - 
and it’s “clumsy, careless or even downright inept use” is argued to be at the heart of 
“many of the current dissatisfactions expressed by patients regarding their doctors” 
(Siegler & Osmond, 174-5). It is argued by Koch & Jones (2010:371) that the 
difficulty of balancing the professional tradition for emotional distance with a level of 
personal engagement in order to be effective may contribute to “early physician 
burnout”. 
Whilst the power might all seem to be in the hands (or the gaze) of the GP, Truog 
(2012) argues that recent decades have seen a general increase in empowerment of 
people generally including specifically the emergence of the concept of patients’ 
rights. In one study by Pilgrim et al (1997), cited in Herrington et al (2003:265) they 
noted that “Some individuals visit their GP with a formulation of their problems and 
actively request specific help – the autonomous patient” – however, as can be seen 
by the sheer range of influences on whether the GP then refers the patient cited in 
this paper (which usefully summarises all the literature on GP referral), the patient 
only has the power to ask – whether they receive remains in the power of the GP.  
An alternative view can maybe be seen in the conclusions of a survey of counsellors 
conducted by Aubrey et al. (1997: Conclusion) which included their opinions on 
patients’ suitability for counselling. The most common reasons cited for unsuitability 
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were: “motivation for therapy, motivation for change and psychopathology”, 
suggesting that some patients are “sent” for counselling rather than asking for it. 
By focusing on the biochemical at the expense of communication, Shorter (1991:217) 
argues that the doctor is more likely to miss “apparently ‘trivial’ symptoms [which] are 
often just an excuse allowing the patient to gain his composure in the doctor’s office 
in order to talk about the real underlying problem, which is often psychological”-  the 
fact that this change has also been accompanied by a perceived increase in the time 
pressure on the doctor / patient interview is noted by Helman, 1994, Shorter, 1991 
and Roter and Hall, 2006.  As Siegler & Osmond (1974:200) summarise when 
considering Paterson’s (1957) ideas “the “art of doctoring” and the “techne of 
medicine” are the warp and woof of the medical fabric” and the doctor’s ability to 
weave the two is critical to the success of the medical interview. 
In considering further the literature regarding Foucault’s notion of the clinical gaze it 
is highly relevant to this study in two ways. The first is the idea that as Armstrong 
(1997:21) summarises “The gaze has been identified by a number of different writers 
as representing the process through which specific social objects, namely disease 
categories, come into existence”. Further, it is seen as “a means of bringing into 
being the subjects ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’’” (Lupton, 1987:99).  
As Rabinow (1994:xii) noted, Foucault “sought to work at the nexus where the history 
of practices met the history of concepts”. He therefore placed great importance on 
the physical location of social practices in their specific institutions – in his 
deconstruction of the archaeology of medical perception in “The Birth of the Clinic” 
(1973:89) Foucault notes that during the eighteenth century “the medical gaze was… 
organized in a new way. First, it was no longer the gaze of any observer, but that of a 
doctor supported and justified by an institution, that of a doctor endowed with the 
power of decision and intervention”. The gaze, therefore, is “both a literal description 
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of social practices and a metaphor for the monitoring and surveillance of subjects 
undertaken by state apparatus” (Leonard, 1997:43). 
This signals the second aspect of the gaze relevant to this study which concerns 
power: “Foucault saw power as a relationship which was localised, dispersed, 
diffused and typically distinguished through the social system, operating at a micro, 
local and covert level through sets of specific practices.” (Turner, 1997:xi-xii). 
Foucault’s’ ideas on power and knowledge (which he sees as “inseparable” (White 
and Epston, 1990:21)) are central to his observations on the medical discourse. He 
sees power as being ‘constitutive’ – that it has a “role in “making-up” persons lives” 
and that “rather than proposing that this form of power (power through truth) 
represses, Foucault argues that it subjugates. It forges persons as “docile bodies””. It 
is made clear that this is not an intentional subjugation on the part of power hungry 
medics, but an effect of us all operating in the world of available discourses.  
From his work in charting the history of the development of the practices of medicine 
and psychiatry, it emerges that “power as it operates in the medical encounter is a 
disciplinary power that provides guidelines about how patients should understand, 
regulate and experience their bodies” (Lupton, 1987:99). Foucauldian scholars 
contend that “society is medicalised in a profound way, serving to monitor and 
administer the bodies of citizens in an effort to regulate and maintain social order as 
well as promoting good health and productivity” (Lupton, 1987:100). Foucault’s work 
potentially tells us, therefore, about the power relationships that may exist in the 
modern equivalent of ‘the clinic’ - GP surgeries and other NHS structures - and how 
as a result subjects may be constituted. 
In the same vein as the calls for an evolution in the medical model (more of which 
later), the literature which considers the doctor / patient relationship includes a variety 
of suggestions or hopes for its future development, with various models being 
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proposed, from the mutuality model in which “each participant brings strengths and 
resources to the relationship on a relatively even footing” (Roter and Hall, 2006:27) to 
Moore et als’ (2005:186) partnership model which “emphasizes the physician's 
interpersonal skills, including empathy and patient education”, also echoed by Aziz, 
(2009). 
So, having gained this view of the current state of the doctor / patient relationship in 
primary care as it relates to the development of the medical model in medicine, what 
research is out there about how this might impact the counselling relationship? 
The researcher has located two studies that have considered either client 
expectations of counselling in primary care or the potential impact of the GP / Patient 
relationship on counselling. The first of these is a qualitative piece of research 
conducted by Lambert (2007) entitled “Client perspectives on counselling: Before, 
during and after”. Three of her eight participants were accessing counselling in a 
primary care setting. Whilst she explored expectations and influences on how clients 
perceived counselling there was no mention of any potential impact of the GP / 
patient relationship or the medical model more broadly – and whilst at least two of the 
participants expressed a desire to be asked more direct questions by their 
counsellor, this was interpreted as being an “indication of researcher influence on 
expectation” (Lambert, 2007:109). (This was somewhat understandable as the 
participant used the research interview as an example but there is no exploration or 
wondering about why the participant had that preference.) 
The most pertinent research found, however, was conducted by Cocksedge and May 
(2006:133-135) who have researched the “role of general practitioners in the referral 
process” to counselling in primary care.  They usefully discuss the different ways in 
which GPs perceive their motivations in this process from which it might be possible 
to deduce a range of expectations of both counsellors and counselling that might be 
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generated in their patients; “Motives reported in making a referral to a counsellor 
included giving patients the best possible care, sharing the load, offering a few weeks 
breathing space to both GP and patient for things to ‘sort themselves out’ 2-84, 
easing a long term burden, and self-preservation, though the words ‘off-loading’ and 
‘dumping’ were mentioned in a couple of interviews”. Potentially most significantly, 
several of the GP participants expressed a concern that their patients might feel 
rejected by them in being referred to counselling (as Foucault might put it that the 
patient’s subjectivity had been threatened by rejection by ‘the gaze’) – as one of them 
summarized: “So I do find myself hoping they’re not going to be offended when I’m 
going to send them. I try not to let them feel rejected and I go a bit over the top about 
how brilliant they [counsellors] are 22-101”.  This interestingly raises the notion that 
GPs may be concerned that their relationship with their patient may be damaged by a 
referral to a counsellor; in fact their research concluded that “On-going GP patient 
relationships were mostly not thought to be endangered in any way by these 
referrals, and might even be strengthened”. Perhaps as Balint (1964:231) suggested, 
however “Reassurance is much too often administered for the benefit of the doctor, 
who cannot bear the burden of either not knowing enough or of being unable to help”. 
 
Having now understood something of the literature relating to the clinical medical 
model in medicine and how this might impact the doctor/patient relationship and 
subsequently a counsellor/client relationship, the next section considers the literature 
which specifically relates to the medical model in terms of understanding human 
distress. We have seen that the medical model in physical medicine has potentially 
direct repercussions for counselling and so it is possible that it has an equal if not 
greater impact in terms of how it has developed in explaining human distress (i.e. for 
issues of ‘mental health’ or psychopathology). Within this review of literature the 
researcher has also endeavoured to highlight what has been written about the 
development of the role of the doctor in dealing with human distress (as GP, 
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psychiatrist and eventually therapist/analyst) as it is probable that these subjects play 
a significant role in influencing therapists working in any setting. 
 
2.2.3 Literature concerning discourses of the medical model in conceptions of 
human distress 
How do GPs and psychiatrists view issues of mental health? Where have those ideas 
come from and how might they influence both how doctors relate to their own 
patients and how they might view the involvement of a therapist in the ‘treatment’ of 
that patient? There are a number of writers who have given their attention to 
discussing the different conceptions of human distress in terms of both their 
theoretical bases and how society has organised itself in response in terms of 
institutions and practices (most notably Abma, 2004; Bentall, 2004, 2011; Foucault, 
1967, 1973; Parker et al (1995); Siegler and Osmond (1974) and Shorter, 1997). In 
terms of theory, this field is also known as psychopathology - as Maddux et al 
(2008:3) clarify  “conceptions of psychopathology do not try to explain the 
psychological phenomena that are considered pathological but instead tells us which 
psychological phenomena are considered pathological and thus need to be 
explained.” The very term psychopathology can be argued to stem from the medical 
model and so as “we live in a culture linguistically dominated by medical models” 
(Boyle, 2006:193) the researcher has chosen, in the spirit of Foucault, to use the 
term ‘conceptions of human distress’ as representing terminology from a less 
dominant discourse and as an attempt to keep in view that the medical model is one 
of several competing discourses. 
This section therefore considers the literature relating to medical model conceptions 
of human distress in terms of a brief overview of their history (as required by the 
chosen methodology in order to give a sense of how particular discourses have 
emerged) including how the relationship between doctor and patient has developed 
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and been used, and a consideration of the core philosophical assumptions of such 
conceptions, because as Maddux et al (2008:11) put it, “we have to stop struggling to 
develop a scientific conception of psychopathology and attempt instead to try to 
understand the struggle itself – why it occurs and what it means”. This is relevant to 
this study because the researcher will be asking participants about how they 
experience the medical model in their work and it may be important to locate those 
experiences in terms of the assumptions that they, or those they interact with, are 
making about how they see their clients/patients. 
According to Siegler and Osmond (1974) and as summarized by Kihlstrom 
(2002:281) “the history of psychology can be traced in terms of three major models of 
psychopathology. The supernatural model [which] prevailed before the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment …the moral model which prevailed in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries …[and the] medical model which began to emerge in the 
nineteenth century”. 
The first of these “assumes that psychology reflects the possession of the individual 
by demons; by implication, the proper response to psychopathology is exorcism.” 
(Kihlstrom, 2002:281). Rather than seeing conceptions of human distress as “social 
constructions that inevitably reflect the wider social ideologies of the day” (Joseph, 
2007:429) Shorter appears to re-interpret the past from a modernist, medical model 
standpoint; “human society has always known psychiatric illness, and has always 
had ways of coping with it” (Shorter, 1997:1).  He details a richer picture of a less 
homogenous approach to human distress prior to the eighteenth century and 
highlights the differences in arrangements between urban and rural areas: “the urban 
world has always had to confront the problem of the homeless psychotic or 
demented individuals and cities have organised institutions to accommodate them”, 
(Shorter, 1997:4) whereas rurally families were generally required to look after their 
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disturbed relatives. Foucault (1967:59) also notes that “Confinement was an 
institutional creation peculiar to the seventeenth century [and]…in the history of 
unreason it marked a decisive event: the moment when madness was perceived on 
the social horizon of poverty, of incapacity for work, of inability to integrate with the 
group; the moment when madness began to rank among the problems of the city”.  
Foucault focused on the concept of unreason as “For classical man, madness was 
not the natural condition, the human and psychological root of unreason; it was only 
unreason’s empirical form; and the madman…disclosed that underlying realm of 
unreason which threatens man and envelops…all the forms of his natural existence” 
(Foucault, 1967:78). For Foucault, unreason, prior to the eighteenth century formed a 
distinct conception of human distress. 
Siegler & Osmond’s (1974) moral model of the mid to late eighteenth century 
“assumes that psychopathology - or, more precisely, abnormal behavior- is 
deliberately adopted by the individual, much in the manner of criminal behavior; by 
implication, the proper response…is confinement and other forms of 
punishment.”(Kihlstrom, 2002:281). From the literature it appears that doctors 
became involved in asylum regimes around the end of the eighteenth century – 
Foucault (1967:238) notes that “until the end of the eighteenth century, the world of 
madmen was peopled only by the abstract, faceless power which kept them 
confined; within these limits it was empty, empty of all that was not madness itself…”  
It is around this time, the end of the eighteenth century, that the literature indicates 
the emergence of the first use of an early type of psychotherapy. Shorter (1997:8) 
comments that “it was not the notion that madness was curable that changed at the 
end of the eighteenth century… rather it was the notion that institutions themselves 
could be made curative…” Asylums were re-organised at this point and according to 
Shorter (1997:18) “The founders envisioned two aspects of life in an asylum as 
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therapeutic – the setting itself with its orderly routines and communal spirit, and the 
doctor-patient relationship. A particular form of this relationship was often called 
“moral therapy”” (emphasis added). He goes on to argue that “Physicians began 
using techniques related neither to the giving of medication nor to physical 
procedures. This was the advent of psychotherapy; the formal use of the doctor-
patient relationship to restore patients” (Shorter, 1997:19), perhaps giving 
psychotherapy a unique definition and with it, an existence permanently framed by 
the medical model.  
Supporting this view Abma (2004:96) also states that “Moral treatment consisted of a 
deliberate system of persuasion and influence, centered around the moral authority 
of the doctor”. It is important to note the emphasis here on the moral authority of the 
doctor – as Foucault (1967:257) also highlights, “the doctors intervention is not made 
by virtue of a medical skill or power that he possesses in himself and that would be 
justified by a body of objective knowledge. It is not as a scientist that homo medicus 
has authority in the asylum, but as a wise man”. This seems to be drawing upon the 
notion of Paterson’s (1957) Aesculapian authority as previously discussed, and this 
will be returned to in the next section when considering how elements of medical 
model thinking have been applied to psychotherapy. 
According to Foucault (1967), Samuel Tuke was a key figure in the development of 
the asylums and it was under his auspices that the role and symbolic structure of the 
family assumed a great importance (which can be argued is still seen today) – “In the 
great reorganisation of relations between madness and reason, the family, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, played a decisive part – simultaneously imaginary 
landscape and real social structure…The entire existence of madness…was 
enveloped in what we may call, in anticipation, a “parental complex”” (Foucault,  
1967:240). This was reinforced in his view by the fact that asylum inmates were 
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regarded legally as minors. He goes on to highlight that in the asylum setting, “Tuke, 
precisely reconstitutes around madness a simulated family which is an institutional 
parody but a real psychological situation. Where the family is inadequate, he 
substitutes for it a fictitious family décor of signs and attitudes” Foucault (1967:239). 
The role of the doctor, “…the medical personage…had to act not as the result of an 
objective definition of the disease or a specific classifying diagnosis, but by relying 
upon that prestige which envelops the secrets of the Family, of Authority, of 
Punishment, and of Love” (Foucault, 1967:259). He later argues that Freud “exploited 
the structure that enveloped the medical personage” (Foucault, 1967:263), where 
“the madman remains a minor, and for a long time reason will retain for him the 
aspect of the Father” (Foucault, 1967:241). In this analysis Foucault highlights the 
purposeful introduction of the symbolic structure of the family as a therapeutic frame 
into the asylum system which was then inherited by psychoanalysis and arguably 
psychotherapy more broadly. 
According to Abma (2004), Siegler & Osmond (1974), Parker et al (1995) and 
Foucault (1969) in the nineteenth century “medicine (as an institution possessing its 
own rules, as a group of individuals constituting the medical profession, as a body of 
knowledge and practice, as an authority recognised by public opinion, the law and 
government), became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, 
named and established madness as an object” (Foucault, 1969:46). As Parker et al 
(1995:13) summarise, “the case of the mad as pitiable mentally ill persons needing 
care and rehabilitation began as the Modern Age, or modernity – the representation 
of the world as organised by meta-narratives of humanized science, progress and 
individual meaning – came into being”.  
For Foucault (1967:188), it was “When…this great experience of unreason…was 
dissociated, when madness…was nothing more than disease…it is precisely here 
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that psychology was born – not as the truth of madness, but as a sign that madness 
was now detached from its truth which was unreason…”. 
Staying with the literature which details the history of the development of the medical 
model’s use in the field of human distress, under a broad title of the ‘first biological 
psychiatry’ Shorter (1997:28) summarises theories that favoured a biological 
explanation for human distress, from Reil’s notion of “irritable nerve fibers” in the 
brain to phrenology and beyond and is untroubled by their eventual abandonment – 
“no matter. What is important is that these early psychiatrists had some gut sense of 
organicity in the afflictions of their patients”. He also hails the prescience of these 
early pioneers in anticipating the role of heredity in understanding mental illness.  
Those writers who focused on the social and environmental context of human 
distress were retrospectively grouped under the label of “romantic psychiatry” 
according to Shorter (1997:29) & he characterises a tension between the 
Enlightenment focus on reason and the Romantic Movement’s focus in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century on feeling and sentiment. “Their underlying 
premise was that social circumstances…not biology, governed passion, and that 
strict adherence to moral precepts was required for the control of these passions” 
(Shorter, 1997:30). This marks a fundamental distinction in psychiatry to which we 
shall return when considering literature regarding the underlying philosophy of such 
models – a distinction which remains contested to the present day and as such may 
be experienced by therapists working in any setting. 
From the period 1880-1920 all the writers detail the growth in sanatoria across 
Europe in response to the need to treat what became known as “nervous disorders” 
(Abma, 2004:100) “such as anxiety, neurotic depression, and obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour” (Shorter, 1997:22) which largely “did not belong to psychiatry. They were 
assigned to family medicine or to one of the organic specialities such as neurology 
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(Shorter, 1997:22). Abma (2004:102) argues that psychiatrists sought to “bridge this 
divide…To this end they introduced [the] concept… of prevention. Assuming that 
untreated neurosis would degenerate into psychosis, psychiatrists reasoned that 
moral treatment had failed because insanity reached a chronic state before 
psychiatrists saw it. Hence in the name of prevention they claimed jurisdiction over 
the diagnosis and treatment of neurosis”. At this point it is interesting to note that, 
according to Abma (2004:101), “both neurologists and “mental healers” […] implicitly 
counted on the same principle employed by asylum doctors in moral treatment, that 
is, the beneficial psychological influence of the authority of the physician”. 
Abma (2004:105) summarises that this formed the backdrop to Freud’s work – 
educated as a neurologist he became convinced that “that these neurotic symptoms 
had mental causes. This was the starting point for a whole new way of theorizing 
about mental illnesses; they stemmed from repressed thoughts, memories and 
impulses, hidden in the unconscious”. Abma also makes the same point as Foucault 
in highlighting how Freud inherited the asylum tradition; “By acting as a substitute 
parent, the doctor would induce the process of “transference”, by which the patient 
subjected himself emotionally to the psychoanalyst, a procedure which was 
reminiscent of the way asylum and sanatorium doctors tried to exert moral authority 
over their patients” (Abma, 2004:105). As we have seen earlier in this chapter there 
are writers such as Stein (1985) who explore how far such processes are still in 
evidence today between both doctors and therapists and their patients/clients. 
Shorter (1997:145) characterises psychoanalysis as simply creating a “hiatus” in the 
glorious history of biological psychiatry which was “interrupted by half a century of 
divorcing brain from mind with the dominance of Freud’s theories” (Shorter, 1997:viii) 
with his overall view being that “If there is one central intellectual reality at the end of 
the twentieth century, it is that the biological approach to psychiatry – treating mental 
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illness as a genetically influenced disorder of brain chemistry – has been a smashing 
success” (Shorter, 1997:vii). This is a view which plenty of writers have disputed 
including Breggin (1993) in his critique of psychiatry in the USA and perhaps most 
notably Bentall (2010:1) who said that  “Far from being a success, there is compelling 
evidence that the biological approach has been a lamentable failure”. For Shorter, it 
was “Kraepelin, not Freud, who is the central figure in the history of psychiatry” 
(1997:100) and whose work created the basis for the shift from seeing psychiatric 
“illness vertically rather than cross-sectionally: trying to understand the patient’s 
problems of a given moment in the context of his or her lifetime history, in contrast to 
the biological approach” (1997:99). Freud’s work is dismissed by Shorter (1997:100) 
as being “based on intuitive leaps of fantasy [which] did not stand the test of time”. As 
Siegler (2005:160) has noted “many critics pin both Freud and psychoanalysis to 
one, usually very early, position and then mistakenly think that they have captured 
the essence of the discipline” and perhaps this is the case here - the view from 
psychoanalysis is discussed in more depth in the next section which considers 
literature on the medical model specifically in psychotherapy. 
The reference to what might be loosely termed a genealogical approach is similar to 
what is being attempted here - as Hook summarises (2001:37) “Foucault's 
conceptualization of discourse indispensably requires the role of historical 
contextualization; discourse analysis only finds its real usefulness within the agenda 
of a 'history of systems of thought' (Foucault, 1977)”. This section of the review of the 
literature is therefore attempting to detail such a history of the development of the 
medical model in human distress in order to provide the backdrop to present day 
discourses which counsellors and psychotherapists may experience in their work 
(whether in a modern day ‘clinic’ such as a GP surgery or in private practice). As 
Illich (1976:172) puts it “All disease is a socially created reality. Its meaning and the 
response it has evoked have a history. The study of this history will make us 
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understand the degree to which we are prisoners of the medical ideology in which we 
were brought up”.  
In terms of the next phase of historical development, therefore, Abma (2004) frames 
the twentieth century in terms of three main conceptions of human distress coinciding 
with particular, if overlapping, periods in history. The first of these was the mental 
hygiene movement (1914-1940) “After the First World War…problems of adjustment, 
deviance and illness were increasingly subsumed under the banner of mental 
hygiene… it signified optimism within psychiatry that all forms of disorder…could be 
cured or managed by scientifically supported therapeutic interventions” (Abma, 
2004:110) – he also suggests that psychoanalysis and behaviourism were in 
competition with each other during the 1920’s and 30’s, whose “tenets, implying a 
certain plasticity of human nature, created the possibility of non-residential treatment, 
which in turn enhance therapeutic optimism. As a result of all this, psychiatric 
medicine was freed of its dependence on disease and fired with a new ambition to 
intervene in the lives of the healthy” (Abma, 2004:110). No longer dependent on the 
notion of physical disease, perhaps at this time as Illich (1976: 172-3) suggests 
human distress’, “status as a 'sickness' depends entirely on psychiatric judgement”. 
Abma suggests that it was around this time that a new framework emerged, “that of a 
continuum ranging from the normal to the pathological” (Abma, 2004:110), rather 
than distress being categorised in the more black and white fashion of disease or 
health. At one end of this continuum lies the increasing prevalence of the use during 
the 1930’s of psychosurgery (e.g. prefrontal lobotomy) which seems to be quite 
clearly about biology and it is clear that in reality there is a melting pot of ideas in 
currency at this time.  
The second key phase of the twentieth century saw the dominant theory of distress 
move away from biology. This period termed “Adjustment (c1930-1960)” by Abma 
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(2004:111), saw the field needing to account for the experiences of otherwise healthy 
soldiers and officers who fell prey to a range of symptoms arising from their roles in 
the Second World War. Such experiences came to be seen as “a normal response to 
an abnormal environment” and that such interpretations “pushed the general 
orientation of clinical professionals in decidedly social directions” (Abma, 2004:111). 
Following the war, it is contended that the general population in Western cultures 
“sought therapeutic assistance more insistently than ever before, and by 1960 mental 
illness had become a subject of great interest to the general public…as a result, the 
idea of “psychotherapy for the normal” became widely accepted” (Abma, 2004:113). 
The non-medical model method of counselling developed by Rogers in the 1940’s 
fitted well with this new demand – “Rogers’ method brought about a decisive shift of 
emphasis, from an exclusive concern with the pathological to a focus on ordinary 
unhappiness and alienation” (Abma, 2004:114) – his approach also heralded “a more 
democratic relationship between professional and client” (Abma, 2004:122). 
This period also saw the rise of behaviourism which Abma (2004:114) summarises 
as “presupposing that all behaviour was learned through reinforced stimulus-
response associations, behaviourists claimed that this included behaviour associated 
with mental illness, and that it could also be unlearned, given the appropriate 
methods.” He argues that Eysenck and his team explicitly set out to oppose 
“psychoanalysis with all the methods at their disposal. Apart from claiming a greater 
effectiveness for behaviour therapy, the bottom line for Eysenck was always the 
scientific superiority of behaviourism”. Whilst he argues that the increasing 
prevalence of both person-centred counselling and behaviour therapies “eventually 
contribute[d] to the decline of psychoanalysis in its classic form. Nevertheless, the 
proponents of these new therapies agreed with the psychoanalytic view that mental 
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problems have psychological causes rather than biological ones… (Abma, 
2004:117). 
The third twentieth century period elucidated by Abma (2004, 117-8) is termed 
“Radicalism (c1960-1980), in which “Alternative interpretations of mental illness, such 
as anti-psychiatry, joined forces with the anti-establishment battle of the 
counterculture…”. He explains the important contributions of Szasz (1960) in the US 
and Laing in the UK both of whom argue that the origins of human distress do not lie 
in chemistry or biology but argue instead that “mental illness is a myth, whose 
function it is to disguise and thus render more palatable the bitter pill of moral 
conflicts in human relations” (Szasz, 1960:118) and that “just as Kierekgaard 
remarked that one will never find consciousness by looking down a microscope at 
brain cells…so one will never find persons by studying persons as though they were 
only objects” (Laing, 1967:20). As Illich (1976:172) summarises, writers such as 
“Liefer, Goffman, Szasz and Laing, and others are all interested in the political 
genesis of mental illness and its use for political purposes.” 
During this period, in 1964, frustrated by her experience of working in a mental health 
center in America, Siegler and her colleague Osmond set out to try to identify the 
variety of conceptions of human distress currently in operation amongst the disparate 
group of professionals with whom they were working.  After identifying eight distinct 
‘models of madness’ they concluded that “what we have in psychiatry is worse [than 
the Tower of Babel]: each person uses a hodgepodge of bits and pieces of ideas, 
theories, notions and ideologies in order to engage in a supposedly common 
enterprise with others similarly confused” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:11). They 
describe each of these models in terms of a number of distinct characteristics such 
as how each one approached defining what the issue is for the client/patient, any 
notion of aetiology, approaches to treatment etc. Of the eight models they identified 
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only three involved any form of psychotherapy (the psychoanalytic, psychedelic and 
family interaction models). Significantly they recognised, however, that “Our 
classification system implies that all the models are equal, but in fact there is one 
model which is more equal than the others; this is the medical model” (Siegler & 
Osmond, 1974:19).  
Shorter’s (1997) exhaustive history of psychiatry fully describes developments in 
psychopharmacology in the twentieth century and he concludes, fully endorsing a 
biomedical model of distress that “In two hundred years’ time, psychiatrists had 
progressed from being the healers of the therapeutic asylum to serving as 
gatekeepers for Prozac. Psychiatric illness had passed from a feared sign of bad 
blood – a genetic curse – to an easily treatable condition not essentially different from 
any other medical problem…” (Shorter, 1997:325). He appears, however, to be 
contradictory in his statements about the role of the doctor-patient relationship – on 
the one hand he (1997:314)  says “There is no doubt that psychotherapy helped 
patients feel more comfortable with their psychiatrists…yet lifting symptoms rather 
than cultivating a sympathetic rapport in the office remained the ultimate therapeutic 
objective” but then goes on to claim a more significant role for therapy: “…patients 
began to view physicians as mere conduits to fabled new products rather than as 
counsellors capable of using the doctor-patient relationship itself therapeutically”. He 
is of the firm belief, however, that it is the specific nature of the role of physician 
which carries the therapeutic impact – “…the history of medicine suggests that 
patients derive some kind of bonus from the knowledge that they are dealing with a 
physician” (Shorter, 1997:327). Shorter’s version of psychotherapy, however, 
appears to consist only of the reliance on this Aesculapian authority. Quoting an 
observer he states ““Human suffering responds to the spoken word rendered by 
compassionate persons cast in the role of healer” (Shorter, 1997:327). 
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The researcher has now considered the literature regarding the historical 
development of the medical model conception of human distress in order to help 
locate current discourses which may emerge in the empirical research. One of the 
key features of this history has been the waxing and waning of the popularity of 
biological explanations of human distress and in general, a real lack of consistency 
amongst the various writers considered as to exactly what justifies the label of 
medical model – is it just the involvement of a doctor or also the assumption of 
organicism? The way terms like disorder, illness and mental defect are used almost 
interchangeably makes it very difficult to discern such distinctions. As it will be 
important for the researcher to understand when the medical model is being spoken 
of they will now briefly review the literature which may help elucidate this question. 
According to Engel (1977:318-9), who considers the biomedical models’ underlying 
epistemological and ontological assumptions as they relate to psychopathology; “The 
dominant model of disease today is biomedical, with molecular biology its basic 
scientific discipline...It …not only requires that disease be dealt with as an entity 
independent of social behaviour, it also demands that behavioural aberrations be 
explained on the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological) 
processes. Thus the biomedical model embraces both reductionism, the philosophic 
view that complex phenomena are ultimately derived from a single primary principle, 
and mind-body dualism, the doctrine that separates the mental from the somatic”. He 
therefore called for a new biomedical model, suggesting the need for a bio-
psychosocial model, arguing that “…while the medical model constitutes a sound 
framework within which to understand and treat disease, it is not relevant to the 
behavioral and psychological problems classically deemed the domain of psychiatry” 
(Engel, 1977:318). He discusses that such an approach would benefit all branches of 
medicine (perhaps in their clinical aspects), not just psychiatry and suggests that the 
biomedical model has become a dogma: “Biomedical dogma requires that all 
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disease, including “mental" disease, be conceptualized in terms of derangement of 
underlying physical mechanisms” (Engel, 1977:320).  
So whilst Engel sees the medical model as somatogenic (meaning “originating or 
developing from the body” [Chambers, 2010]), Kihlstrom (2002:280-1) suggests that 
the “common association of the medical model with somatogenic theories and 
biological treatments reflects a deep misunderstanding” and that “the medical model 
assumes only that psychopathology is the product of natural causes that can be 
identified by the techniques of empirical science” [original emphasis]. He goes on to 
describe a psychogenic explanation for psychopathology (meaning “originating in the 
mind” [Chambers, 2010]) which he links to cognitive and behaviour therapy. Using 
such an explanation, he suggests that ‘natural causes’ are implied to result in 
“underlying mental abnormalities - disorders of cognitive, emotional, and motivational 
function that underlie the abnormalities of experience, thought, and action that 
present themselves as palpable signs and symptoms of mental illness” (Kihlstrom, 
2002:293). Without any account of how such abnormalities result from ‘natural’ 
psychogenic causes (as opposed to either biological or presumably man-made, 
cultural or environmental causes) this argument appears to remain incomplete. 
Underlying Kihlstrom’s argument is an assumption that somatogenic and 
psychogenic models refer to something qualitatively different in terms of what causes 
human distress – i.e. there is an inherent assumption of Cartesian dualism 
(introduced in chapter one) or as Reznak (1991:73) puts it “the Dualist Fallacy – the 
fallacy of assuming that the mind is not identical to any physical thing (the brain 
included)”. Fratteroli (2001:18) disagrees that Cartesian dualism is a fallacy or error – 
“based on my experience of the psychotherapeutic process, I am convinced that the 
mind-body problem is inherent in human nature. We may experience it either as an 
inner moral conflict or as self-alienation, but both elements are always present to 
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some degree”. He argues that the doctrine of scientific materialism that Reznak 
espouses “makes it all too easy to persuade ourselves that there is no mind-body 
problem, no inner conflict or self-alienation, and therefore no need to examine the 
inner life of the soul in psychotherapy (Fratteroli, 2001:20). He contends instead that 
whilst brain processes are a “necessary condition” for human experience or soul this 
is similar to the way that soil is a necessary condition for a tree – they are not 
“sufficient cause” (Fratteroli, 2001:8). Bentall (2011:169) goes further to challenge 
“the false dichotomy between biological and psychological approaches, pointing out, 
for example, that adverse early life experiences can lead to profound changes in 
brain structure and functioning”. 
Whilst Parker et al (2005:15) argue that “The keystone of the medical model and of 
psychiatric practice is that there is an organic foundation to the distress people 
sometimes experience”, they go on to suggest that “…we need have no trouble 
accepting that biological processes inform the sense we make of the world if we hold 
firm to the idea that human beings attribute meanings to those biological changes 
and if we always attend to patterns of power that structure what we are allowed to 
attribute to what.” For those involved with working with those in distress the critical 
question still remains, however, as to how far biological processes (whether from 
mind or body) underlie their experience - should we be pursuing biochemical causes 
and treatments as well as seeking to highlight the social construction of meaning? 
(as introduced in chapter one). It will be important for the researcher to potentially 
locate where participants sit in terms of this fundamental question in order to 
understand which discourses are being invoked. 
So, it would appear from the literature that medical model conceptions of human 
distress not only include that which might be described as biological psychiatry i.e. 
“treating mental illness as a genetically influenced disorder of brain chemistry” 
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(Shorter, 1997:vii) but also the stripped down version elaborated by Kihlstrom 
(2002:281) which he argues is “centered on particular rules regulating two primary 
social roles: the doctor and the patient”. He suggests that it is the notion of 
“Aesculapian authority” (as described by Siegler & Osmond (1974) already 
referenced in section 2.2.2), which forms the basis of the medical model of human 
distress. There are five key components to the doctors’ role in this – through the use 
of his authority; (i) to investigate the disorder presented, (ii) to make a diagnosis (iii) 
to inform the patient of their findings, (iv) to absolve the patient from blame and finally 
(v) to “create the conditions for the afflicted person to return to health and his or her 
proper role in society” (Kihlstrom, 2002:282).  
Having now considered the literature regarding the medical model in medicine, how 
medical models of human distress have developed and how both of these have 
influenced the evolution of the doctor/patient relationship, the researcher will now 
turn to a review of the literature which details how the medical model has been 
applied in psychotherapy. 
2.2.4 Literature re the discourse of the medical model in psychotherapy 
Interestingly the researcher has been unable to find any research studies which have 
explored how therapists perceive their work in relation to any definition of a medical 
model. This section will therefore consider the theoretical literature as it relates to 
different conceptions of the medical model in psychotherapy and the primary 
alternatives suggested at what Sparks, Duncan and Miller (2008:454) have termed a 
“metatheoretical”, non-modality specific level (those arguably offering an alternative 
meta-narrative to that of medicine). This will help the researcher understand how 
participants may bring a medical model influence to bear internally on their practice in 
addition to how they experience it externally. Some modality specific examples will 
be used to illustrate how these difference conceptions of the medical model are used 
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in practice, (but space precludes this being an exhaustive review of literature per 
modality). 
The first point of interest noted by several writers (Boyle, 2006; Elkins, 2009; 
Wampold et al, 2001) is that the medical model, as the dominant cultural discourse, 
is very hard to not only confront but to even see in the first place – ““…for more than 
a century we have become so accustomed to describing psychotherapy in medical 
model terms that it is difficult, if not impossible, to remove the medical model “grid” to 
see the process of psychotherapy as it actually is” (Elkins, 2009:71). Boyle 
(2006:191) also notes “the extraordinary psychological and social power of medical 
models, and therefore the great difficulty of persuading people to listen to, 
understand, and accept alternatives”. Boyle goes on to suggest that one of the 
reasons that the medical models have such power is that “they borrow credibility from 
the prestigious languages of science and medicine and receive strong support from 
the pharmaceutical industry” (Boyle 2006:199). It is clear that some writers are loathe 
to relinquish such power - in discussing what he sees as an alternative model, 
Wampold (2001:2) is at pains to not only retain claims to scientific credibility but to 
use science to disprove the medical model – “the scientific evidence shows that 
psychotherapy is incompatible with the medical model and that conceptualizing 
psychotherapy in this way distorts the nature of the endeavour”. As noted earlier in 
this chapter, the researcher wonders how far it is possible to truly divorce science 
from the medical model given the embedded nature of the observers ‘gaze’ in 
science.  
In the relevant literature there are several writers who have suggested that the 
medical model in psychotherapy is essentially intended to be understood 
metaphorically rather than literally (Ahn and Wampold 2001; Bettelheim, 1982; 
Elkins, 2009, Hyman, 1999; McCready, 1986; Wampold, 2001). In understanding any 
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discourse Foucault (1969:64) notes the importance of considering two distinct fields – 
a “field of presence (…all statements formulated elsewhere and taken up in a 
discourse…) [and]…a field of concomitance (this includes statements that concern 
quite different domains of objects…and belong to quite different types of discourse, 
but which are active among the statements studied here, either because they serve 
as analogical confirmations or…because they serve as models that can be 
transferred to other contents…)“ The medical model in Foucault’s terms belongs to 
the field of concomitance as “essentially the medical model of psychotherapy is an 
analogue to the medical model in medicine, rather than a literal adoption. The 
medical model in medicine contains the same components as the medical model of 
psychotherapy except that the theories, explanations, and characteristic techniques 
are physiochemically based” (Wampold, 2001:14). Put this way Wampold appears to 
be making the same distinction between somatogenic and psychogenic causes as 
Kihlstrom (2002). 
Bohart and Tallman (1999:5) continue that “in the medical model, the therapist is 
analogous to a physician” and describes the key features of the model as being 
diagnosis, and the recommendation and application of a treatment intervention that 
“cause change in the client, thereby alleviating the symptom”. Bettelheim (1982:39-
40) argues that the roots of the use of the term ‘mental illness’ can be traced back to 
Freud but that he never intended it to be taken literally: “If this metaphor is not 
recognized as such, but, rather, taken as referring to objective facts, we forfeit a real 
understanding of the unconscious and its workings. In this metaphor, the body stands 
for the soul. If the metaphor is translated literally… our psyche, or soul – for Freud 
the terms were interchangeable – seems to become something tangible. It acquires 
something akin to a physical existence, like a bodily organ; hence its treatment 
becomes part of medical science.” Reznak (1991:73), however, suggests that the 
practice of talking about mental problems as mental illness in fact reaches back even 
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further - “since Hippocrates mental problems like depression have been seen as 
illnesses”.   
Whilst McCready (1986) suggests that using the phrase ‘medical metaphor’ would be 
more helpful than medical ‘model’ in order to keep its proper status in mind, a 
number of practitioners have written about their disagreement with the use of this 
model altogether, including Elkins (2009:67), who contends that the superimposition 
of this model uses “medical terms to describe what is essentially an interpersonal 
process that has almost nothing to do with medicine”.  
Wampold (2001:13-14) deconstructs the medical model as used in psychotherapy, 
identifying five key components as follows: (i) there is a client who is “conceptualized 
to have a disorder, problem or complaint” – whilst some therapeutic schools may 
choose to use diagnosis, (such as some schools of psychoanalysis according to 
Hyman (1999): “In health care, the diagnosis determines the treatment; in 
psychoanalysis the "treatment" is "diagnosing" and vice versa”) Wampold argues that 
this is not essential to the model in psychotherapy, (ii) That “a psychological 
explanation for the client’s disorder, problem or complaint is proposed”, (iii) that “each 
psychotherapeutic approach posit a mechanism of change”, (iv) that such 
approaches, “to varying degrees…prescribe specific therapeutic actions” and finally 
(v) “the therapist provides treatment that contains specific therapeutic ingredients that 
are characteristic of the theoretical orientation as well as the explanation of the 
disorder, problem or complaint…The specific ingredients are assumed to be 
responsible (i.e. necessary) for client change or progress towards therapeutic goals”. 
This is characterised as the specific ingredients model. It should perhaps be noted 
however, that according to Hyman (1999), “The outcome of analysis is…an entirely 
subjective matter and quite different from that which is expected in a medical model”. 
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It is also worth noting that this deconstruction does not fully take into account the 
power involved in the position of the doctor / therapist. 
Wampold et al (2001:268) argue that a key feature of the medical model is that 
primacy is given to the “specific ingredients” of psychotherapy-as-treatment rather 
than “common or contextual factors” both of which have formed the basis of 
alternative meta-theories of why psychotherapy works. An example of  
psychotherapy-as-treatment might be seen in the description that Siegal (2005:159) 
offers of some psychodynamic analytic reasoning which uses “interventions tailored 
to the patient and tested in the “laboratory” of the sessions”. The term ‘common 
factors’ was first used by Rosenzweig (1936:412) when he wondered “(1) whether 
the factors alleged to be operating in a given therapy are identical with the factors 
that actually are operating and (2) whether the factors that actually are operating in 
several different therapies may not have much more in common than have the 
factors alleged to be operating”.  
Essentially the common factors model asserts that regardless of the theory of the 
cause of human distress, it can be ameliorated by any therapy which utilises some 
identified so-called common factors. Summarised by Sparks, Duncan & Miller 
(2008:457),  Frank (1961) gave these as : “(1) an emotionally charged, confiding 
relationship with a helping person; (2) a healing setting; (3) a rationale, conceptual 
scheme or myth that plausibly explains the patients symptoms and prescribes a ritual 
or procedure for resolving them and (4) a ritual or procedure that requires the active 
participation of both patient and therapist and that is believed by both to be the 
means of restoring the patients’ health”.  
Sparks et al (2008:454) usefully trace the “evolution of the common factors as a 
metatheoretical framework for research and the emergence of a transformative 
clinical practice” from its inception in Rosenzweig’s 1936 paper through to 
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developments in the twenty-first century, including Lambert’s (1986) summary of 
outcome studies which identifies a “percentage variance attributable to four common 
factors” (Sparks et al 2008:458) which seems to imply that the factors act  
independently of each other. Wampold (2001:26) however suggests that it is the 
underpinning context in which the therapy takes place which is of overriding 
importance; “the healing context and the meaning attributed to it by the participants 
(therapist and client) are critical contextual phenomena”. He suggests therefore that 
“in a contextual conceptualisation of common factors, specific therapeutic actions, 
which may be common across therapies, cannot be isolated and studied 
independently” (Wampold, 2001:26). In a subsequent paper Wampold et al 
(2001:269) state that “the alternative to the medical model is not a collection of 
common independent factors, such as the working alliance, expectation of progress, 
and therapist empathy. Every therapy should have a rationale, be administered in a 
healing context, and contain therapeutic actions consistent with the treatment 
rationale.” The researcher, however, wonders how ‘alternative’ this model is to the 
medical model with its use of words like ‘treatment’? Ironically, Wampold et al 
(2001:270) comment that “One cannot examine the evidence, find the medical model 
scientifically unsupported, and continue to use medical model language.” 
This perhaps serves as an example of how difficult it is to recognise and move past a 
medical model discourse – in the literature writers such as Boyle, (2006:191) note 
that “such is the ideological power of medical models that thinking outside them is as 
much a challenge for those who develop alternatives as for those with whom they are 
trying to communicate”. Boyle (2006:192) goes on to suggest that real alternatives to 
medical models would need to have two essential features – first that “they would 
remove biology and genetics from their current privileged position and emphasize the 
importance of interpersonal and social factors in causing emotional distress and 
disturbing behaviour”, and second that “they would have to present a 
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reconceptualization of what is usually called mental disorder and do this in a way that 
could not easily be absorbed into a medical framework”. He stresses the importance 
of a refocusing on the meaning that experiences have to the client in terms of their 
life and social context and that ultimately, “the task for alternatives to medical models 
is to put the rationality back into madness” (Boyle, 2006:199).  
This follows arguments by several authors including Bolton (2001:188) who noted not 
only that “in the attribution of madness it is apparently failure of intelligibility that is 
crucial”, but that Foucault discussed the medical model as inherently including the 
“idea of madness as lack of reason, stripping it of all possible significance except as 
mere disorder”. Parker et al (2005:12) wonder “what if the very act of dividing reason 
from unreason were a product of culture?” and indeed Bolton (2001:188) notes that 
“the common thrust of the anti-psychiatry critiques was that the medical model failed 
to see what meaning there was in apparent disorder”. Frattaroli (20001:62) argues 
that …the whole Medical Model approach to psychiatry …is afflicted by this same 
fearful need to hide from the existential moment of self-awareness”. 
An additional factor which emerges from a review of the literature in understanding 
the dominance of the medical model in our current culture is that it accrues both 
status and money to its proponents.  Kihlstrom (2002:297) acknowledges that there 
is a desire that “By placing diagnostic concepts and practices on a firmer scientific 
base, a shift from symptoms to laboratory tests will also reinforce the status and 
autonomy of clinical psychology, as well as the profession’s claim to third-party 
payments for services”.  Simon & Wynne (2006:187) note that “The biogenetic model 
of mental disorders that now dominates the mental health field is largely a fiction 
created by psychiatry and supported by the massive pharmaceutical companies 
whose main goal is the sale of psychiatric drugs“ and wonder whether it is possible to 
“explicate the reasons why we hold on to this false medical terminology beyond the 
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very real possibility that we earn our livings in a field that has embraced the medical 
model and is largely funded by medical insurance and other third-party payers?” 
(Simon & Wynne, 2006:188). Elkins (2009) makes the argument that eschewing the 
medical metaphor would lead to a loss of power and prestige for the profession, 
which is partly why it is so attractive - ”the medical model has remained the dominant 
descriptive system for psychotherapy, not because it offers the most accurate 
description of what actually occurs in therapy but, rather, because the model’s 
association with medicine and science gives psychotherapy a level of cultural 
respectability and economic advantages that other descriptive systems do not.” 
(Elkins, 2009:73) 
So what does the literature tell us might be a meta-theoretical alternative to the 
medical model metaphor in psychotherapy? Stiles and Shapiro (1989:522) have 
suggested that in research terms there is “an investigative paradigm that we will call 
the drug metaphor. Rooted in the broader medical model of psychological disorder 
and its treatment, this paradigm views psychotherapy as comprising active 
ingredients, supplied by the therapist to the client, along with a variety of fillers and 
scene-setting features”. As summarised by Guy, Loewenthal, Thomas and 
Stephenson (2012) an alternative is the idea of therapy as dialogue - Bohart & House 
(2008:195-6) suggest that “In contrast to the idea that the therapist is ‘treating’ a 
‘disorder’, therapy becomes a co-created dialogue between two (or more) intelligent, 
living, embodied beings. The guiding metaphor for this approach is therefore 
conversation and dialogue”, which occurs within an interpersonal therapeutic 
relationship. “Psychotherapy is conceived of, above all, as a practice” (see also 
Heaton, 2010). Siegel (2005:152) considers how psychoanalysis has developed in 
this regard and suggests that “Relational psychoanalysis maintains that meaning is 
not discovered in the patient, but created in a field of potential space between analyst 
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and patient. Each participant in the dialogue co-creates the analysis.” This view 
seems to sit within the therapy-as-dialogue model proposed above. 
This section has considered the literature regarding the alternative meta-theories to 
the medical model in psychotherapy in terms of; the medical model as metaphor, the 
common factors model, the contextual model and therapy-as-dialogue. Broadly 
speaking regardless of the terminology actually used all these models assume that 
therapy is not a medical-like treatment or intervention but a practice that should be 
understood primarily in terms of relationship. In addition to those writers already 
mentioned, there is support for this view amongst those who have explored the social 
causes of mental distress more generally beyond a consideration of the role of 
psychotherapy - (Bentall 2004; Horwitz 2002; Mirowsky and Ross, 2003; Pilgrim et al, 
2009) - who summarise the strong interdisciplinary case for the importance of 
personal relationships in both the creation and amelioration of mental health 
problems. In line with the call for the widespread adoption of a biopsychosocial model 
for understanding such experiences (Engel, 1977), they do not suggest that biology 
does not play a part, but that that part is a subordinate one.  
Having now considered the literature as it relates to the discourse of the medical 
model in medicine and how it has impacted the development of the GP/patient 
relationship, discourses of the medical model in understanding human distress and 
medical model discourses within psychotherapy itself, in the final section in this 
chapter the researcher will now summarise literature which offers critiques of such 
ideas. As the very genesis of this study has been framed in terms of a potential 
conflict between a modernist, scientific world and a postmodern one interested more 
in the nature of subjectivity and language these critiques have been grouped in terms 
of how they might be located within modern and postmodern epistemologies. As 
mentioned previously, literature on these critiques has been included in order to 
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contextualise the participants’ own possible interpretations of their experiences of the 
medical model in their work and the researcher’s analysis of them. 
 
2.2.5 Literature re postmodern critiques of the medical model 
2.2.5.1 Questioning meta-narratives 
As mentioned, the philosophy underlying this entire debate might be characterised as 
being rooted in the respective epistemologies associated with modernism and 
postmodernism which, according to Osborne (1992), are not chronological 
categories, but qualitative ones. As briefly outlined in chapter one and exemplified in 
the literature on the biomedical model above, modernism is characterised as the 
post-Enlightenment triumph of reason over superstition and ignorance, order over 
chaos and the championing of science as a method to achieve knowledge of a reality 
which is assumed to be independent and objective through the actions of 
autonomous individuals (Leonard, 1997; Parker et al, 1995; Gordon, 1988; 
Loewenthal & Snell, 2003; Sarup, 1993). “The fundamental assumption of modernity 
is that knowledge can be based on primary processes in the ‘real’ world that are 
beyond and independent of the effects of discourses about them” (Leonard, 
1997:11). Modernist thinking is also characterised as resting on what Lyotard (1984) 
termed ‘grand’ or ‘meta-narratives’ - the idea of history as progress, or “the 
progressive liberation of humanity through science, and the idea that philosophy can 
restore unity to learning and develop universally valid knowledge for humanity” 
(Sarup, 1993:132).   
As a working definition Leonard (1997:5) defines “postmodernity as the period in 
which we are now living, the most recent stage in the development of late capitalism 
and postmodernism as the critical challenge to the universalistic knowledge claims of 
modernity and its belief in reason and progress”. There are several ideas core to this 
critique. The first is a questioning of the meta-narratives Lyotard describes about 
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science and medicine; “I will use the term modern to designate any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a meta-discourse…I define postmodernism as 
incredulity towards meta-narratives” (Lyotard, 1984:xxiv).  
Foucault (1969:35) also questions “What, in fact, are medicine, grammar, or political 
economy? Are they merely a retrospective regrouping by which the contemporary 
sciences deceive themselves as to their own past?” and suggests that “their history is 
not the stone-by-stone construction of an edifice” (1969:62) as might sometimes be 
portrayed. He recognises that this questioning of previously held ‘givens’ inevitably 
leads to uncertainty, and that “Everything that was thought to be proper to the history 
of ideas may disappear from view. The danger, in short, is that…one is forced to 
advance beyond familiar territory, far from the certainties to which one is 
accustomed, towards an as yet uncharted land and unforeseeable conclusion” 
(Foucault, 1969:42). His history of the present (or genealogy), therefore, “is not an 
attempt to understand the past from the point of view of the present, but rather to 
disturb the self-evident present with the past” (Bunton & Peterson, 1997:4). The first 
postmodern criticism of the medical model might therefore be summarised as a 
questioning of meta-narratives such as the idea that through scientific method the 
nature and biology of man can and will be progressively revealed as matters of 
objective fact.  
2.2.5.2 The role of language 
As also briefly described in chapter one, a further key element of the postmodern 
critique of science and medicine centres on a questioning of the assumed direct links 
between meaning, language and reality. Saussure (1974: 67) first brought to 
prominence the idea that “The linguistic sign is arbitrary” (original italics) whereby “for 
Saussure, an individual element in language (a word, or a sound) is without intrinsic 
or ‘natural’ meaning. It has no meaning outside convention” (Loewenthal & Snell, 
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2003:64). Meaning, it is argued, is both subjective and subject to change over time 
and so “because meaning is continually slipping away from us, there can be no 
essential, certain meanings, only different meanings emerging from different 
experiences” (Leonard, 1997:10). Postmodernism therefore “not only highlights the 
ambivalence of meaning in language, but also demonstrates that understanding is 
mediated by the symbolic world of culture and tradition in which we exist” (Frie, 
2003:137). This constitutes the second postmodern critique of the biomedical model - 
the notion that language simply represents an external objective reality is stripped 
away: as Foucault (1969:54), building on the ideas of Saussure and Lacan, wanted 
to “show…that in analyzing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the 
embrace, apparently so tight between words and things”.   
Foucault does not therefore believe in modernist notions of an objective reality or 
independent truth, but seeks to understand the impact of truth claims made by 
competing discourses and how they construct subjects. For him, truths are 
“constructed ideas that are accorded a truth status - these “truths” are normalizing in 
the sense that they construct norms around which persons are incited to shape or 
constitute their lives” (White & Epston, 1990:19-20).   
With reference to the medical model conception of human distress, as Parker et al 
(1995:1) put it “The terms we use are loaded with assumptions, and those 
assumptions are reproduced moment by moment in the practice of psychiatry…”. 
They go on to note that “What arises from these historical studies is the idea that the 
organisation of language is crucial to an understanding of mental ‘illness’. Language 
does not only organise reason but it also structures what we imagine to lie outside 
reason. It structures not only what we talk about but we imagine we cannot talk 
about” (Parker et al 1995:14). In the dominant discourse perhaps as Illich (1976:175) 
put it “Language is taken over by the doctors: the sick person is deprived of 
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meaningful words for his anguish, which is thus further increased by linguistic 
mystification“.  
Siegler & Osmond (1974:4) suggest that “…clinical medicine is best seen as a 
puzzling and poorly understood activity and should be approached anthropologically, 
as one would approach a religious ritual of some primitive people.” They go on to 
argue that instead of “assuming that it is a conscious and rational activity, the rules of 
which are known to its practitioners, we should assume the opposite: that its rules 
are so deeply imbedded in human culture and lie so much outside awareness that its 
practitioners know as little about it as most of us do about the grammar and origin of 
our language”.  
2.2.5.3 Questioning the nature of reality 
This brings us to the third element of the literature on the postmodern critique of the 
medical model in medicine – that based on a social constructionist perspective. From 
a review of the relevant literature the researcher has noted that there appears to be 
two distinct strands of thinking within this group – for the first (Foucault, 1969; 
Gergen, 1985; Lupton 1987 and Parker, 2008) medical knowledge is understood as 
“not simply as a given and objective set of ‘facts’ but as a belief system shaped 
through social and political relations” (Lupton, 1987:99). Disputing the idea that there 
is an objective reality that is simply uncovered by science, they argue instead that 
“through deconstruction we are able to see our knowledge and beliefs as historically 
and culturally specific products no longer able to be legitimated by reference to the 
universal authority of Reason, the transcendental guarantor” (Leonard, 1997:23).  .  
In the other strand (including Joseph, 2007; Maddux, Snyder & Lopez, 2004 & 
Maddux, Gosselin & Winstead, 2008 and Reznak, 1991) these arguments appear 
only to apply to psychopathology and not to medicine. Maddux et al (2004:321) are at 
pains to point out that “Unlike theories of physiological wellness and illness, 
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conceptions of psychological wellness and illness cannot be subjected to empirical 
validation. We cannot conduct research on the validity of a construction of 
psychological wellness and illness. They are social constructions grounded in values, 
not science, and socially constructed concepts cannot be proven true or false” – they 
do not therefore believe that theories of physiological wellness and illness might 
equally be socially constructed concepts. 
Both of these strands highlight the issue of cultural relativism. As Parker et al 
(1995:1) suggest “The notions of madness and abnormal psychology as we 
understand them are particular and peculiar to our culture and our time.” From 
Maddux et al (2008:11) “Our conceptions of psychological normality and abnormality 
are not facts about people but abstract ideas that are constructed through the implicit 
and explicit collaborations of theorists, researchers, professionals, their clients, and 
the culture in which all are embedded and that represent a shared view of the world 
and human nature.” Clearly not everyone will agree about where the dividing lines sit 
between these ideas, but our power to be heard will depend on our position in 
society. 
For Foucault and Lacan the clinical gaze can not only create subjects, but as a way 
of seeing the body, even into the body, it has the power to actually constitute the 
body. As Lupton (1987:99) puts it, “the body and its various parts are understood as 
constructed through discourses and practices, through the ‘clinical gaze’ exerted by 
medical practitioners”. According to Sarup (1993:7) Lacan’s “view is that biology is 
always interpreted by the human subject, refracted through language; that there is no 
such thing as ‘the body’ before language….he shows how culture imposes meaning 
on anatomical parts”. How far, therefore, do the discourses doctors and therapists 
engage in with their patients/clients serve to create reality rather than reflect it? 
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2.2.5.4 Decentring the subject 
Beyond a questioning of the grand narrative of progress through science, the 
representational nature of language and the nature of reality, the fourth element of 
the literature on the postmodern critique of the medical model questions the 
existence of an independent human subject, both as able to observe, measure and 
classify an objective reality which includes other human subjects as objects 
(Leonard, 1997) and in psychotherapeutic terms, able to participate in a process 
arguably focused on a ‘self’ or ego. This view, for Gordon (1988:21) is closely linked 
to the influence of ““individualism” – a complex of values and assumptions asserting 
the primacy of the individual and of individual freedom” in the development of the 
biomedical model. As Leonard (1997:xi) summarises, “Postmodernism challenges 
the modern idea of a universal, essential subject, common to all humanity”.  
 
In the biomedical model, the individual, the subject, is assumed to be an autonomous 
being acting independently of social forces. Even in “the softer humanist varieties the 
person is valued as the carrier of the symptoms. However, these are two sides of a 
process which individualizes distress, and treats it apart from social context” (Parker 
et al 1995:7-8). Discussing individualism Parker (2008:40) notes that, “Contemporary 
discourse is replete with words and images that locate the causes for our activities 
inside individual minds; we increasingly inhabit a ‘psychological culture’ that delimits 
the horizons of our inquiry”. Social constructionists, however, view “subjectivity as a 
product of the social relations characteristic of a specific social formation at a 
particular point in history” (Leonard, 1997:34). The assumptions that participants may 
make about themselves and their clients, therefore, will give some clue as to the 
nature of the discourse being drawn upon. 
For Foucault (1969:60), as mentioned in chapter one, the subject has no 
prediscursive existence; “discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestations of 
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a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the 
dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined”. He 
believed both objects and subjects to be products of discourse (“the object does not 
await in limbo the order that will free it…it does not pre-exist itself…it exists under the 
positive conditions of a complex group of relations. (Foucault, 1969:49)) and that in 
medicine “The power that doctors have in relation to their patients…might be thought 
of as a…means of bringing into being the subjects ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’ and the 
phenomenon of the patients ‘illness’” (Lupton, 1987:99). The relevance of the 
literature which questions the existence of the subject beyond discourse is key: “In 
prosaic terms, if we cannot be sure of the investigator, there can be no investigation” 
(Heartfield, 2006:20), calling into question one of the central pillars of the modernist 
notion of science.  
The literature considering postmodern critiques of the biomedical model has served 
to provide a counterbalance to that on the medical model itself, and shown some of 
the range of criticisms that may emerge from the empirical studies to be conducted, 
either directly from participants’ contributions or via a subsequent analysis from the 
researcher. Having now considered the literature in relation to the research as laid 
out at the beginning of this chapter, the researcher will now move on to describe 
what options for research methodologies were considered and how a choice of 








Chapter 3: Methodology and Method 
This chapter covers both the journey to select an appropriate research methodology 
and then describes how it was implemented. The journey begins with some 
reflections on the nature of quantitative versus qualitative approaches to research 
(and their underlying philosophical assumptions) and then considers which qualitative 
method is most appropriate for this two part study into the potential influence of the 
medical model on psychotherapists working in either an explicitly medical setting 
(e.g. the NHS) or in private practice. The researcher then provides sufficient detail 
about the selected method to contextualise the implemented design. Finally, the 
researcher discusses ethical issues relevant to the research. 
3.1 Quantitative versus qualitative approaches 
Any researcher has the initial decision to make as to what type of research 
methodology will be chosen, quantitative or qualitative. This will be largely driven by 
the researchers’ views on both ontology and epistemology where “epistemology 
concerns what it is possible to know whereas ontology concerns what there is to 
know in the world ‘out there’” (Harper, 2012:87). Broadly speaking quantitative 
research is the option of choice for those working within a modernist, positivist 
epistemology, which “implies that the goal of research is to produce objective 
knowledge; that is, understanding that is impartial and unbiased, based on a view 
from ‘the outside’, without personal involvement or vested interests on the part of the 
researcher” (Willig, 2008:3). It is characteristically used by those working within an 
empiricist, scientific paradigm whereby “science progresses through a process of 
conjectures and refutations” (McLeod, 2003:5) and based on the idea that there is an 
objective reality of which it is possible to learn through experiment. As has been 
discussed in chapters one and two, “the fundamental assumption of modernity is that 
knowledge can be based on primary processes in the ‘real’ world that are beyond 
 68 
and independent of the effects of discourses about them” (Leonard, 1997:11) and as 
such stems from a realist ontology which “maintains that the world is made up of 
structures and objects that have cause-effect relationships with one another” (Willig, 
2008:13). There are those that argue (Gergen, 1985, Burman and Parker, 1993) that 
mainstream research in psychology has relied heavily on such beliefs and 
approaches, adopting “the view that the only knowledge worth having (or that it is 
possible to have) is derived from the prediction and control of (probabilistic) laws of 
behaviour” (Burman and Parker, 1993:158). Guba & Lincoln, (1994: 106-7) outline 
the key criticisms of quantitative approaches from both an intra- and extra-
paradigmatic point of view. Amongst the former are the notions of “context stripping” 
where “precise quantitative approaches that focus on selected subsets of variables 
necessarily “strip” from consideration…other variables that exist in the context that 
might, if allowed to exert their effects, greatly alter findings” and the “exclusion of 
meaning and purpose”. They go on to argue that “human behaviour, unlike that of 
physical objects, cannot be understood without reference to the meanings and 
purposes attached by human actors to their activities”. Amongst the 
extraparadigmatic critiques they discuss are those which highlight both the “theory 
[and] value-ladeness of facts” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:107) whereby “putative “facts” 
are viewed not only through a theory window but through a value window as well”, 
undermining the possibility of real objectivity in such research.  
 
As outlined in chapter one, the researcher is intending to explore psychotherapists’ 
experience of the potential influence on their work of the medical model (which has 
been argued in chapter one and two to rest on modernist, realist philosophical 
foundations),  and which seems in some ways to conflict with less modernist, more 
postmodern approaches to psychotherapy and counselling. The researcher is 
therefore interested to understand research methods based on alternative ontological 
approaches, more in harmony with postmodern ideas such as the questioning of the 
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role of language, history and culture in constructing reality and the place of the 
subject in any knowledge creating enterprise. 
 
In considering alternative ontological positions the researcher noted that according to 
Willig (2008:3) there are few “unreconstructed positivists” left anyway and that 
Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba (2008) go on to describe a paradigm closely related to 
positivism of postpositivism. According to them (2008:100) where, ontologically, 
positivists embrace a “naïve realism” ” in which there is a “real reality” (which is also 
apprehendible), postpositivism alternatively is deemed to embrace “critical realism” 
where reality can only be “imperfectly and probabilistically” apprehended.  
Epistemologically, where positivists would regard their findings as true, postpositivists 
would regard them as “probably true” (Lincoln et al, 2008:100).  
As Gergen summarises, what researchers disagree about is the “extent to which our 
understanding of the world can approach objective knowledge, or even some kind of 
truth about the world”, with opinions ranging between the extremes of “naïve realism” 
and “rampant relativism” (Gergen, 1985:273). According to Willig (2008:13) relativist 
ontology maintains “that the world is not the orderly, law-bound place that realists 
believe it to be… [but] questions the ‘out-there-ness’ of the world and emphasizes the 
diversity of interpretations that can be applied to it”. A critical realist stance in her 
view therefore combines “the realist ambition to gain a better understanding of what 
is ‘really’ going on in the world with the acknowledgement that the data the 
researcher gathers may not provide direct access to this reality” (Willig, 2008:13). 
As has been discussed in chapter two, social constructionism “draws attention to the 
fact that human experience, including perception, is mediated historically, culturally 
and linguistically. That is, what we perceive and experience is never a direct 
reflection of environmental conditions but must be understood as a specific reading 
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of these conditions” (Willig, 2008:7). Its associated research methodologies therefore 
could either embrace relativism or critical realism, depending on the importance 
placed on the existence of structures in the ‘real’ world.  
On balance the researcher subscribes to the view that as Willig (2008:12) puts it,  
“there is no such thing as ‘pure experience’ and that the aim of research ought to be 
an explanation of the ways in which cultural and discursive resources are used in 
order to construct different versions of experience” (Willig, 2008:12). Given this belief 
and the researcher’s intent to explore other therapists’ experience, indeed, how they 
construct that experience through language it was quite quickly apparent that a 
qualitative research method would be the most appropriate to pursue as “qualitative 
researchers… are interested in how people make sense of the world and how they 
experience events” (Willig, 2008:8). Having made this choice, how did the researcher 
decide what qualitative methodology to use? 
3.2 Qualitative Research Methodologies 
The researcher first considered the options available from within phenomenological 
research methods because phenomenology is “the philosophical study of ‘Being’ (i.e. 
of existence and experience)” (Larkin and Thompson, 2012:102) - phenomenologists 
are therefore interested “in the nature of subjective experience from the perspective 
of research participants themselves” (Harper, 2012:89). Willig (2008:13) suggests 
that “there is a range of positions in-between the ‘realist’ and the ‘relativist’ endpoints 
of the continuum” and that one such is a phenomenological position that “argues that 
while experience is always the product of interpretation and, therefore, constructed 
(and flexible) rather than determined (and fixed), it is nevertheless ‘real’ to the person 
who is having the experience”. 
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Larkin and Thompson (2012:102) explain that phenomenology is understood to have 
“two important historical phases: the transcendental, and the hermeneutic or 
existential”, the former associated with Husserl, and the latter with both Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty. They suggest that for Husserl, “phenomenology was about 
identifying and suspending our assumptions (‘bracketing’ off culture, context, history, 
etc.) in order to get at the universal essence of a given phenomenon, as it presents 
itself to consciousness” (Larkin and Thompson, 2012:102). LeVasseur (2003:419) 
has suggested that, more simply, the “project of bracketing attempts to get beyond 
the ordinary assumptions of understanding and stay persistently curious about new 
phenomena.”  Husserl also introduced the concept of intentionality, described by 
Spinelli (2005:11) as “the first most basic interpretive mental act – that of ‘translating’ 
the unknown raw stimuli of the real world, which our senses have responded to, into 
an object-based (or thing-based) reality”.  As LeVassuer (2003:411) puts it, “In 
[Husserl’s] view, consciousness was unified with its intentional object and could 
never be separate from that object. Husserl argued that it was the nature of human 
consciousness that it always be directed—that it is always pointed, as it were, toward 
something other than itself”. This presented a very different view to that espoused by 
natural science which “correspond(s) to a belief in a lawful material world in which 
knowledge is separate from being” (LeVasseur, 2003:408). 
 
The initial aim of transcendental phenomenology was therefore “to examine, expose 
and separate any difference between the appearance of things and what those things 
actually are (that is, the things themselves)” (Spinelli, 2005:10). These ideas are 
apparent in some of the “more descriptive forms of phenomenological psychology 
(see e.g., Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003)” (Larkin & Thompson, 2012:102).  Whilst the 
researcher found Giorgi’s method interesting, they had some doubts over his desire 
to work within a scientific framework (meeting criteria such as repeatability and 
interpersonal performance) (Giorgi, 2010) and how this would fit with a desire to find 
 72 
a research method which offered a more postmodern approach. These doubts 
centred in particular first on the requirement to ‘bracket’ “one’s natural assumptions 
about the world…so that what is essential in the phenomena of consciousness can 
be understood without prejudice” (LeVasseur, 2003:411) – as Scheurich (1995:240) 
puts it, a “postmodernist perspective suggests that the researcher has multiple 
intentions and desires, some of which are consciously known and some of which are 
not”; and second, that Giorgi’s (2010:10) insistence that “100% of the data has to be 
analyzed and accounted for in the analysis whether the data appear to be relevant or 
not upon initial inspection” is, from a postmodern view (as discussed in chapter one) 
an attempt to reduce “the "wild profusion" of the Other (the interviewee)…to fit the 
modernist prison of the Same (the researchers' project)” (Scheurich, 1995:246-7). 
The later form of phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology, (also referred to as 
interpretative phenomenology) allows the researcher “to go beyond the text and, 
instead, to interpret the experience and so render it more meaningful” (Harper, 
2012:89). According to Larkin & Thompson (2012:101), “Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith et al., 2009) is an approach to qualitative 
analysis with a particularly psychological interest in how people make sense of their 
experience”. IPA does not therefore aim for transcendent knowledge but draws 
instead on ideas from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty which suggest that “persons 
(Dasein, ‘there-being’) are inextricably involved in the world and in relationships with 
others” (Larkin & Thompson, 2012:102). In IPA, therefore, “we are interested in 
understanding a person’s relatedness to the world (and to the things in it which 
matter to them) through the meanings that they make.” (Larkin & Thompson, 
2012:102). 
As the idea for the research arose from the researchers’ own experience in working 
first as a therapist in a GP surgery and then setting up in private practice, the 
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researcher also considered the use of the phenomenological relational research 
method of heuristics - “a distinction of heuristics from other research methods is the 
explicit nature of the researchers’ involvement with the phenomenon that is being 
investigated” (Rose and Loewenthal, 2006:139). Such an approach would seek to 
“illuminate” (Moustakas, 1990) the question and really foreground the researcher’s 
own experience, putting “the researcher at the centre of the meaning-making 
process” (Rose and Loewenthal, 2006:141). As Rose and Loewenthal go on to ask, 
however, how might this be perceived from a postmodern perspective in which, as 
discussed at length in chapter two, the self is decentred and is subject to? Whilst it is 
true that all research methods involve an element of subjectivity, the researcher 
believed it to be more appropriate to seek a method which explicitly recognises the 
forces (language, social practices, the unconscious) to which individuals are subject.  
As the researcher learned more about these options it became increasingly apparent 
that a method which engaged more with how meaning is constructed, specifically in 
terms of the importance of the social context, was felt to be a better fit both for the 
researcher and the research question selected.  There was also the issue of the 
perceived dominance of the medical model in Western culture which meant the 
researcher wished to use a method which would help draw attention to the power 
relations at play. As Harper (2012:33) suggests, “for some researchers, the primary 
aim may not be to describe an empirical phenomenon, it may be to ask a question 
underpinned by certain theoretical preoccupations (e.g. …subjectivity, power) and/or 
drawing on particular theorists (e.g., Foucault…). Thus, one’s theoretical and, to 
some extent, political orientation is also a choice that needs to be made”. 
With further reading it became clear that these ideas are well expressed in the ideas 
of social constructionism – research from this perspective is, according to Gergen 
(1985:266-271) “principally concerned with explicating the processes by which 
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people come to describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including 
themselves) in which they live” – social constructionists are “are less focused on 
phenomena in themselves and are more interested in how the phenomena are seen” 
(Harper, 2012:90). 
In his paper on the social constructionist movement Gergen (1985:266-271) explains 
that it challenges the idea of a direct connection between words and reality, pointing 
repeatedly to the importance of the “linguistic context”, stressing that “The terms in 
which the world is understood are social artefacts, products of historically situated 
interchanges among people…the process of understanding is not automatically 
driven by the forces of nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of 
persons in relationship” - as a consequence of this the “explanatory locus of human 
action shifts from the interior region of the mind to the processes and structure of 
human interaction. The question “why” is answered not with a psychological state or 
process but with consideration of persons in relationship” – social constructionists are 
therefore “critical of individualistic and intra-psychic approaches in the social 
sciences” (Harper, 2012:90).  In addition, they are interested in “how some claims 
about reality are seen as having more validity than others” and that “different 
constructions have different social power” (Harper, 2012:90-1). The researcher 
wondered what kind of research method would enable these considerations. 
There are two possible examples of qualitative research methods which fit with a 
social constructionist approach; the constructionist version of Grounded Theory 
espoused by Charmaz, 1990 (cited in Willig, 2008) and those associated with 
Discourse Analysis (which the researcher had first learned of through attending a 
series of lectures on research methods offered as part of the university’s doctoral 
programme). In looking more closely at Charmazs’ (2006:19) ideas her approach 
“explicitly assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of 
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the studied world, not an exact picture of it. Research participants’ implicit meanings, 
experiential views—and researchers’ finished grounded theories—are constructions 
of reality”. In taking this view Charmaz successfully counters one of the major 
criticisms levelled at Glaser and Strauss’ original formulation of Grounded Theory 
that it “pays insufficient attention to the role of the researcher” and relies on an 
inductivist epistemology whereby “observations give rise to new ideas” (Willig, 
2008:46). 
In reading more about the development of Grounded Theory it became clear to the 
researcher that it was primarily designed to facilitate the study of “fundamental social 
or social psychological processes within a social setting” (Charmaz, 2006:14) rather 
than an exploration of a range of experiences. Whilst Grounded Theory has been 
used in psychology to categorise research participants experiences, according to 
Willig (208:47) “such a mapping of experiences is a descriptive rather than an 
explanatory exercise and, as such is not geared toward the development of theory”. 
She goes on to suggest that perhaps Grounded Theory should be reserved for the 
“study of social psychological processes” (Willig, 2008:47), a suggestion perhaps 
based on Charmaz’s (2006:17) own declared intent to “return to past grounded 
theory emphases on examining processes”. In this respect the researcher wondered 
how suited Charmazs’ method would be to research questions aimed at exploring 
therapist’s experience of the influence of the medical model on their work – to what 
extent were social processes at play? Charmaz (2006:18) usefully defines a process 
as consisting of “unfolding temporal sequences that may have identifiable markers 
with clear beginnings and endings and benchmarks in between. The temporal 
sequences are linked in a process and lead to change. Thus, single events become 
linked as part of a larger whole” and gives an example as “a study of how newly 
disabled young people reconstruct their identities” (Charmaz, 2006:14). Whilst the 
researcher could see that there might be various social processes involved giving 
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rise to experiences (for example how a patient reacts to being ‘diagnosed’ with a 
‘mental health condition’ or how psychiatrists react to their patients also choosing to 
work with a psychotherapist) it was not the intention to try to isolate any one of these 
processes and study it, but to potentially understand what range of social processes 
(and their discourses) might be at work. In considering discourses, Willig (2008) 
suggests that the social constructionist version of grounded theory might also need to 
do more than just recognise the active role of the researcher and take language more 
into account, to “theorise the role of language in the construction of categories, which 
in turn would mean engaging with the notion of ‘discourse’” (Willig, 2008:46-7). It 
therefore seemed appropriate for the researcher to consider what discourse analysis 
itself might have to offer. 
So what is a discourse analytic approach? According to Georgaca and Avdi 
(2012:147) it “developed out of the ‘turn to language’ in social psychology in the 
1970s and 1980s and the emergence of social constructionism”. It terms of its use as 
a research method Willig (1999:1-2) noted that “In recent years discourse analysis 
has become an increasingly popular research tool in psychology (e.g. Potter and 
Wetherall 1987; Edwards and Potter 1992; Parker 1992; Burman and Parker 1993; 
Butt 1995)”, with Hook noting just two years later that “There can be little doubt that 
discourse analysis has come to represent something of a 'growth industry' in 
research psychology. Indeed, there has been, together with a proliferation of the 
various models of the process of discourse analysis (cf. Bannister, 1995; Fairclough, 
1995; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherall, 1987) a veritable explosion of discursive 
analytic work” (Hook, 2001:1).  
In her consideration of the introduction of the particular form of discourse analysis 
espoused by Parker (1992), Foucauldian discourse analysis, Willig (2008:112) noted 
the significance of the publication of the book 'Changing the Subject: Psychology, 
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social regulation and subjectivity' in 1984. Since that time she comments that it has 
become "a highly influential publication which inspired many discourse analytic 
research projects including doctoral theses throughout the 1980s and 1990s".  
It should be recognised, however, that to some, the use of discourse analysis might 
be regarded as unorthodox on perhaps two levels: first, whilst it has grown 
significantly in popularity, its use remains less common than that of other methods. In 
its defence, according to Gerogaca & Avdi (2012:159) “Over the last two decades 
much discourse analytic work has been carried out in the field of psychotherapy” and 
they usefully produced a review paper in 2007 in which they “attempt to organize 
studies which employ discourse analysis to examine psychotherapy process, with the 
aim of rendering the existing literature more accessible to researchers and therapists 
(Avdi & Georgaca, 2007:158). Second, this method may be regarded as unorthodox 
because it raises a direct challenge to conventional forms of research in psychology 
and questions any approach that starts with a hypotheses and tests for it. “In its 
method psychology has helped to make its objects of study into the kind of ‘subjects’ 
who can be known, so the stakes of control and resistance are much more than 
simple images of what people are. This means that radical research in qualitative 
psychology is the subversion and transformation of how we can come to know more 
about psychology” (original italics) (Parker, 2005:1). Specifically in terms of research 
in psychotherapy such methods are used to move from the looking at the 
“construction of therapeutic discourse to its deconstruction” (Parker, 1999:1) 
Taylor and Loewenthal (2001:66) suggest that it is this method which “comes closest 
to offering a research method in a postmodern world. However, it is an approach 
rather than a method”. Burman and Parker (1993:2) argue that “In so far as there 
could be said to be commonality, these approaches are united by a common 
attention to the significance and structuring effects of language”. A discourse is 
 78 
variously defined as “a system of statements which constructs an object” (Parker, 
1992, Ch1:2), “linguistic systems of statements through which we speak of ourselves 
and our social world” (Leonard, 1997:2) and “shared patterns of meaning” (Burman 
and Parker, 1993:1). In discourse analysis, therefore, what is said is analysed in 
terms of how objects and subjects are spoken of, how they are constructed by how 
they are spoken of.  
The reason that discourse analysis can only be described as “coming the closest” to 
a postmodern friendly methodology is that the central ontological debate in this field 
remains how far, if at all, such discourses reflect objects that have an independent 
existence outside of that discourse (given that they are constructed by the 
discourse). According to Scheurich (1995:240-1) it is still common to find qualitative 
methodologies working on modernist assumptions such that it is possible to 
accurately represent either the real experience of the participant or the data 
collected; “The claim of accurate or valid representation, especially in terms of such 
techniques as line numbering, identification, and quantification of comparable-
meaning monads, statistical techniques, or even discourse analysis simply serves to 
hide the overwhelming absent presence of the researcher and her or his modernist 
assumptions [about selves, language, and communication]”.  He goes on to suggest 
that there is a “startling lack of discussion about the unresolvable ambiguities of 
consciousness, language, interpretation, and communication. From a postmodernist 
perspective, this severe modernist reduction of the exquisiteness of each lived 
moment borders on a kind of violence” (Scheurich, 1995:242) and this will be 
discussed further in chapter five.  Potter and Wetherall (1987:49) contend, however, 
that “We do not intend to use the discourse as a pathway to entities or phenomena 
lying ‘beyond’ the text. Discourse analysis does not take for granted that accounts 
reflect underlying attitudes or dispositions and therefore we do not expect that an 
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individual’s discourse will be consistent and coherent. Rather, the focus is on the 
discourse itself: how it is organised and what it is doing”.  
Parker (1992, 1995), on the other hand, identifies himself as a ‘critical realist’ by 
arguing that “our knowledge of the world is necessarily mediated by, and therefore 
constructed through language… while maintaining that there are underlying 
structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena, versions of which we then 
construct through language…This means that discursive constructions of reality are 
not free-floating but that they are grounded in social and material structures such as 
institutions and their practices” (Willig, 2008:130). Otherwise, according to Burman 
and Parker (1993:160) “discourse analysis may be in danger of mistaking discourse 
as the sum total, rather than the manifestation of, structural relationships”. As Harper 
(2012:92) notes, researchers adopting a critical realist social constructionist 
approach “take the position that, alongside an awareness of the importance of 
studying qualitative data in detail, it is also important to go beyond the text in order to 
add a further layer of interpretation – by setting what is said in a broader historical, 
cultural and social context”.  
The researcher considers this debate to be central to the research question – how far 
are social structures such as the NHS, GP surgeries, third party funders and their 
‘practices’ to be considered as independent sources of the experience which 
participants may construct accounts of in interview? If they can be considered as 
independent sources, then how far might a participant be able to exert their own 
agency in the face of the dominant discourses which construct such sources, or will 
those discourses actually shape the participant’s sense of self (how far is the 
participant ‘subject to’?)  
Having concluded that discourse analysis was the most appropriate methodology for 
this research, the researcher has then considered the different approaches available. 
 80 
3.3 Approaches to Discourse Analysis 
As the two approaches representing “perhaps the two most prominent ‘schools’ of 
discourse analysis in psychology” (Hook, 2001:1), the researcher compared the 
approach outlined by Potter and Wetherall (1987) with that of Parker (2005) who, as 
mentioned above, has developed and advocated the use of a more Foucauldian 
approach to this methodology which pays attention to how dominant discourses may 
support and enable, or oppress and disempower, particular groups in society by 
considering power relationships and the “material conditions within which such 
experiences may take place” (Willig, 2008:113).  Foucauldian discourse analysis also 
encompasses a historical analysis (or genealogy) of how current discourses have 
come to be and how such discourses construct subjects. Potter and Wetherall’s 
approach is more focused on the specifics of language used within a text – how it 
functions, what it does, what purpose it serves. As apparent relativists, whilst they 
are also looking at how “people are using their language to construct versions of the 
social world” (Potter and Wetherall, 1987:33), there is less emphasis on looking at 
power relations and the possible influence of independent social structures.  
In the context of this research question, therefore, the idea of pursuing a Foucauldian 
approach was attractive because of its focus on power (what might the power 
relationship be between a dominant ‘medical’ discourse and that of non-medical 
model counselling modalities?) and on the possible role of independent ‘material 
structures’ in the social landscape and their associated discourses (Willig, 2008) (for 
example, as discussed in chapter two, Foucault’s focus on the institutional location of 
doctors ‘gaze’ and the notion of the location of discourse being exterior to individual 
consciousness). 
One final attraction of Parkers’ approach is his desire to inspire radical research that 
is action oriented - whilst there are clear limitations in terms of what can be hoped for 
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in the context of this piece of research, it is not unreasonable to consider the 
possibility it may ““build the capacity of those involved to take action” (Morrow, 
2005:545 citing Patton, 2002).  
His method has been published and well documented over the last twenty years with 
many researchers having now used his approach, including Soal & Kottler’s 1996  
study of narratives in family therapy, Willig’s 1999 exploration of sex education, 
Harper’s 1999 study using discourse analysis to explore “the ways in which talk 
about [psychiatric] medication construct a number of subject positions for users and 
professionals” (Harper, 1999:125) and Shaw & Greenhalgh’s 2008 exploration of 
research in primary care to cite a few. His method has also been critiqued 
extensively perhaps most famously by Hook (2001:1) who takes issue “with 
erroneous (mis)-applications of Foucault's concept of discourse by attempting to re-
characterize a Foucauldian perspective on what discourse is, and on what a sound 
discursive analytic methodology should entail” which is discussed further in chapter 
five. 
Before going into detail on Parker’s methodology, is it worth noting that both Potter 
and Wetherall (1987), and Parker (1992) comment that their respective suggestions 
of steps or stages represent an outline of an approach rather a prescriptive 
framework to be applied sequentially.  
 
3.4 Methodological Approach and Implemented Design 
What follows is an overview of the methodological options and suggestions made by 
Parker (1992, 2005) along with confirmation of the actual design implemented by the 
researcher. The detail of his 20 possible steps are summarised for clarity and brevity 
in Appendix A. 
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3.4.1 Preparation, Participant Recruitment and Selection 
“First element of technique – the interviewee as co-researcher is enrolled as a 
discourse analyst (Parker, 2005:95). A discourse analysis can start from any piece of 
text (for example, an advert or a bus ticket). Parker (2005:95) suggests that a 
research interview can be regarded as “a text-in-process” and the researcher chose 
this option. Parker recommends that each participant is interviewed twice and the 
rationale for this will be discussed further under the fourth element of technique and 
critiqued in chapter five.  
As preparation for the first interview, Parker (2005:94) suggests that the researcher 
should have considered such questions as “why you chose this topic, what stake you 
have in it, why you may want to question it, and what theoretical resources might be 
useful” and these have therefore been considered in chapter one. As also explained 
in chapter one, the overall study has been designed to explore the potential influence 
of the medical model on psychotherapists working in either an explicitly medical 
setting (e.g. the NHS) or in private practice. This was operationalized into two distinct 
primary interview questions; for part one, “Is the medical model infectious? How, if at 
all, is psychotherapy provided in a GP surgery affected by the relationship a patient 
has with their GP?” For part two, “How, if at all, does medical model thinking 
influence or enter your work in private practice?” 
Parker (2005:94) also highlights the need to have “determined that your co-
researcher is also interested in questioning those issues and that they will be willing 
to engage in the additional task of helping you question their own discourse 
analysis”. This, alongside the need for a second interview, was therefore factored in 
to the approach to participants which was conducted as follows. 
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Recruitment and Selection of Participants 
As detailed in the appropriate Ethics Applications (see section 3.5.2 and Appendix 
B), the researcher contacted a range of personal contacts soliciting participants. The 
criteria for selection for the first part of the study were that a prospective participant 
could confirm that; 
(i) they had had at least six months experience of delivering psychotherapy 
in a GP surgery and that 
(ii) their theoretical orientation was one which does not embrace the medical 
model / metaphor for psychotherapy (e.g. person-centred / humanistic) 
Six people contacted the researcher following the initial email recruitment campaign 
and it was confirmed that they had all received a copy of the briefing document, 
understood the nature and timing of the commitment required and met the selection 
criteria. This contact included an overview of the need for two research interviews 
and drew attention to the role the participant would need to play (Briefing Document 
in Appendix B).  
For the second part of the study the criteria for selection were that they could confirm 
that they; 
(i) have had at least one year’s post qualification experience delivering 
psychotherapy in a private practice setting and 
(ii) currently only work in private practice and  
(iii) be accredited by a recognised body (BACP, UKCP, IPN Member or similar) 
and 
(iv) be interested in talking about issues relevant to the research question 
After advertising for participants via a range of email contacts, the BACP on-line 
research student noticeboard and at a UPCA conference, the researcher had eight 
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people respond and as above, all administrative requirements of the ethics 
application were met.  
As each participant would be interviewed twice the researcher selected eight 
participants in total across both parts of the study partly on a purposive basis based 
on the criteria given above (“to provide the most information-rich data possible” 
(Morrow, 2005:255)) and partly on a convenience basis in terms of availability for 
interview, as it was felt this would give sufficient data and be realistic in the time 
available for research on each occasion. As the researcher had no pretensions to 
generalizability there was no question of trying to ensure that the participants were 
representative of psychotherapists in general. This is discussed further in chapter 
five. See demographic table below reflecting the information available to the 
researcher on selection. 
Table 1 - Participant Demographics 




1 F Humanistic / 
Gestalt 
Trainee / MBACP 
At least 6 months 
experience in a GP 
surgery 
2 M Person Centred Trainee / MBACP 
3 F Integrative / TA Trainee  
4 F Humanistic / 
Gestalt 
Trainee 




Not also currently 
working in a 
medical setting 
6 M Existential / 
Psychodynamic 
IPN Participant 
7 F Jungian UKCP Accredited 
8 M Gestalt UKCP Accredited 
 
3.4.2 First Interview – Structure and Implementation 
Parker (2005:93) suggests that the first interview be semi-structured and should 
facilitate the participant to “elaborate socially shared material connected to the text 
through a version of free association” (at this stage, the ‘text’ is effectively the 
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research question). This is followed by a focus on the objects mentioned in the 
emerging text-in-process (the interview) in terms of both their significance and how 
they are talked of; “the object that a discourse refers to may have an independent 
reality outside discourse, but is given another reality by discourse” (Parker, 1992, 
ch1:5). 
It would also seek to cover the “Second element of technique – the discourse itself is 
made to speak, and the analyst sees it at work” (Parker, 2005:95). This is achieved 
first through a focus on the subjects which have arisen in the text, by “specifying what 
types of person are talked about in this discourse,” (Parker, 1992, ch1:6) and 
considering “what else may be said by subjects in the text” (Parker, 2005:93).  
Second, the researcher should aim to facilitate the interview in spelling “out the 
networks of relationships” (for example power relationships), in the text.  
Finally, it would cover the “Third element of technique – a point of contradiction and 
space against the discourse is highlighted” (Parker, 2005:93-96). The researcher 
should enable the interviewee to “speculate as to how the characters positioned in 
relation to one another would deal with objections from ‘outsiders’”, or “ways in which 
a discourse disallows and discredits ways of speaking outside its own frame of 
reference, outside its own version of the world” (Parker, 1992, ch1:7). They should 
also seek to contrast “the ways the same ‘object’ is positioned in contradictory ways 
of speaking”. 
The researcher therefore created an interview plan to cover these points and a copy 
of this is included as Appendix C. Each interview was conducted according to the 
plan (having first got the participant to sign the agreed consent form) and relevant 
examples will be given in chapter four in which the findings of the research are 
presented. The participants were suitably debriefed and arrangements made for 
second interviews to take place, three-four weeks later.  
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3.4.3 The Initial Analysis 
Between the two interviews, the researcher enters the first phase of analysis, the 
final one taking place after the second interview. In both phases, Parker (2005:89-90) 
suggests that the researcher should apply an analytic framework based on:  
(i) Multi-voicedness: “instead of searching for underlying psychological 
process or themes” this explicitly listens for the contradictoriness of 
people’s experience.  Whereas other research methods might wish to 
ignore or underplay these, in discourse analysis “this variability marks 
points of contradiction that need to be taken seriously”.  
(ii) “Semiotics, by which we mean the way we put language together in 
discussions and other kinds of text…At the same time as we actively form 
sentences…, we also have to use words and phrases that carry meanings 
we cannot entirely control”.  
(iii) Resistance: Third, he suggests the researcher should look for uses of 
speech that represents “resistance. Language doesn’t only describe the 
world, it does things. Innocent comments may carry a force of blame or 
complaint or indirect request….”  
(iv) Potential Discourses:  these he defines as being “a chain of words and 
images…the organisation of language into certain kinds of social bond 
and each bond includes certain kinds of people and excludes others”. In 
order to do this, Parker (2005:98) suggests that the researcher decide 
“what kind of theoretical stuff is going to get this motor running, and 
whether it is drawn, for example, from work on gender, sexuality, race or 
class as relevant axes of power”. He then advocates that the researcher 
“soak what you have [the text-in-process] in this resource, and use it to 
organize what you now see in the text”. 
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The researcher should then start to make some choices about the categories they 
wish to use (these should derive from the theoretical resources selected - they “might 
be ideological images structuring the text or aspects of control and resistance”) and 
use them to “read and frame the whole text”.   
The theoretical resources selected for this study were; medical knowledge / expertise 
/ practices as a primary power axis for analysis; the presence or absence of a 
medical discourse in relation to conceptions of human distress and counselling; and 
notions of autonomy versus heteronomy. 
Each interview was transcribed by the researcher using a variation of the 
transcription convention developed by Jefferson, as detailed by Madill & Barkham 
(1997) (see Appendix D). They were then analysed using the analytic framework 
described above. Following Parker’s (2005:98) recommendations the researcher 
then grouped what emerged through immersion in the data into relevant categories 
(an example being ‘the discursive construction of the heteronomous patient’). 
Parkers approach suggested that these categories should then be discussed with the 
research participant at a second interview, making clear how they were arrived at, to 
see what they make of it – as the text is still ‘in process’ during this second session, 
points of difference should be discussed and clarified.  
 
3.4.4 The Second Interview -Structure and Implementation 
The second session covers steps 11-12, the: “Fourth element of technique – the 
analysis is made visible to the co-researcher” (Parker, 2005:96). In this interview the 
researcher and participant “name some ‘discourses’ as the kinds of social bond that 
makes the contradictory arrangements between the subjects possible” (Parker, 
2005:94) or “Reflect on the term used to describe the discourse” (Parker, 1992, 
Ch1:10). As Scheurich (1995:246) notes, most of the time “respondents have no 
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opportunity to comment upon interpretations of their words and intentions. This way 
of doing research takes away from respondents their right to "name" their world”. 
This issue is addressed in this second interview. 
 
In his earlier work Parker (1992:Ch1:10-13) details seven more possible steps which 
are also shown in Appendix A. Of these the researcher decided to include steps 15-
18 which “identify institutions and groups of people which are reinforced or attacked 
when this or that discourse is used” and looks at “who would want to promote and 
who would want to dissolve the discourse”. Whilst step 13 (“how and where 
discourses emerge”) was not covered in interview, the information included in the 
literature review concerning the development of the key discourses has inevitably 
informed both the analysis in chapter four and discussion in chapter five. 
The researcher created an interview plan for this second stage (see Appendix C) and 
interviews were conducted in line with it – issues regarding the relative success of 
this will be discussed in chapters four and five. Again, participants were appropriately 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Before moving on to describe the method recommended and implemented for the 
final transcription and analysis, it is relevant at this point to mention reflexivity, 
specifically in connection with the role it played in the second interviews. 
Willig (2008:10) suggests that “reflexivity requires an awareness of the researcher’s 
contribution to the construction of meanings throughout the research process”. 
Parker (2005:25) takes this idea further in terms of his critical realism stance in 
suggesting that “reflexivity is a way of attending to the institutional location of 
historical and personal aspects of the research relationship”.  Specifically, the 
researcher needs to consider the role they will play in constructing meaning, as 
Morrow (2005:253) questions, “the extent to which there is a mutual construction of 
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meaning …between and among researcher and participants, or co-researchers.” 
There are two components to this role – the first is that by taking the initial analyses 
back to the participant the researcher strives to increase the chances that meanings 
drawn are mutual, although this will be discussed further in chapter five.  
The second aspect is the active consideration by the researcher of the impact of their 
positioning in terms of theoretical orientation, philosophy and politics on the 
meanings drawn and discussions held. It is important to mention this specifically as 
part of Parker’s (2005:35) suggested method is that reflexivity “should not be a self-
indulgent and reductive exercise that psychologizes phenomena and psychologizes 
your own part in producing them. Instead the reflexive work is part of the action and 
in action research much of that reflexive work is undertaken alongside and in 
collaboration with co-researchers”.  The researcher consequently did not shy away 
from locating the research philosophically and politically with a participant during one 
of the second interviews when it was of relevance.   
3.4.5 Final Transcription and Analysis 
The second interviews were transcribed using the same conventions as the first 
interviews yielding a total of nineteen hours and forty-eight minutes of data. The 
transcripts were then subjected to a final phase of analysis. This included producing 
summaries of emerging discourses that appropriately reflected the content of both 
interview sessions for each participant. The researcher is particularly conscious that 
as far as any ‘final’ analysis is concerned “We can never come to the end of the 
meaning of a text, because there will always be another perspective on it, a new 
horizon will come into view.” (Taylor and Loewenthal, 2001:71). 
Having completed the analysis for each participant the researcher considered what 
types of discourse, if any, appeared in more than one participant’s transcripts (within 
each study rather than across both). The connected groups of discourses that 
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emerged from this review have formed the major part of the structure of chapter four, 
which details a selection of the research findings for each study in turn. Potential 
similarities or significant differences between discourses across both parts of the 
study have been highlighted in the presentation of findings for part two and are 
discussed further in chapter five. 
In line with Parkers’ method, these are described in terms of how the researcher and 
participants saw subjects and objects constructed through discourse and are 
presented where relevant in terms of their relationships and institutional context. As 
Burman and Parker (1993:2) explain, “discourse analysis offers a social account of 
subjectivity by attending to the linguistic resources by which the socio-political realm 
is produced and reproduced”.  As has been discussed, Parkers’ (1998:2) stance of 
critical realism promotes an understanding of how “subjectivity is discursively 
reproduced within present social arrangements” and so potential connections to 
relevant structures and mechanisms have been drawn. 
The findings also include references to the results of chapter two, the literature 
search, as “some awareness of cultural trends, of allusions to political and social 
developments, is essential for a discourse analysis to work. If you do not know what 
a text is referring to, you cannot produce a reading” (Burman & Parker, 1993:157-
161). It is therefore essential where possible, to locate discourses culturally and 
historically, and reflect the fact that discourses are not fixed –“It is necessary for 
discourse analysis to theorize fluctuations and transformations in discursive relations 
to ward off a reading of them as unchanging”. 
Finally in this chapter the researcher recognises the importance of having considered 
questions of ethics in regard to the research and outlines what areas were given 
such consideration.  
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3.5 Ethics and Procedure 
3.5.1 Doing justice to the participant  
When thinking through the ethical considerations for this research, the researcher 
was much influenced by the philosophy of Levinas (1989), in particular the idea of 
doing justice to the participant at each stage of the research rather than adopting a 
more formulaic approach. The first application concerns participant anonymity. 
Parker (2005:17) considers his methodology to offer an option for radical, action 
oriented research – a key element of this is that it attempts to give a voice to those 
normally silenced by mainstream discourses. He therefore suggests that “…rather 
than take this anonymity for granted as a solution to ethical problems…it is better to 
treat anonymity as an ethical question.” Whilst this idea appealed to the researcher 
very much it was reluctantly concluded that given the time constraints for this piece of 
work it would not be feasible to offer participants the option of being identified in the 
final report, as it would have meant allowing them the option of withdrawing after the 
report had been substantially written up.   
The second aspect for which the idea of doing justice by the participant was relevant 
concerned their ability, as therapists, to deal with any issues which arose from the 
research interviews. On the one hand, “the tendency to highlight the need for third 
party intervention has implications for agency and empowerment….[which] are being 
compromised by the tendency to assume vulnerability” (McLaughlin, 2003:47). On 
the other, as part of the researchers responsibility to the Other, how far was it 
reasonable to assume a participant might not be vulnerable? It was therefore decided 
to ask participants whether any issues had arisen for them and to offer peer support 
in seeking help should that be required.   
Finally, a third aspect arose during both stages of analysis and during the write up of 
this report - “whether or not the interpretations that are being elaborated in the report 
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lie within the terms of the commitment that was made to the co-researchers” (Parker, 
2005:34). The researcher has sought to ensure that this commitment has been 
honoured, seeking both to avoid the temptation whereby “Identical and non-identical 
are identified. The labour of thought wins out over the otherness of things and men” 
(Levinas, 1989:78), and to ensure that difference is identified rather than criticized. 
As Morrow (2005:252) comments in her discussion of the notion of trustworthiness in 
research, “Fairness demands that different constructions be solicited and honored”. 
This will be further discussed in chapter five. 
3.5.2 Ethical Approval & Procedure 
Two separate ethics applications were approved by the relevant School Ethics 
Committee which summarised the nature and intent of each part of the study 
respectively. These applications also considered the management of risk and 
confirmed data would be stored and handled in conformance with the relevant 
university guidelines.  These plans have been followed by the researcher and copies 
can be found as Appendix B. 
In this chapter the researcher has described how they arrived at the selection of 
Parkers’ (2005) Discourse Analysis influenced by Foucault as the research method 
for this research and then described specifically how the method was implemented. 
The researcher has also discussed ethical issues considered before, during and after 








Chapter 4: Analysis and Findings 
This chapter describes the findings of the research conducted into the questions 
which comprise this two part study which are: “Is the medical model infectious? How, 
if at all, is psychotherapy provided in a GP surgery affected by the relationship a 
patient has with their GP?” and “Exploring the influence of the medical model 
discourse on psychotherapists working in private practice” which, as outlined in the 
previous chapter was operationalized as the question “How, if at all, does medical 
model thinking influence or enter your work in private practice?” 
In the last chapter the researcher described the stages of Parker’s (1992, 2005) 
approach to Discourse Analysis used in both parts of the study. The analysis was 
composed of three stages; first, the material from the first interviews was analysed 
using the framework described in 3.4.3. An example of the output of this analysis can 
be found as Appendix E. The researcher then fed back the discourses they saw as a 
result of this to participants at the second interview using the method described in 
3.4.4. Last, a final stage of analysis was completed which reflected the output of both 
sessions and generated discourse summary tables for each participant. An example 
is included in the presentation of findings below with further examples available in 
Appendix F. (Whilst these serve to provide a connection back to the original data, it 
should be borne in mind that the researcher has also considered the ways in which 
the discourse constructs meaning beyond that necessarily intended by the 
participant.)   
The findings, drawn from these summary tables, are presented as a total of seven 
sets of discourses relevant to the questions asked (four sets relating to the first 
question, three to the second). The findings are presented for each part of the study 
separately, starting with those associated with part one. 
 94 
4.1 Part one: The discursive ‘frame’ for primary care counselling 
Whilst in general the findings reveal a diverse range of discourses, all of the 
participants referred to elements of a social and institutional structure that framed 
their delivery of therapy. This served to provide an object position for primary care 
counselling. 
Counselling was positioned as being part of an overall system comprised of primary 
and secondary care medical services. A patient visits their GP as a “first port of call” 
(C: 1/547) whose role it is to then assess patients’ needs and route them as 
appropriate to a range of medical services available on GP referral (primary care 
services), including counselling. If the patient’s needs are deemed sufficiently serious 
then the GP may choose to refer them directly to secondary care services, for 
example to a consultant psychiatrist.  
All participants talked of clients being ‘assessed’ using a standard questionnaire (“the 
CORE system puts it all in numbers” (A: 1/325)) with particular focus being placed on 
the ‘risk’ factors (questions involving self harming or intent to harm others). 
Participants who were trainee therapists talked of only being assigned clients who 
had low CORE scores: “that’s the nice aspect of it that it is known in advance what 
the score is and therefore it’s known that this should be ok for a trainee counsellor” 
(B:1/115-6). As discussed in chapter two the preference for numerical evidence is 
regarded as a major feature of the biomedical model. The same participant went on 
to recognise, however, that clients “do misread questions and get things wrong” (B: 
1/129).  
When a trainee is out of their depth participants were clear that they can “bounce” (A: 
1/303) the client back for re-referral “you know as a counsellor, I can pass that 
responsibility back” (D: 1/239) with the GP being seen as “the responsible clinician” 
(D: 1/250).   
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Counselling in primary care was therefore constructed as dealing with “anxiety and 
lower end scale problems” (C:1/253) with “perhaps more psychotic problems, manic 
depression, you know, they would be secondary care” (C:1/256-7).  Psychiatrists are 
positioned as being “very much qualified in seeing a client, listening to them, I think 
they do do counselling as they're listening to them and drugs - drugs, drugs, drugs - 
that's what it's all about juggle the drugs” (C:1/189-91). 
From three of the four participants there was a superficial, initial discourse, therefore, 
about counselling as a ‘medical’ service, having a clear place within an overall 
continuum of ‘medical’ care in the structure of the NHS. The researcher sees this as 
linked with a particular version of the subject position of the ‘heteronomous 
counsellor’ - in which the counsellor is subject to both the power of the doctor and the 
system – and this will be expanded on later.  
A specific part of the interview involved thinking about who gains and who loses from 
particular discourses and it was felt that both patients and people who worked in the 
system benefitted from this overall discursive frame, as it gave them a “‘place and a 
function and a purpose inside that system”(Researcher C:2/170). Some participants 
could not however see anyone who might lose from the discourse; the researcher 
suggested that there might be those who operate outside the system, in a non-
medical model way, and that they might be disadvantaged by such talk but there was 
no real recognition that such a group might exist (“yeah, I suppose” C:2/182). 
An alternative meaning framework was, however, introduced by a participant who 
used the metaphor of the counsellor as being a “cuckoo in the nest” (B:1/23-4) of the 
surgery, referring to the temporary nature of their presence as a trainee counsellor; “I 
do feel like a temporary visitor, I don’t feel part of it” (B:1/358). The participant went 
on to talk about how they were finding it difficult to find a room suitable to conduct 
counselling that’s “free of people, free of clutter” (B:1/577), that wouldn’t be invaded 
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by other staff. There was a clear resistance to criticise the surgeries “they’ve all been 
very welcoming” (B:1/ 253-4), but it remained a fact that the counsellor’s fundamental 
need for a private, quiet, contained space had not been met – perhaps in the way 
that a real cuckoo’s needs are difficult for the host to accommodate and indeed 
requires some kind of sacrifice.   
When reflecting on the use of this metaphor in the second interview the participant 
was horrified at the idea that the ‘cuckoo’ counsellor might disadvantage the 
surgery’s own ‘chicks’, offering a clear example of semiotics, where there are “words 
and phrases that carry meanings we cannot entirely control”(Parker,2005:89). 
This participant went on to say that whilst they were now used to the idea of 
counselling being delivered in a GP surgery, it was not an association they would 
have made previously: “I personally I just associate doctors with bodies – I know 
different now but I’m talking very generally – doctors deal with [.] things that go wrong 
with bodies, um so if you’ve got something wrong with your mind you’re absolutely 
stuck, because you don’t know where to go, you don’t know who can help you and 
you wouldn’t think to go to your doctor” (B:1/497-501). 
Overall, therefore, primary care counselling was positioned as being embedded in 
the medical system (whether logically or not) with frequent uses made of medical 
discourse language (“mental health problems”, “serious personality disorders”, 
“diagnosis”), and with clients frequently referred to in object-like terms; by diagnostic 
labels such as ‘OCDs’ or ‘the borderline’ (A: 2:251); of being able to “bounce” clients 
back to the referring doctor when a referral had been inappropriate. It was also 
suggested that clients can be viewed as ‘appointments’ (A: 2/387). It was recognised 
that clients lose from this discourse “because the human aspect kind of goes - they 
are a number, and they are using up a time slot” (A: 2/398), but it was thought that by 
treating the clients as time slots “counsellors gain because it becomes manageable” 
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(A: 2/395). This was felt to be a necessary evil in order to manage the waiting list 
effectively.  
As the interviews progressed however, and the researcher questioned what was 
meant by some of the terms used, other discourses emerged about how far the 
‘system’ often doesn’t work as it is supposed to, with GP’s sometimes not fulfilling the 
role described for them and with secondary care not always providing a consistent or 
helpful service to clients; “my client's experience of secondary health care was dire 
again” (C: 1/202) – a set of ‘unofficial’ discourses emerged which the participants all 
displayed various levels of resistance in describing and these will be expanded on 
later.  
Within the context of the overall official set of discourses about the ‘system’ of 
primary care counselling the researcher found five relevant discourses about the key 
subjects involved – the GP, the patient/client and the counsellor.  These are now 
presented in two sets, sorted in terms of their relational partners. 
4.2 The heteronomous counsellor, patient and the GP as the ‘God in White’ 
Before the researcher describes the discourses around the GP/patient relationship in 
this set of three, it has become apparent how important it is in terms of context to 
understand the subject position of the counsellor in relation to the GP– it is after all 
their discursive view of the GP/patient relationship which has been researched. 
 
4.2.1 The heteronomous counsellor 
In this discourse counsellors (and particularly trainee counsellors) are described as 
having a very prescribed role with limited authority; “as a trainee I don’t have the 
authority to make any decisions” (B:1/111-2), “all the paperwork is done by the 
doctor” (A: 1/304-5) and are clearly often subject to the authority of GPs/doctors and 
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senior counsellors. In one case participant A had agreed that “I will not do anything 
without discussing it with the doctors” (A: 1/114).  
Three of the four participants referred on several occasions to their relief that they 
could refer a client back to a GP who held overall ‘clinical responsibility’ and who 
could refer on into secondary care or otherwise take back responsibility for a 
client/patient. The heteronomous counsellor is not only subject to the power of the 
medical system in this position, but pleased to be so (A/2-445-7). As participant D put 
it “they’re the responsible clinician [.] sometimes I look at them at them and think, 
God, how do you guys sleep at night?” They want to believe in their infallibility “I 
thought because the doctor referred him to me, I thought it will all be ok” (A: 1/78-9). 
One of the participants, however, whilst initially having used terms to describe her 
experience as a trainee counsellor such as “I am kind of their servant” (B:1/367), “I 
suppose I felt rather disempowered” ((B:1/329), “I don’t think the GPs necessarily 
understand what us trainees do, or what our status is or anything, really” (B:1/286-7), 
could not recognise the discourse of the counsellor who is ‘subject to’ when 
discussing initial conclusions at the second research interview. This was because 
during the four weeks that had elapsed between interviews the participant had 
completed her training and had since been employed as a qualified counsellor; “so 
from being a trainee last time I spoke to you, or even a trainee last week, um I'm now 
somebody else um, who supposedly who has more clout” (B:2/264-6). This serves to 
illustrate the idea that discourses are not static, that, in critical realist terms, they are 
“manifestations of structural relationships” (Burman and Parker, 1993:160).  
4.2.2 The GP as the ‘God in White’ 
For participants in the first part of this study the GP is uniformly regarded as having 
the most power (of a patient / client, counsellor and GP). In the ‘God in White’ subject 
position the GP is characterized as being a source of respected knowledge whose 
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words carry great weight. The image of the ‘white coat’ invokes the idea that they 
“have all the answers” (A: 2/141-2) and implies great power associated with 
knowledge (in line with Foucault’s (1973, 1982) conclusions). This discourse was 
originally described by participant A in relation to how some patients see their 
doctors; however its discursive characteristics are also relevant in relationship to the 
heteronomous counsellor (indeed all of the participants drew explicitly on their own 
experience as patients in their interviews).   
The researcher draws a parallel between the ‘God in White’, the version of the 
“Expert” doctor discussed in chapter two (Moore et al, 2005) and the notion of 
‘Aesculapian Authority’ (Paterson (1957)  where emphasis is placed on the doctor’s 
education and technical competence as well as more traditional paternalistic 
characteristics and charisma. 
In fact the ‘God in White’ subject position attracts many of the negative aspects of 
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1982) including patient’s fearing how the doctor will use 
their power (see table 1) and the consequent need to keep ‘dark secrets’ from them, 
preferring instead to entrust these to a therapist.  Alongside this fear there is also a 
clear discourse of the patient’s (and counsellor’s) desire for the doctor’s attention 
(again see table 1). GPs are felt to both gain and lose through this discourse – on the 
one hand it accrues status and respect, but on the other “there are also different 





Discourse Summary Table 1 – Participant A 
Discursive constructions of the balance of power in the doctor/patient relationship 
Sub-Theme 
Who gains or 
loses? 
      
The doctor 
as the god 
in white 
1/527-8 Where the doctor says "try it out, it's a good thing" [they do] and because it's the doctor "ok, fine, yeah" 
Desire for/submission to Drs 
power 
The surgery is 
reinforced by positive 
views of powerful 
doctors 
2/93-4 [Sometimes] it's wonderful the doctor knows it all, they can [.] completely give over responsibility  
2/97 Others say "the doctor thought it was a good idea so I went along with it because the doctor knows best"  
2/141-2 For some, I think the dr is the god in white and has all the answers and they go there for support and guidance 
1/473-77 Clients possibly  don't feel they have a choice to really come, if the doctor in the white coat suggests it's a good idea Experience powerlessness 





1/18 -20 it takes some time to build up the trust that what we discuss in the counselling session will not be fed back to the GP Keeping secrets from drs 
Doctors and patients 
lose as it reinforces 
the idea there is 
something to be 
afraid of. Counsellors 
gain as they can be 
the patients' secret 
keeper 
1/31-34 
[.] particularly the GP sees the whole family, so if there is an issue [.]  any dark secrets, they don’t want the doctor to 
find out. 
1/222-24 
she was terrified of being judged [.] and she was terrified for not getting the same care possibly from her GP if he'd 
found out [.] 
1/341 the GP is the one that holds the power,  
1/212-4 R: clients [.] potentially having secrets from GPs: I Yes, yes, definitely, 
Passive resistance by 
patients 
1/511-3 they dish out a lot of prescriptions which will never be picked up, or perhaps picked up but never taken  







time to give 
1/850-1 Some [patients] want the attention, and others want just to be in and out Desire for doctor's attention 
Doctors lose; if they 
do give time they get 
repeat visits and 
more dependent 
patients, if they don't, 
they risk being seen 
as technical. 
Counsellors gain as 
it justifies the value 
of listening. 
1/863-4 So there is definitely one where all the attention  seekers go to and just hope he has lots of time <laugh>  
2/168-9 All they want is strokes, attention, they don't want to explore, to move on, all they want is the dr says "oh, poor you" 
2/209-10 It is positive attention, rather than perhaps the partner who is volatile, the dr will understand, the dr will not act out, 
2/149-
151 
There are the drs who listen for a minute & then write out the prescription [.] and the others [.] listen to what the problem 
really is & engage with the client  
2/223-6 
The ones who spend more time listening that have those repetitive clients [.] if the dr takes out lots of time for one client 
the other one is waiting  
2/231-3 
puts the dr in quite a vulnerable position because lots of clients might become dependent on him so he might feel quite 
responsible [.] more responsible than the others who remain detached from them   
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The researcher will now consider how participants framed their talk of patients’ 
reactions to this kind of doctor and how that experience might impact subsequent 
relationships inside the surgery. 
 
4.2.3 The heteronomous patient / client – the ‘dutiful schoolboy’ 
Cast in relation to the powerful ‘God in white’ patients sometimes “don’t feel they 
have a choice” (A: 1/474-77) to do whatever the doctor is recommending they do. 
Here then is one way in which a discourse suggests that a GP/patient relationship 
may impact therapy provided in the same surgery. According to this discourse, 
patients sometimes simply comply with their GP’s recommendations. The patient is 
described as being able to be “sent” for counselling without having any clear idea of 
what they’re being “sent” for (A:1/405-7), and also can be “sent” home by the 
counsellor (A:1/447-9) with the counsellor being cast as another authority figure (e.g. 
“the dutiful schoolboy being sent to the headmistress” (A:1/467-8)).  This is 
reminiscent of Houses’ discussion of the reluctant client who can “easily draw 
counsellors into unconsciously acting out from their own internal ‘rescuer’ or 
‘persecutor’” (House, 1995:90).  
This patient is someone who is “done unto” (B:1/878) and who subjects themselves 
to a variety of medical procedures (which would appear to support the conclusions of 
Aubrey et al (1997) regarding therapists’ perceptions of client motivations for therapy 
mentioned in chapter two.) 
Patients can and do sometimes reject doctor’s advice but in this subject position it 
will be in a passive way, by not turning up for appointments or not taking prescription 
drugs, for example, (A:1/510). Clients are described by one participant as sometimes 
worried, on entering the counselling relationship, that the counsellor will treat 
confidentiality in the same was as their GP and of the possible involvement of wider 
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social agencies without their consent – there is the sense that the patient is 
powerless in the face of the doctor, and some clients take time to trust that the 
counsellor does not hold similar power (see table 1). 
The researcher will now move on to describe an alternative subject position for the 
GP – that of ‘The Family Doctor’ - which encompasses much of the same power and 
respect as the ‘God in White’ but overall is a more benign figure. Where the ‘God in 
White’s patient as a counselling client takes time to trust that the counsellor will not 
tell their secrets to their doctor (A:1/18), the Family Doctor’s more autonomous 
patient has mainly come to counselling because it was their doctor who suggested it.  
 
4.3 ‘The Family Doctor’ and his patient 
This subject position emerged most clearly from the transcripts of participant D. The 
‘family doctor’ discourse encompasses the idea of the ‘cradle to grave’ GP of the 
early NHS who has built up relationships with entire families over many years, who 
will see a patient in a holistic way and be sensitive to wider issues beyond the 
biomedical.  “He'd known them all for years, he knew people's parents, he knew their 
brothers and sisters you know there was that real history as well and that counted for 
a lot” (Appendix F, Table 2: D: 1/104-6). 
The subject position of the patient of the family doctor is closer to that of an 
autonomous patient / client which as a discourse was present in a muted way 
throughout the transcripts. Rather than doing what the doctor says because of the 
perceived power of his position, the family doctor’s patient implicitly trusts the doctor 
to not only have his best interests at heart but to know him and his circumstances in 
sufficient depth to make any recommendations worthwhile following. The family 
doctor will also have spent time discussing the available options with him. The family 
doctor discourse appears to blend the communication style of the mutuality model 
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advocated by Roter and Hall (2006) discussed in chapter two with either the old 
fashioned paternalism of Shorter’s (1991) traditional model or Paterson’s (1957) 
notion of Aesculapian authority (which blends sapiential, moral and charismatic 
authority). 
In this discourse, therefore, the likelihood of the patient’s being referred for, taking up 
and engaging with therapy are all dependent on the quality of the relationship 
between the family doctor and their patient. This is confirmed for participant D 
through discursive observations that referrals by locums for therapy are rarely 
successful (Appendix F, Table 2). This somewhat paternalistic discourse benefits 
those GPs who place importance on maintaining relationships in the face of the 
“reforms that have swept through the NHS [that] have meant that that's no longer 
possible” (D:1/174-7). Interestingly the participant saw this discourse as able to upset 
patients in as much as “to have the relationship spoken about and thought about in 
this way almost gives the relationship more reality somehow, I dunno - it may be a 
controversial thing” (D:2/199-200).  It seemed uncomfortable to position the patient 
as party to a relationship based on unspoken or even unconscious forces.  
It is important to note that the participant also spoke of possible exceptions to this 
discourse in recognising that when a patient who was new to the area or had little or 
no contact with the GP was in crisis they may well present to a GP and successfully 
connect into therapy. 
The final set of discourses that comprise the research findings is that of the 
‘unofficial’ discourses. 
4.4 The ‘Unofficial’ Discourses: the ‘imperfect GP’ & the ‘stubborn counsellor’ 
The researcher decided to group these discourses under a heading of ‘unofficial’ 
discourses to reflect some of the participant’s discomfort (resistance) in describing 
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experiences which either did not reflect well on GPs (the ‘Imperfect GP’) or pointed to 
an on-going area of conflict in key subject relationships (the ‘stubborn counsellor’). 
 
4.4.1 The ‘Imperfect GP’ 
All the participants spoke of experiences where GPs had fallen short of the role 
expected of them in ways which had directly impacted their role as surgery 
counsellor. Two of the participants expressed discomfort in criticising GPs, but still 
had clear opinions they wished to express. 
Parkers’ discourse analytic method required the researcher to analyse for resistance 
(see section 3.4.3) and to highlight areas of contradiction (where subjects or objects 
are talked about in conflicting ways) and so the researcher explicitly raised these 
tensions for discussion in second interviews. Participant D (2/315-6) concluded that 
for some GPs, “in terms of counselling work and emotional language and emotional 
sensitivity, some people's strengths lie elsewhere I would say”. In speaking in this 
way the participant is working hard to preserve the subject position of the 
‘heteronomous counsellor’ in relation to the ‘God in White’ whilst also clearly saying 
something contradictory.  
The ‘imperfect GP’ (D:2/346) emerges as a subject position in which the GP can be 
very technically competent but lack emotional intelligence and sensitivity, who is 
usually under great pressure in terms of both responsibility and time availability (‘the 
busy GP’), but who is a fallible human being. When a GP refused to fulfil their 
perceived role to discuss a need to pass a client back, one participant said “I was 
absolutely livid because I thought, you don't care about these patients” (C: 1/106-7). 
Individual GPs can be seen as victims of the system (B: 1/802) whether they try to 
listen and give time (A: 2/231-2) or not.  
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This discourse can also be seen to reflect the GP who is described as simply not 
knowing a lot about counselling and so sometimes doesn’t know how to best use the 
service: “some of the GPs at least think anti-depressants is the cure to anything” (A: 
1/348), “with the different approaches, I don’t think they are very clued up” (A: 1/384-
5), “they sometimes don't know what they're doing [.] sometimes I have the feeling 
that if a doctor doesn't know what else to do with a patient, they send them to 
counselling” (A:2/585-7).  
When the notion of how GPs might react to the discourse of the ‘imperfect GP’ was 
discussed during the second interview, one participant was very clear that: “I think if 
we started talking about the imperfect GP & that really they're just fallible human 
beings like the rest of us [.] I don't think they'd be very happy [.] I don’t even think 
some areas of medicine would even tolerate or allow the debate to happen at all [.] 
they're a very powerful, very powerful body (D:2/431-442).  The ‘unofficial’ discourse 
of the ‘imperfect GP’ sits uncomfortably alongside the ‘official’ subject position of the 
‘God in White’ who will not permit criticism.  
In summary, the participants ‘unofficially’ discursively constructed the ‘imperfect GP’ 
as often not understanding the range of different types of counselling available, 
capable of being emotionally insensitive, sometimes treating counselling as being 
interchangeable with medication and therefore not being in the strongest position to 
educate their patients about what counselling might offer them. 
All of these features were perceived to have an impact on therapy delivered in a GP 
surgery in terms of which patients ended up (i) being referred for it, (ii) deciding to try 
it or (iii) even discussing their distress with their GP in the first place. Clearly, it 
should be understood that all the participants knew a range of GPs with a range of 
strengths and weaknesses - the subject positions discussed here comprised the 
dominant discourses from the transcripts. 
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Finally for part one of the study, the researcher will consider the findings in terms of 
how participants talked of their response to the ‘Imperfect GP’. 
 
4.4.2 The ‘stubborn counsellor’  
This subject position arises explicitly in one participant’s account (A: 2/644) in direct 
response to the frustrations experienced by the ‘heteronomous counsellor’ meeting 
the ‘imperfect GP’ (where they hoped to be dealing with either the ‘God in White’ or 
the ‘Family Doctor’).   
The ‘stubborn counsellor’ persists in the attempt to deliver a valuable service to their 
clients in spite of the myriad ways in which GPs can misunderstand what they do. 
The counsellor continues to offer relational depth when GPs treat it like “a few doses 
of CBT and you’ll be fine [.] they haven’t really got a clue how deep it is” (A: 2/631-5).  
Doctors were perceived to lose from talking of the ‘stubborn counsellor’, because it 
casts them in an unflattering light, but that counsellors win – this discourse justifies 
counsellors acts of resistance and characterises them as working thanklessly for the 
benefit of their clients. As Leonard (1997:47) points out, for Foucault “…power is not 
exercised without resistance, without insubordinacy and obstinacy, and we may see 
this resistance as an indicator that the subject, is, in part, self-constituted, able under 
certain material and historical circumstances to act as a moral agent.” 
Other participants spoke sometimes literally in hushed voices of stories they had 
heard where the system had failed patients / clients; “it just seemed like she was kind 
of slipping through everything, all the net, I felt frustrated” (C: 1/364-5), but had no 
way of making sense of these stories, simply experiencing them as anomalies. This 
seems to point as Leonard (1997:48) suggests to the idea that “structural 
contradictions and their attendant struggles enter the consciousness of the 
subordinate subject as a disturbance which points to the gap between dominant 
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discourses and the actual material experiences and practices of everyday life”. 
Further, that the lack of an available alternative discursive subject position 
constrained “what can be said, done and felt by individuals” (Willig, 2008:127). 
In overall summary of part one, the research findings are that the therapists 
interviewed talked of a variety of ways in which psychotherapy provided in a GP 
surgery may be affected by the relationship a patient has with their GP. These range 
from potentially detrimental impacts such as clients not being referred for counselling 
at all, sometimes feeling “sent” if they are and being slow to trust the confidentiality of 
the counselling relationship, through to more positive impacts such as the GP using 
the strength of that relationship to appropriately persuade someone of its potential 
benefits. The implications of the findings surrounding the idea of how far the medical 
model is ‘infectious’ will be discussed in more depth in chapter five.  
The researcher will now describe the three sets of discourses which emerged from 
the second part of the study which saw participant therapists respond to the question 
“How, if at all, does medical model thinking influence or enter your work in private 
practice?” 
 
4.5 Part two: the discursive construction of private practice in psychotherapy 
In contrast with the discursive construction of primary care counselling, that of private 
practice was less substantial. Taking a critical realist view that it is social structures 
and practices that give rise to discourses as “the manifestation of structural 
relationships” (Burman & Parker, 1993:160) this is perhaps unsurprising given its 
more disparate nature. It is in fact the very lack of such social structure which makes 
up one the main strands of its discursive construction which combines a sense of 
isolation “I think psychologically the isolation can feel brutal occasionally, it's 
alleviated by the odd conference and supervisions, but nine and a half years into the 
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work um it's pretty lonely stuff it's just you and your books” (F: 2/1212-5) with the 
realisation that sometimes clients need more than one person: “so you do you do 
have a feeling that there are certain situations which you can't operate - you're one 
person and sometimes people need a team” (E: 1/751-4). This sense of some clients 
needing more was picked up by two other participants “when you're working privately 
especially you don't […] necessarily have the resources of a team around you” (H: 
1/284-6), and “she started to collapse and at that point I said look I don’t have the 
resources for you” (F: 1/227-8). It was also recognised that the support of a team or a 
social institution can help a therapist be heard: “I think if I had an individual sitting 
here without any other party, any other team […] it would be much more difficult, I 
imagine, for me to get support, get input, […] be listened to” (H: 2/61-3). The 
associated subjective construction of the ‘therapist without a voice’ is described in 
more detail shortly. 
The other main strand of the discursive construction of private practice concerned 
money – this was in terms of both the perceived power and rights the commercial 
transaction confers upon clients and the need for therapists to earn a living. In terms 
of the former one participant was clear that “[…] fundamentally they’re coming in and 
parting with their money um and that means that they have an expectation of 
something” (F: 1/994-6) and when explaining why he chooses to use some medical 
model language even though it no longer chimes with his own way of working “there's 
a commercial transaction going on - in that commercial transaction they need some 
signalling that their vocabulary is recognised” (F: 2/26-8).  
The need to earn money was recognised by all the participants and there was an 
acknowledgement that occasionally meant that they had to decide what they were 
prepared to do to earn that money: “it’s kind of a tussle with (…) going with one's own 
kind of ethical sense and wanting to earn some money in a realistic way, and I do like 
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to earn some money” (G: 1/241-3). (This theme will be returned to in considering a 
subject discourse concerning the need for pragmatism and collaboration when 
working with representatives of the medical establishment). One participant added 
that “they're paying me and they can choose when to go so they have power over my 
living” (E: 2/844-5) – for another the issue of earning one’s living was a real concern: 
“this is literally bread and butter, hard core evolution Darwinian primordial soup stuff 
you know it's like how do I make it from month financially without going into arrears 
[…]” (F: 2/1068-70). 
Finally in terms of the discursive construction of private practice there were hints at 
the freedom that working in this setting can bring; one participant noted that seeing a 
private osteopath led her to see that “you could have personal autonomy and 
authority outside the health service” (G: 1/369-70) and another commented that “if 
you look at someone like myself working in the independent sector using the DSM IV, 
I can appropriate it for totally different agendas […]” (F: 2/184-6), but these were 
hints rather than a strong discourse and this will be discussed further in chapter five. 
The researcher will now go on to describe two dominant discourses which emerged 
in relation to the medical model, named the ‘Paradox of Power’ (E: 2/214) and the 
‘Empire of the Medical Model’ (F: 2/430). These will each be followed by descriptions 
of the key relational subject positions discursively constructed in association with 
them; the ‘Doctor/analyst’ and the ‘Collaborative Therapist’ in respect of the first; the 
‘All-Powerful Psychiatrist’, the ‘Therapist without a Voice’ and the ‘Modern Day 
Therapist who Refuses to Die’ in respect of the second.  
Within each of the discourses of the medical model about to be discussed, there 
were a number of objects (the DSM IV, medical language, medication, the NHS - 
including hospitals, clinics and GP surgeries), and subjects (GPs, psychiatrists 
(including doctors who are also analysts), therapists, patients and clients) common to 
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both - but what emerged in the analysis was a distinction based on the discursive 
emphasis placed on power and how participants talked of their relationship to it. 
 
4.6 The Medical Model as the ‘Paradox of Power’ 
Whilst the cultural dominance of the medical model was acknowledged by all the 
participants in some form or another; “the medical model is culturally imposed” (E: 
1/61), “the medical model in vocabulary and discourse is ubiquitous and it pervades 
the mental health field” (F: 1/43-4), and “the medical model can't have not influenced 
me” (G: 1/50-1) the discourse of the ‘Paradox of Power’ (E: 2/214) was one in which 
the medical model was constructed as being simultaneously anxiety provoking and 
containing for patients/clients (perhaps echoing the discourse of the GP as the ‘God 
in White’ who is both feared and desired, from part one of this study). This discourse 
was particularly prevalent in the interviews for participant E - as suggested by the 
approach to discourse analysis being used, the researcher raised an apparent 
contradiction of ideas (multi-voicedness) from the first interview, in the second. This 
centred on the idea that on the one hand “people essentially don’t feel safe with the 
medical model” (E: 1/455) and yet first, in respect of using the term ‘consulting room’ 
in their private practice “it is the medical model – I may have borrowed the word – 
‘consult’ has an aura of confidentiality about it that what takes place in a consulting 
room doesn’t leave it” (E: 1/1007-11) together with the idea that taking a patient’s GP 
details somehow reassures them by linking the therapists work with that of the GP 
(E: 1/1100). What emerged was the idea that whilst patients fear a potentially 
judgemental response from a doctor and that “they’re afraid that they’ll be 
medicalised” (E: 1/443-5) there is simultaneously something ‘holding’ about some of 
the practices that go with the medical model.  
Whereas in chapter two the definitions of the medical model encompass the 
relationship between a doctor and a patient, for this participant a distinction emerged 
 111 
in the discourse between the two; it’s “not always the medical model sometimes it's a 
transference from the relationship between doctor and patient into the therapeutic 
setting, it's not always the medical model” (E: 2/174-6). This distinction began to 
make sense as the interview proceeded and, as a Jungian, this participant drew 
heavily on the discourse of the ‘Doctor/Analyst’ (which the researcher will shortly 
move on to describe as a sort of hybrid between a doctor and a therapist subject 
position). In discussing the relationship between the object positions of Jungian 
thinking and that of the medical model it was suggested that Jungian thinking 
integrates the medical model and goes beyond it to a deeper level (E: 2/1018-24), 
working on many occasions via a doctor/patient style relationship - so what appeared 
to the researcher during the two interviews as a continual blurring of the lines 
between these two objects was probably a reflection of the integration of these 
discourses. It, therefore, made perfect sense to this participant that they could 
‘borrow’ what they regarded as positive terminology and practices from the doctor’s 
way of working without necessarily adopting any negative connotations of the 
medical model. 
4.6.1. The ‘Doctor/analyst’  
This subject position was constructed as “a man who trains as a doctor and then 
trains as an analyst and then that power relationship passes to the psychotherapeutic 
but it doesn't take the medical model with it” (E: 2/193-5) and that “there are many 
psychiatrists who are Jungian analysts - it’s very common” (E: 2/1145-6). Jungian 
doctor/analysts were positioned differently to those from a more classically Freudian 
position who were constructed as embodying something more authoritarian -  
“automatically there's an authoritarian line in Freud, now because I'm not involved in 
the Freudian scene that may have evolved so we have to bear in mind that I'm 
looking at it historically” (E: 2/772-4).  
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For the researcher, this construction of a Jungian doctor/analyst perhaps echoes the 
idea of the early involvement of doctors in asylums where they were involved not for 
their medical knowledge but “as a wise man” (Foucault, 1967:257). However, it is 
clear for this participant that an analyst does not need to be a doctor to work 
successfully with patients, and that in their discursive construction of Jungian practice 
there is no sense of conflict or contradiction between the medical model and the 
practice of therapy – initially it can be used to reassure a patient or be explicitly 
drawn upon to work with a particular issue (“it’s important to study psychiatry, it does 
teach you a lot” (E: 1/468-9), but usually the latter leaves the former behind and 
journeys to deeper realms.  
In terms of who benefits or loses from this discourse, participant E suggested that 
alongside Jungian analysts, doctors in general would benefit because the model of 
Jungian therapy integrates that of the medical model and “no one likes to be ignored 
in their work” (E: 2/1144).  
4.6.2 The ‘Collaborative Therapist’ 
This discourse emerged in relation to participant G who constructed a distinction 
between the medical model and the notion of health, seeing the latter as a much 
broader concept than just the knowledge and practices of the medical model: “health 
and care to me are words that sit with what I do […] and because therefore the 
person I'm seeing is the patient, the person who is suffering, I don't have a problem 
with that” (G: 2/36-8). They discursively constructed the role of the therapist as being 
one of “mind body spirit facilitation” although this was recognised as being 
“something which would frighten the life out of healthcare providers” as being too 
“new age” (G: 2/73-5). This reflected a deep pragmatism which emerged in the 
discourse of the ‘Collaborative Therapist’ who recognised that “you have to hold that 
on one hand and know what you think and believe whilst having to on a kind of 
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realistic in-the-world kind of way have to conform to some of this stuff because 
otherwise nothing's going to happen” (G: 1/261-4).  
Whilst there was recognition that some groups of therapists struggled with the idea of 
engaging with doctors “there were some counsellors there who had been trained in a 
psychodynamic way […] who could not contemplate speaking to a doctor about a 
patient” (G: 1/304-7), for this participant there was no sense of such a struggle. In 
discussing power relationships with both doctors and patients, a key aspect of this 
discourse was in fact constructed as being to “behave like a human being and treat 
other people similarly” (G: 1/638-9), invoking the idea of a fundamental equality 
between people that transcends social role – “we all go in a box at the end as 
people” (G: 1/737). 
4.7 The ‘Empire of the Medical Model’ 
In contrast to the first discourse of the medical model described above, this second 
discourse, the ‘Empire of the Medical Model’, was most notable for participant F who 
characterised the overarching system which embodies the model as an “aggressive, 
frankly fascist hierarchical political attempt to destroy the very things therapy stands 
for namely agency amongst a whole bunch of other things” (F: 1/722-6) which has 
‘colonised’ the field of mental health. The Empire is described as being made up of 
several facets; the hegemony of the medical profession and of medical language 
(which “infests and invades clinical practice” (F: 1/45-6)) and an overarching ideology 
which is seen as a "a systematic ideology that is driving people into a preconceived 
idea of normality – […] which reinforces a consumerist capitalist society” (F: 1/769-
72). For this participant there was little differentiation between the medical model and 
politics - “I can’t now distinguish psychiatry from politics – there is no distinction in my 
mind, they are agents of the state […] and they enforce the legal and political dictates 
of the state” (F: 1/900-2). In terms of who gains or loses from this discourse, they felt 
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that “the pharmaceutical industry would be hugely threatened because if you stop 
dispensing medication you're talking about billions and billions of pounds” (F: 2/436-
41) and that more broadly the ‘Empire’ performs the function of keeping the 
population in check – so pointing this discourse out and talking about it would be 
threatening to society as a whole (F: 2/494-508).  
For participant H there was perhaps an echo of this idea in that there was a clear 
sense that those working within the medical model system are charged with more of 
a responsibility to act “for the greater good” than therapists (H: 2/411) but that this 
can sometimes translate into actions which are not necessarily in the best interests of 
individual clients or patients: “it’s too easy for them to just come in and go right ok I 
know I've got it sorted what needs, I'm doing it for the best and so this is what I'm 
going to do, without maybe really stepping back and saying what's really going on 
here?” (H: 2/548-51). In both of the discourses of these participants there is a sense 
that the therapist and the client or patient’s interests are subject to the will of the 
doctor or psychiatrist.  This discourse in some senses mirrors the idea which Siegler 
and Osmond (1974:89) discussed in chapter two of public medicine, in which “the 
clinical model can be suddenly superseded by the public health model with its heavy 
legal sanctions and its lack of concern for the individual patient”. This discourse is 
closely linked with the discourse of the ‘All-powerful Psychiatrist’ which the 
researcher will now move on to explore. 
4.7.1 The ‘All-Powerful Psychiatrist’ 
Common to all participants to a greater or lesser extent was the discourse of the ‘all-
powerful psychiatrist’. Asked to rank the key subjects of their interviews 
(psychiatrists, GPs, therapists, clients and patients) psychiatrists were universally 
listed as the most powerful, often with reference being made to their legal powers to 
section patients or determine state benefit availability. Whilst one participant saw the 
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role of the psychiatrist as more therapeutic via the subject position of the 
‘Doctor/Analyst’, for the remaining three the psychiatrists’ primary role was 
constructed as being to “to diagnose and medicate and medicate and medicate” (H: 
1/765); “psychiatrists dispense and are legally allowed to dispense” (F: 1/261). 
The discursive construction of how a psychiatrists power might be used or abused 
ranged considerably; at one extreme, participant F’s experience was that “the 
violence and the aggression that they show towards vulnerable […] patients, for 
them, is beyond belief” (F: 1/262-3), leading him to state that; “the mental health of 
psychiatrists is under serious concern and needs to be professionally assessed” (F: 
1/299-301). Other participant’s views were less forceful, “the psychiatrist […] has the 
most power […], they have the most influence pure and simple,[…] in telling you who 
you are - you are, you have, you is” (H: 1/804-11). Both of these participants also 
commented at length about their experiences of, as therapists, being either ignored 
or treated hostilely by psychiatrists. The researcher therefore suggests that a partner 
subject position to the ‘All-powerful Psychiatrist’ is the ‘Heteronomous Therapist’, or 
the ‘Therapist without a Voice’. Unlike the ‘Heteronomous Counsellor’ who emerged 
in part one of this study, the ‘Heteronomous Therapist’ is not reassured by or pleased 
to be subject to the power of the doctor or the medical system but deeply frustrated 
by it as we shall now move on to explore. 
4.7.2 The ‘Therapist without a Voice’ 
This discourse emerged strongly in the analysis of two participant’s transcripts. 
Whilst three of the participants characterised their work as therapists as sitting 
outside the medical model one still felt able to be heard when needed (via ‘the 
Collaborative therapist’ subject position). The discursive construction of the 
therapist’s position for the remaining two participants was remarkably different.  
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For participant H (see Discourse Summary Table 2)  an ambiguity arose in the first 
interview surrounding the question of whether a therapist is qualified to comment or 
have their opinion listened to by the medical profession in general and psychiatrists 
in particular – “I never put over that I'm making a stand in terms of the diagnosis 
because I'm not qualified to” (H: 1/46-8), “I'm not qualified” (H: 1/260), “I'm not 
qualified to comment” (H: 1/176)  and yet simultaneously feeling that they had 
something important to contribute “inside I'm going 'this isn't what it's about - this is 
not what it's about'” (H: 1/183). This ‘multi-voicedness’ (Parker, 2005) was explored 
in the second interview and what emerged was that they felt “[…] generally 
pessimistic that a gestalt psychotherapist which for some people is way over the 
fringe anyway probably wouldn't get a look in without any medical background” (H: 
2/87-90) and that “without any previous psychology degree or nursing qualification I 
think the exclusion would come and they'd go 'well who is this person'” (H: 2/92-4). 
They went on to name this discourse as the ‘therapist not having a voice’ (H: 2/208). 
Participant F discursively constructed a greater experience of outright hostility from 
doctors generally but particularly psychiatrists – in response to the researcher 
clarifying that “your experience has very much been one of them exercising their 
power against you?” they responded “Yes, yes in a deliberately premeditated, 
humiliating, derogatory manner which has no interest in the client” (F: 1/359-62). A 
client of theirs had requested to see them in hospital and “the consultant was 
outraged that somebody else was coming into his ward” (F: 1/343-4). He experienced 
psychiatrists as deliberately undermining his work with his clients “[…] he said ‘well I 
don’t think he will have helped you a great deal’ […]” (F: 1/210-1). The participant 
when on to describe their supervisor’s advice on how to respond to such situations 
as being “don’t destroy your career so early on, don’t take on these big fights’” (F: 
1/1192-3) and that what the participant took from this was that “what she saying to 
me was ‘you’re nobody’ – you’re nothing – these guys will wipe out your ability to 
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practice “(F: 1/1195-6). As a result of these experiences the participant characterised 
psychiatrists as setting “[…] themselves up in conflict with me - I'm not interested in 
conflict with them, I'm very happy to meet them and discuss and negotiate” (F: 2/607-
9). 
4.7.3 The ‘Modern Day Therapist Who Refuses to Die’ 
The final discourse for the second study is again one which relates to that of the ‘All-
powerful Psychiatrist’ and the ‘Therapist without a Voice’ and which seems, at least 
superficially, to have something in common with the ‘Stubborn Counsellor’ 
constructed by participants in the first part of the study – that of the ‘Modern Day 
Therapist Who Refuses to Die’. This discourse was named by participant F (F: 
2/1055) who recycled a song title (‘the Modern Day Composer Refuses to Die’) in the 
service of our second interview. In analysing the interview transcripts for evidence of 
resistance as required by the method, this discourse sees the construction of the 
therapist who refuses to be cowed by the power of the psychiatrist, who struggles on 
with their independent practice – “this is about survival, about food on the table it's 
about electricity bills, well it has been for me anyway right - can you pay for your 
supervision, can you pay for your books” (F: 2/1056-8). In this discourse the therapist 
is pushed into a position of subversion – in response to a psychiatrist not wanting the 





Discourse Summary Table 2 - Participant H  
Discursive constructions of the therapist 
 Sub-Theme Who gains or loses? 
Therapist 
without a voice 
1/432-4 
[R] does therapy ever sit inside the medical model [I]  Well my therapy sits outside of it that's for 
sure  
Therapist sits outside the medical 
model   
1/46-8 […] you know I'm not qualified - I never put  over that I'm making a stand in terms of the diagnosis 
Therapist is not qualified to be heard 
by those in the medical model 
Loses: Therapists 
 
because I'm not qualified to […] 
 1/53-4 medical profession and thinking you know 'is this fair on this woman' um, but have to bow to, 
 1/201-3 what can you do? You know we've got to take care of the other students […] but who am I to say? 
 1/258-60 and I'm not qualified and not trained psychotherapy is not for somebody who's psychotic […] 
 1/175-183 […] so now she's having treatment,  […] but I'm not qualified to comment but what I'm hearing is  
 
 
[…] that she's making comments  about wanting to kill somebody […] and I've heard all this sort of 
 
 
stuff before and it's just the outrage and its about the self really but immediately 'oh we can't send 
 
 
you back to university because you're going to go and attack 'someone' and inside I'm going 'this  
   isn't what it's about - this is not what it's about'   
2/87-90 so there's that aspect, then in being heard by "the official guy or woman" I think I am generally 
Psychotherapist with no medical 
background can't be heard  
Gain: Those who get some 
kudos from resolving or 
fixing people 
 
pessimistic that a gestalt psychotherapist which for some people is way over the fringe anyway 
 
probably wouldn't get a look in without any medical background 
2/92-4 without any previous psychology degree or nursing qualification I think the exclusion would come  
 
and they'd go 'well who is this person' 
2/105-7 but when you put it at a distance and either say show me your bits of paper, or what are your 
  qualifications that's when I feel I would not be heard or wanting to be heard 
2/137-9 [R] so what qualification would enable you to be heard by the medical profession? 
MM qualifications help you be heard 
Gain: Those working inside 
the medical model 
 
My immediate answer is a nursing qualification  
2/141-147 […] the route is what they want, usually would be somebody who has trained as a nurse and 
 
[…]is supported within the medical world and they have more chance of being listened to 
2/148-50 [R] so there's something in here about the medical profession simply not hearing anyone who isn't 
  one of their own ? [I] I think so - yeah -  
2/77-9 [R] that's an individual issue for you about being heard? 
Individual issue re voice not being 
heard is seen as a wider issue 
  
 
that's my own stuff - but by definition I'm going to carry that into my world […] 
 2/208 there's definitely something this thing about having a voice  
 2/210 and it's strange that what I've said is what I've also said about myself 
 2/212 having a voice and then talking about having a voice   
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hospital grounds “so I remember sitting in the snow with him (laughs)” (F: 1/371-2). It 
is suggested, however, that this isn’t a position the therapist willingly takes up: “most 
therapists are not sitting there thinking ‘I want to subvert the fucking capitalist system! 
I’m so bored I’ve got nothing else to do with my life! I know I’ll go off and subvert that 
through therapy!”” (F: 1/831-4) - it is a position taken up in direct response to the 
subject position of the ‘All-powerful psychiatrist’.  
A similar discourse also emerged in participant H’s interviews who said that 
“psychotherapy approaches are a little bit subversive to society - to empower 
individuals and let them have a voice” (H: 2/182-4) and connected this to a need to 
champion the cause of their clients in the face of the powerful other who might be 
misunderstanding or mishearing what is being said – “it’s that crusade against being 
misunderstood, misinterpreted” (H: 2/346-7). Discursively the therapist is challenged 
at some point as having to answer the question “do you take your stand for society or 
do you take your stand for the individual?” (H: 2 /413-4). Therapy is potentially seen 
as “the word revolutionary is coming into my mind at the moment, anarchist if you 
read stuff behind gestalt therapy in particular […] the founders were anarchistical if 
that's the word, anarchical” (H: 2/173-6).  
In terms of who gains or loses from this discourse, participant F was clear that “the 
therapy institution itself is undermined because what I'm really saying here is that we 
don't know how to support each other” (F: 2/1107-8), that each therapist is left to 
struggle on their own against the power of the dominant discourses emanating from 
the institutions and practices of the NHS.  Participant H suggested that “well probably 
every patient is undermined” (H: 2/469) in that they are talked of as needing 
therapists to stand alongside them in the face of the powerful Other.  
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In overall summary for the second part of this study, the medical model is 
discursively constructed as having an influence on therapists in private practice 
primarily through the power relationships experienced with clients’ doctors (both GPs 
and psychiatrists). These relationships range from the benign and collaborative to the 
downright hostile and aggressive, with each type of relationship inspiring a 
corresponding subject position for the therapist. The researcher will discuss the 























Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter will cover four areas; first the researcher discusses the research 
findings in greater depth in relation to both the literature presented in chapter two and 
some additional literature which has presented itself as relevant since the completion 
of the analysis of findings; second, the researcher reflects on the wording of the 
questions used in each part of the study and what this might have set up; third the 
researcher offers a critique of the research method based partly on relevant literature 
but also on the experience of conducting this study; finally, the researcher concludes 
by considering what has been learned as a consequence of this research (including 
impacts on practice) and makes recommendations for possible avenues for future 
research.  
 
5.1 Discussion of findings 
Links between the findings and the literature reviewed in chapter two can be drawn 
on a number of different levels. As required by the research method used, some 
parallels have already been drawn at an individual discourse (or micro) level as part 
of the presentation of findings in chapter four (examples being of the ‘God in White’ 
and the ‘Family Doctor’ and the various models of doctor / patient interaction 
described by Moore et al (2005), Shorter (1991), Roter & Hall (2006) and Paterson 
(1957)).  This discussion will attempt to locate the research findings in the context of 
the existing literature at a more macro level. Before starting this the researcher 
wishes to acknowledge that as with any piece of qualitative, small scale research, the 
findings cannot be generalised from – this discussion therefore is predicated on the 
assumption that findings are local and relative to these participants at this particular 
point in time.  
It is also important to briefly highlight an issue associated with a Foucauldian 
approach to discourse analysis which is that he was more interested in the “’upward 
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reach’ of discourse” (Hook 2005:44) into “large knowledge structures” rather than 
down into the “more micro-political contents” (the social rather than the ‘psycho’). 
This leads to the requirement in Parker’s method that “discourse analysis…treats the 
meaning of terms as deriving from the way they are articulated into chains of 
meaning that are independent of the speakers” (Parker, 2005:100) rather than 
becoming an attempt to discover “what people really think” whereby the researcher 
reduces “the things that are said to what the speakers really mean and worse, into 
speculation about what psychological processes or personality characteristics might 
explain why they said what they said” (Parker, 2008:101). In the attempt to remain 
true to the method chosen the researcher has therefore ensured that chapter four 
includes discussion of the discourses, or “chains of meaning”, which emerged from 
the research only at a ‘social’ level. In this discussion of findings, however, the 
researcher now includes material that might be argued to stem from a ‘psycho’ rather 
than ‘social’ level of explanation.  The issue of the balance between psycho-social 
explanations will be explored in detail in terms of a theoretical critique of method in 
the second part of this chapter. 
As we have seen from chapter four, the main findings from the first part of the 
research study were that participants discursively constructed the GP/patient 
relationship as having several important impacts on counselling subsequently 
delivered in a primary care setting. These range from potentially detrimental impacts 
such as clients not being referred for counselling at all, sometimes feeling “sent” if 
they are and being slow to trust the confidentiality of the counselling relationship, 
through to more positive impacts such as the GP using the strength of that 
relationship to appropriately persuade someone of its potential benefits. How do 
these findings fit with the literature reviewed in chapter two?  
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The first set of links to the literature concerns the role of the GP. The relevant 
discourses that emerged from the research are those of the ‘God in White, the 
‘Family Doctor’ and the ‘Imperfect GP’. Common to these discourses is the sense of 
great authority that the role of GP carries for good or ill, and this links strongly for the 
researcher to the notion of ‘Aesculapian authority’ which emerged as a key concept 
from the literature reviewed in chapter two. As will be remembered this is seen by 
Siegler & Osmond, (1974:93-9) to have three components; sapiential authority which 
“means the right to be heard by reason of knowledge or expertness”; moral authority, 
which is understood as “the right to control and direct by reason of the rightness and 
goodness according to the ethos of the enterprise”; and “charismatic authority, the 
right to control and direct by reason of God-given grace…”. The discourses 
mentioned above could be seen to link to combinations of these types of authority, 
through them being exercised either successfully or unsuccessfully.  
In addition to the role of ‘Aesculapian authority’, the literature on the GP/patient 
relationship also included research about the perceived time pressures on GPs and 
patients’ conflicting need for time to work up to talking about difficult matters 
(Helman, 1994; Shorter, 1991; Roter & Hall, 2006) – issues which also appeared in 
these discourses. The researcher was also struck by the parallels between what 
Roter & Hall (2006:5) had to say about how patients may defend themselves from the 
reduction in emphasis placed on communication and attention-giving in the medical 
interview by “recourse to idealization or denigration of the physician” with the finding 
that in the discourses of the ‘heteronomous counsellor’ and the ‘Imperfect GP’ 
counsellors both wanted to believe in the infallibility of the GP - “I thought because 
the doctor referred him to me, I thought it will all be ok” (A: 1/78-9) – and to criticise 
them – ““they sometimes don't know what they're doing [.] sometimes I have the 
feeling that if a doctor doesn't know what else to do with a patient, they send them to 
counselling” (A:2/585-7). Whilst this is coming from counsellors rather than patients, 
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this finding could be seen to confirm what the literature is saying in this regard. 
Overall the discourses found concerning GPs were all recognisable to some extent 
from the literature reviewed on the medical model in medicine and the nature of the 
GP/patient relationship. 
The findings from part one also seem to echo the findings of Cocksedge and May 
(2006:133-135) who, as discussed in chapter two, researched the “role of general 
practitioners in the referral process” to counselling in primary care, in as much as the 
reasons given for referral of patients for counselling seemed to reflect the range of 
assumptions made by participants (from the positive desire for patient well-being 
through to the desire to offload someone). 
Perhaps most significantly the researcher noted that in part one of the study whilst 
the question specifically focused on an exploration of the possible impacts of the 
GP/patient relationship on therapy conducted in a GP surgery, only one of the 
participants interpreted these impacts as having anything to do with the medical 
model and therefore as potentially encroaching on their own ‘non-medical’ approach 
to therapy. This was intriguing for the researcher, as part of the recruitment process 
had involved all the participants declaring that their theoretical orientation was one 
which does not embrace the medical model / metaphor for psychotherapy. The 
researcher therefore reflected further on how far a medical model approach to 
therapy was evident in other aspects of the research findings. 
All the participants understandably located GP counselling in the context of the 
overall NHS system, but only one questioned whether this was necessarily the right 
place for it; she explained that she had decided to go along with “the context in which 
it happens [.] in order for me to benefit, because it is a mutual benefit between me 
and the patients / clients as well” (B:2/427-9). In addition, three of the four used a lot 
of medical discourse language despite all of them experiencing some degree of 
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difficulty in explaining what they meant by terms like “mental health problem” (“oof [.] 
that would be a good essay question that” (D: 1 /280)).  
As a consequence, the researcher wonders whether that with the exception of the 
one participant who had recognised that as a mental health nurse “I think I have 
integrated the medical model into my work over time” (D: 2/637-8), that prior to the 
research interviews the participants in part one had simply not thought much about 
the contradictions between the language they were using, the beliefs they seem to be 
engaging in and their model of counselling. Some of the participants were explicit 
about the fact the research was making them not only think about things in different 
ways but to act differently. The researcher sees a strong connection between this 
finding and the literature discussed in chapter two about the nature of medical 
models and how hard they have become to see (Boyle 2006; Elkins 2009; Wampold 
et al 2001).  
In terms of the findings from part two, these were summarised in chapter four as 
being that the medical model is discursively constructed as having an influence on 
therapists in private practice primarily through the power relationships experienced 
with clients’ doctors (both GPs and psychiatrists). These relationships range from the 
benign and collaborative to the downright hostile and aggressive, with each type of 
relationship inspiring a corresponding subject position for the therapist.   There are 
several important links to be made, therefore, between the literature reviewed on the 
historical development of the role of psychiatrists in dealing with human distress and 
participants’ discursive perceptions of them. The relevant discourses are the ‘All-
Powerful Psychiatrist’, the ‘Empire of the Medical Model’ and the ‘Therapist without a 
Voice’. Whilst these discourses are all from the findings of the second part of the 
research study there were also some relevant statements from participants in part 
one. All participants perceived the psychiatrist to be the most powerful of all the 
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subjects under discussion and this power was explicitly linked to both the situational 
authority of being an NHS consultant and to their legal power to constrain a patient’s 
freedom through sectioning. For the researcher this links clearly to the Foucauldian 
literature concerning the power of the medical establishment, which “subjugates. It 
forges persons as “docile bodies””(White and Epston, 1990:20). As participant F put 
it, the medical model is an “aggressive, frankly fascist hierarchical political attempt to 
destroy the very things therapy stands for namely agency amongst a whole bunch of 
other things” (F: 1/722-6) linking also to the postmodern idea discussed in chapter 
two that medical knowledge can be seen as “a belief system shaped through social 
and political relations” (Lupton, 1987:99). The link to Foucault continues within the 
discourses of resistance – ‘the Stubborn Counsellor’ and the ‘Modern Day Therapist 
who Refuses to Die’, for “Foucault himself was careful to emphasise frequently that 
where there is power there are always resistances, for power inevitably creates and 
works through resistance” (Lupton, 1987:102).  
The other key aspect of the role of the psychiatrist that emerged from the findings 
was their perceived pre-occupation with administering drugs: “drugs - drugs, drugs, 
drugs - that's what it's all about juggle the drugs” (C:1/189-91); “medicate and 
medicate and medicate” (H: 1/765). The repetition felt necessary by both of these 
participants serves to underline the strength of this perception which seems to link to 
the role of the biological psychiatrist discussed by Shorter (1997:325) in chapter two: 
“In two hundred years’ time, psychiatrists had progressed from being the healers of 
the therapeutic asylum to serving as gatekeepers for Prozac”.  
One apparent contradiction that emerged with the literature was the assertion by one 
participant that for them the doctor/patient relationship was not part of the medical 
model and that its therapeutic value could be transferred into psychotherapy without 
necessarily bringing the medical model with it (via the discourse of the ‘Doctor / 
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Analyst’). As described in chapter two, Kihlstrom (2002:281) argues that the medical 
model is in fact ““centered on particular rules regulating two primary social roles: the 
doctor and the patient”, however, it is possible that a version of the relationship 
based on different rules may have been being suggested by the participant. If the 
‘Doctor/Analyst’ does not engage in diagnosis or any attempt to absolve the patient 
from blame (required parts of the role of the doctor according to Kihlstrom (2002)) but 
uses the therapeutically ‘holding’ frame of the consulting room, might this constitute 
an alternative? The participant was aware that such a frame might be simultaneously 
anxiety provoking, indicating that the ‘Doctor / Analyst’ is in no way able to control 
which aspects of the medical model are invoked. The question might be whether the 
perceived benefits of invoking “the beneficial psychological influence of the authority 
of the physician” (Abma, 2004:101), outweigh the disadvantages of a model which 
casts the patient as ‘subject to’ the power of the doctor (with for example threatened 
loss of confidentiality). 
In chapter two the researcher reviewed literature which considers the use of the 
medical metaphor in psychotherapy and several alternatives to it, including the so 
called ‘common factors’ model which according to Sparks et al (2008:457) includes 
the notion of “a healing setting” (also regarded as essential in the ‘contextual’ model 
(Wampold, 2001)). The researcher wonders whether borrowing cues from the 
culturally dominant setting of the medical interview (such as calling clients ‘patients’, 
describing the therapy room as a ‘consulting room’, taking GP details and relevant 
medical information as part of a history taking) might be seen as an attempt to create 
such a setting.  Three of the eight participants clearly saw their practice as lying 
outside the medical model, however, and made no reference to their use of any 
language or practices that might be considered as being borrowed from it. From one 
of these participants, in fact, there was an echo of an idea mentioned in chapter two 
regarding the role of the doctor in the asylum – “It is not as a scientist that homo 
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medicus has authority in the asylum, but as a wise man” (Foucault, 1967:257) when 
they remarked in relation to their role as a supervisor “it’s possible to be a kind of 
wise-ish old bird without really taking a position of power” (G: 1/743).  These 
participants seemed to see their practice far more in terms of dialogue and such 
ideas will be returned to in a consideration of implications for practice. 
The researcher will now consider the findings from the research as a whole and how 
these link to the literature both included in chapter two and that which has presented 
itself as relevant since conducting the empirical research.  
The first of these concerns the theme of ambivalence in feelings towards doctors 
which emerged strongly from both parts of the study. From part one the discourse of 
the ‘God in White’ (A:2/141) includes clear statements about the patient’s fear and 
desire for the GP’s attention (these feelings also appear in the discourses of the 
‘heteronomous counsellor’ and ‘the imperfect GP’). In part two, in the discourse of the 
‘Paradox of Power’ (E:2/214) medical model practices are conceived by participant E 
as being simultaneously anxiety provoking and holding (as described above). 
Perhaps, in Foucault’s (1982) terms, these discourses reflect the positive and 
negative connotations of the power/knowledge embodied in the role of the doctor.  
Another aspect of the ambivalence of feelings towards doctors is reflected in how 
constrained participants in part one felt in talking of experiences which might be seen 
as critical of either individual GPs or the system in which they worked. As counsellors 
constructed themselves as feeling both protected and frustrated by the power of the 
GP it would seem logical to conclude that this gives rise to both the desire and 
reluctance to criticise them. Foster & Murphy (2004), in their consideration of 
counsellors motivations for working in the NHS, also raise the issue that such 
motivation may effect a therapists’ behaviour within the service (for example “a 
tendency to conform rather than challenge”) and suggest that “it is important…to 
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keep in mind our possible motives, both personal and historical, for entering the 
profession in this particular context, if we are to understand something of the 
dynamics of which we then find ourselves a part” (Foster and Murphy, 2004:296). 
The tension in this relationship seems to be important particularly in terms of how 
able counsellors feel to influence the provision of local services relevant to their 
clients. 
The second overall finding is the difference in response between each set of 
participants to their discursive construction of their position in being ‘subject to’ the 
authority of the doctor – where the counsellors in the GP surgery constructed 
themselves as being largely relieved to be able to pass responsibility back to a 
doctor, participants in part two of the study talked more of their frustration at the lack 
of opportunity to collaborate with doctors, for their opinions to be not only sought, but 
heard and acted upon – “I'm happy to talk - I'll meet them at the ideological level ok 
but they cannot do that, they are incapacitated they are actually crippled and 
disabled and unable to make that kind of dialogue happen” (F: 2/607-98). Staying 
within the method used, the researcher can reflect upon who is supported or 
undermined by these constructions – the social power of the doctor is largely 
maintained by the constructions from the majority of part one participants whereas it 
is more frequently challenged by those from part two. The researcher is aware of 
several potential explanations of this finding, however, which arguably sit at the level 
of individual psychology and so exemplify what using Parker’s approach to discourse 
analysis excludes. 
The first is that based on analysis of the motives counsellors might have had over the 
years to work within the NHS which reveals for some the desire to be “an insider 
rather than an outsider” (Foster and Murphy, 2004:296), it is possible that there is an 
inherent bias in the motivation of primary care counsellors towards a preference for 
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not being ‘clinically responsible’. By extrapolation it could be argued that those 
choosing private practice wish to work independently (to be on ‘the outside’) and to 
therefore take an appropriate level of ‘clinical responsibility’ - these explanations sit at 
least partly at the level of individual psychology. Second, the basic fact that all of the 
participants in part one were either trainee counsellors - or had been until very 
recently - could suggest that maybe this is an issue of professional confidence in 
terms of career maturity. Again this is saying something about individual psychology.  
Third, and finally, the researcher has subsequently found references to many of the 
frustrated participants’ difficulties in the literature concerning ‘split’ treatment. This is 
“a clinical term in general psychiatry that customarily refers to the prescription of 
psychoactive medication by a psychiatrist while the remainder of the therapy is 
conducted by another psychotherapist, usually a nonphysician” (Myer & Simon, 
1999:327). As Pilowsky and Bellinson (1995:26) elaborate, “Split treatment usually 
begins when a psychotherapist refers a patient to a psychiatrist. The actual 
relationship and fantasies of the psychiatrist-psychotherapist dyad may facilitate or 
hinder their collaborative treatment. The therapists may overtly or covertly devalue 
each other's contributions thus, creating a painful experience for many patients”. 
Whilst such a model appears to have become increasingly common in the United 
States (Imhof, Altman & Katz, 1998) through the impact of their managed care 
system, it is unclear as to how far it has reached the UK as a formal practice (rather 
than one which simply happens ad hoc as in the experience of participants H and F, 
with an attendant lack of formal care and attention being paid to the complex 
dynamics of the relationships involved.) Again, this is an explanation which draws on 
theories such as the psychoanalytic concepts of transference and 
countertransference (Imhof, Altman & Katz, 1998) and so sits at a ‘psycho’ rather 
than ‘social’ level. 
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In general the findings from part two were far less homogenous than those from part 
one. As briefly mention in chapter four, the researcher wonders how far this might be 
considered a vindication of the version of critical realism espoused by Parker 
(2008:2) in asserting that “subjectivity is discursively reproduced within present social 
arrangements” or as Willig (2008:113) puts it “Foucauldian Discourse Analysis asks 
questions about the relationship between discourse and how people think or feel 
(subjectivity), what they may do (practices) and the material conditions within which 
such experiences may take place” – as the ‘social arrangements’ and ‘material 
conditions’ surrounding private practice are not only far less structured than those of 
institutions like the NHS, but also not so imbued with medical model thinking, this 
could perhaps explain the greater variety of subject positions emerging in the 
discourse of the participants in part two and the comparative lack of presence of the 
medical model discourse. As Fairclough (1992:26) puts it “the language that people 
have access to depends upon their position in the social system”. Whilst there are 
those that argue there is an increasing prevalence of the use of medical model 
discourse in wider society (Philo, 1994; Scott, 1994), one possible conclusion of this 
study is that for these participants, regardless of counselling modality, a medical 
setting for counselling insidiously conveyed a medical model discourse more strongly 
than wider society did as the ‘setting’ of private practice. 
5.2 How were the findings influenced by the wording of the questions? 
This brings the researcher to some thoughts on how the findings were influenced by 
the wording of the questions used. As Willig (2008:21) comments, “It could be argued 
that one of the outcomes of qualitative research should be an understanding of what 
would have been an appropriate research question to ask in the first place!” The 
researcher has recognised at least three problems with the questions asked in this 
study.  
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First, in considering the opening question for part one - “is the medical model 
infectious?” - continuing the analogy for the moment, the researcher now wonders 
how many therapists are actually ‘infection free’ when they take up their positions in 
GP surgeries in the first place and in the second, are aware that there might be an 
‘infection’ to guard against. As Sanders (2005:26) puts it the medical model has 
become “not only the dominant ideology of distress, but the only ideology of distress. 
It has become a ‘given’ to be taken for granted – that which we think from rather than 
we are able to think about. The thought that human distress might not be an ‘illness’ 
is not merely radical, it is inconceivable”.  
So the question for part one assumed that the participants would know about the 
medical model in both medicine and psychotherapy. The researcher made the 
mistake of assuming this at least partly because participants had selected 
themselves into the research on the basis that they rejected the medical model but 
as the researcher had not defined this clearly it left room for confusion.  As a result, 
rather than participants talking of how they perceived the medical model might be 
‘infectious’ it put the researcher in the position of having to highlight discourses which 
implied the possible presence of ‘infection’ and reflecting these back to the 
participant. This gave rise to some interesting moments in the second interviews. 
The second issue with the question for part one is that the researcher is now aware 
that the analogy of ‘infection’, whilst being mildly intellectually ironic, sets up a 
judgemental stance towards what could be regarded simply as a different, albeit 
dominant, therapeutic approach – this made the researcher’s job harder when it 
came to talking about therapy based on the medical model in terms of recognising 
difference and honouring it, rather than automatically taking a pejorative stance. 
As a result of this experience with part one the researcher decided to make a 
discussion of the role of the medical model more explicit in part two and as discussed 
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in chapter three, operationalized the research question as “how, if at all, does 
medical model thinking influence or enter your work in private practice”. The 
researcher also included a discussion of what might be meant by the medical model 
in the recruitment of participants.  Despite arguably being open to medical model 
influences from a wider variety of sources than therapists working in GP surgeries 
(for example from private medical insurers, employee assistance programmes, 
industry specific advertising directories etc.) the findings from part two of this study 
have shown that those working in private practice discursively constructed 
themselves as being almost solely influenced by the medical model through their 
encounters with GPs and psychiatrists (whether directly or indirectly via their mutual 
clients). In terms of other evidence of the medical model, in the findings for part two 
there was far less use of language that one might associate with this model and three 
of the four participants were clear that their work sits firmly outside such an 
approach, with the fourth locating their work as ‘going deeper’ (E:2/1029) than it. In 
general whilst the medical model was more explicitly under discussion in part two it 
was in many ways less present – as already discussed its impacts were more directly 
located with very particular clients in particular exchanges with GPs or psychiatrists.  
Third, in terms of problems with the questions asked and probably most 
fundamentally, both of the operational questions asked assume that it might be 
possible for participants to discern what the impacts of the GP / patient relationship 
or the medical model might be, as though it were a variable that could be isolated 
from all the other myriad influences. Given the discussion in chapter three of the 
nature of modernist approaches to research, the researcher now recognises the 
difficulties of this idea in the context of a piece of research with any kind of 
pretensions towards working within a postmodern epistemology. It demonstrates how 
hard it is, amongst other things, to escape a cause and effect view of the world and 
perhaps research questions worded to make a more general enquiry into 
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participants’ experience of medical model discourse might have taken the research a 
step closer to this goal. It can be argued, however, that this issue is inherent in the 
underlying ontological position of critical realism which posits that there are material 
structures ‘out there’ which “generate phenomena, versions of which we then 
construct through language” (Willig, 2008:130) arguably in a cause and effect 
relationship.  
Having discussed some of the findings in more depth, located them in the literature 
and discussed the perceived impact of the wording of the research questions used, 
the researcher will now move on to a more detailed critique of the research method 
used. 
5.3 Parker’s Discourse Analysis – a critique 
In their 1993 paper, Burman and Parker discuss thirty two different problems they 
saw with Discourse Analysis - given constraints of space here the researcher will 
discuss five issues which have had particular relevance for this piece of research. 
As already mentioned, the first and most significant of these to the researcher as 
therapist, concerns the focus on the social level to the exclusion of the individual. As 
Willig (2008:123-4) puts it the “availability of subject positions in discourse cannot 
account for the emotional investments individuals make in particular discursive 
positions” – whilst discourses are involved in the construction of subjectivity, are they 
enough? As has already been discussed, in Parker’s (2005:101) method the 
researcher is warned against speculating about individual participant’s psychological 
processes and at times the researcher found this a struggle. Whilst some examples 
of this have already been included in the first part of this chapter, a further example 
clearly located at a personal level may help to illustrate the issue. It concerns the 
feelings that one participant expressed about a GP who had retired - the researcher 
realised that much as patients were described as desiring the attention of the 
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powerful doctor, so to did the participants (who as has already been mentioned are 
not only counsellors but also GP patients themselves): “Dr <A> would seek my 
advice and recommendations and I felt really quite valued by him, whereas since he's 
left I don't feel as valued” (D:1/706-7). As briefly discussed in chapter two, Stein 
(1985) has written about the role of transference and countertransference in doctor / 
patient relationships and had the method allowed it the researcher would have 
speculated about this in relation to this participant. Stein’s thoughts also seem 
relevant to the talk of the doctor as the God in White; “the accusation that physicians 
play God is an attribution to medicine of the wish to be cared for by a perfect 
undifferentiated father-mother” (original italics) (Stein, 1985:56).  
The researcher returned to Foucault (1969) to try to make sense of this struggle. On 
the one hand, and as discussed in chapter one, he seems to state that the subject 
only appears through discourse, that it has no prediscursive existence (Bunton & 
Peterson, 1997). In reading ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ (1969), however, it 
seems clear that he suggested instead that there had been a historical (arguably 
Husserlian) tendency to ignore the role of discourse in constructing subjects in favour 
of assuming the existence of a ‘transcendental subject’ and that in looking for “a field 
of regularity for various positions of subjectivity……it must now be recognised that it 
is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological 
subjectivity that the regulation of its enunciation should be defined” (Foucault, 
1969:61). Importantly he went on to say that “The analysis of statements does not… 
replace a logical analysis of propositions, a grammatical analysis of sentences, a 
psychological or contextual analysis of formulations: it is another way of attacking 
verbal performances, of dissociating their complexity, of isolating the terms that are 
entangled in its web, and of locating the various regularities that they obey” 
(emphasis added) (Foucault, 1969:121). To the researcher therefore he appears to 
be saying that the emphasis should be more on subjectivity as a social and 
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discursive construction, more in line with Heidegger’s (1927) ‘dasein’ (‘being-in-the-
world’) which emphasises the power of culture and society, rather than Husserl’s 
phenomenology in which the subject’s mind is able to “’stretch forth into the world’” 
(Spinelli, 2005:15) through the process known as intentionality in order perceive 
phenomenal objects. Simply put, are we more ‘subject to’ than subject? He 
addresses a perceived resistance to this when he asks “What is that fear which 
makes you reply in terms of consciousness when someone talks to you about a 
practice, its conditions, its rules, and its historical transformation?” (Foucault, 
1969:231) and acknowledges “how irritating it can be to treat discourses in terms not 
of the gentle, silent, intimate consciousness that is expressed in them, but of an 
obscure set of anonymous rules” (Foucault, 1969:231).  
To some writers, and indeed to the researcher, however, it feels that discourse 
analysis can be in danger of tipping the balance too far the other way in favour of the 
social and so some discourse analysts such as Hollway & Jefferson (2000), advocate 
a psychosocial approach to discourse analysis “that applies psychoanalytic 
interpretative strategies in order to ‘thicken’ discursive reading” (Willig (2008:124). 
According to Hollway and Jefferson (2000:13) “whatever it is that social factors 
explain, it falls far short of a complete explanation” and that “the premise of a socially 
constructed subject…makes it impossible to encapsulate fully the diversity of 
individual’s lived experience”. They therefore attempt to consider people’s 
investments in particular discourses – “by investments, we mean someone’s desires 
and anxieties, probably not conscious or intentional, which motivate the specific 
positions they take up and the selection of accounts through which they portray 
themselves” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000:15). Whilst they use various concepts drawn 
from the work of Klein in exploring how to theorise the ‘self’ they maintain a dual 
focus on both the psyche and the social - “we need to show how conflict, suffering 
and threats to self operate on the psyche in ways that affect people’s positioning and 
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investment in certain discourses rather than others. This will help us understand the 
workings of the psyche and the social simultaneously” (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000:19). Of particular interest to the researcher is their evocation of “the defended 
subject [which] shows how subjects invest in discourses when these offer positions 
which provide protection against anxiety and therefore supports to identity” (Hollway 
& Jefferson, 2000:23). Could this kind of reading have offered an explanation as to 
why participant D, missing the presence of the GP who valued his input, was 
invested so heavily in the discourse of the ‘Family GP’? The researcher therefore 
wonders whether discourses are only socially determined, and that as Leonard 
(1997:33) hoped there might be “a more dialectical understanding of the relationship 
between individual and society”. What might the implications of this be, however, for 
postmodernism? Does this essentially imply a return to modernist thinking, “with the 
productive subject as the centre”? (Loewenthal, 2003:373). 
Burman and Parker (1993:158), remaining true to Foucault’s intent (Hook 2005), 
acknowledge that they are ambivalent about the use of psychoanalytic concepts, 
seeing a problem with “discourse analysts pursuing their texts in a way that is 
suspicious of what is manifest, and looking to hidden meanings”, whilst recognising 
that they accept that “semantic phenomena” can be “overdetermined” (i.e. have 
multiple causes.) As Yates & Hiles (2010:53) put it, “it would ill behoove anyone who 
takes these arguments seriously to reproduce the notion of the transcendent, 
ahistorical subject which was anathema to Foucault …There is thus a challenge to be 
faced in making subjectivity amenable to study in discourse analysis”. They go on to 
suggest that Hook (2005) “hints at a balance to be struck in theorizing subjectivity 
without tipping over into resituating the singular subject as centre of meaning and 
interpretation” (Yates & Hiles, 2010:53). Hook (2005:28) himself is quite clear, 
however, in his belief that “genealogy and psychology are uneasy bedfellows; in fact, 
they combine like oil and water”. He explains that “the effect of much of Foucault’s 
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genealogical work… is exactly that of the destruction of the individual self-reflective, 
self-thematizing human subject, certainly inasmuch as the latter acts as a privileged 
vehicle of explanation” he posits as being central to psychology. The human subject 
is for psychology “the object of analysis it cannot dispense with if it is to maintain its 
viability as a discrete discipline of knowledge” (Hook, 2005:28). In espousing the use 
of a pure form of Foucauldian genealogy, which he describes as the study of  “a 
potent combination…[of] reactivated historical contents alongside a set of dismissed, 
rejected knowledges”, Hook (2005:5) continues to reject the idea of an active subject 
in saying that “rather than move ever further ‘into’ a discourse, towards a hidden 
interior, a supposed ‘nucleus’ of signification, one should examine its exteriority, look 
to those elements which give rise to and fix its limits; its external conditions of 
possibility” (Hook, 2005:10). 
Perhaps rescuing the value of discourse analysis for psychological research and 
psychotherapeutic practice, Willig (2005:32) alternatively stresses the idea that “We 
can think of the human subject as being constituted by historically and culturally 
specific discourses and practices, and at the same time acknowledge that this 
subject experiences him / herself as thinking, as feeling, as embodied”. She goes on 
to suggest that “a better understanding of how subjective experience is constituted 
through the ways in which we position ourselves within available discourses and 
practices over time (as Foucault puts it, ‘(. . .) the history of how an individual acts 
upon himself’) may help us to think more creatively about how to facilitate alternative 
subjectivities for ourselves and those we work with” (emphasis added) (Willig, 
2005:33).  
As equally as a participant’s subjectivity should not be taken for granted, the same 
holds true for that of the researcher. Hook (2005:36) highlights the dangers of simply 
restoring a central subject “in the figure of the interpreter” and suggests that 
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“discourse analysis, in the models provided by both Parker (1992) and Potter & 
Wetherall (1987) cannot rescue itself” from this claim. Burman and Parker (1993:156) 
do note that discourses don’t just emerge from the text and highlight the importance 
of being aware that “analysts are not only readers but also producers of discourse. 
They are implicated in the production of the forms of knowledge they describe”. The 
researcher’s viewpoint is necessarily embedded in the research findings and in this 
case the most major influence on that viewpoint has been the training programme for 
which the research is being conducted.  Having completed a programme of study 
focused on an “exploration of major phenomenological currents in European… 
therapeutic thinking, as manifest, in particular in humanism, psychoanalysis and 
post-modernism” (Loewenthal and Snell, 2008:43) the researcher was required to 
complete a piece of research that reflected this programme of reading.  
How has this therefore positioned the research and the researcher before a question 
was even devised? Just as discourses don’t just emerge from the text, research 
questions don’t just emerge from the researcher – “where the researcher and her/his 
organisation stops and the researched starts is not clear” (Loewenthal, 2003:373) - 
there are academic and political influences at work and at times the researcher 
explicitly discussed these influences with the participants as co-researchers. For 
example the researcher’s programme of study both heavily influenced the 
researcher’s desire to use a qualitative research method which might be regarded as 
postmodern and introduced the researcher to Foucauldian discourse analysis (which 
whilst not a new method and growing in popularity (as already discussed in Chapter 
3) is not perhaps as well-known and accepted as other methods such as Grounded 
Theory).  Parker (2005:29) suggests that “reflexivity helps us question our 
experience, “asking how it might have come to be that I felt this or that about what 
happened”. That is, the self is not treated as the bedrock of experience but as 
something that is crystallized from historical and institutional structures. It is collective 
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matter”. Considering both the psycho as well as the social, the researcher also 
agrees with Banister et al (1994:14) who discuss the importance of a “reflexive 
analysis which respects the different meanings brought to the research by researcher 
and volunteer” and treats them as “valued resources rather than factors that must be 
screened out”. 
This brings the researcher onto the second potential criticism of Parker’s (2005:96) 
method; the use of the second interview. What does it try to achieve? Whilst it might 
appear as a modernist attempt at validation, to get closer to a participant’s ‘truth’ as if 
that were a fixed thing, as described in chapter three Parker sees it as enabling 
participants to join in the process of naming and exploring discourses in terms of their 
impacts. So is it about validation and / or some process of co-creation of meaning? 
In terms of the first of these, Hollway & Jefferson (2000:43) appear to agree - “the 
second interview would act as a check in various ways by allowing us to seek further 
evidence to test our emergent hunches and provisional hypotheses”. However, 
despite Burman & Parker’s (1993:156) belief that the second interview might 
ameliorate the “power of the analyst to impose meanings upon another’s text” might it 
not also be seen as an opportunity for the researcher to enforce their views and 
create a dominant discourse within the interview process itself? This might be even 
more of an issue should the researcher take up Parker’s (2005:96) option of using a 
‘reflecting team’ which involves the researcher and a colleague discussing the 
discourses in front of the participant, thereby “making the discourses visible”. The 
researcher did not use this option and this meant having to take a very active part in 
the second interview, explicitly acting as a co-constructor of meaning, in order to stay 
close to the interview plan (described in chapter three). At times this was frustrating 
for both parties as the researcher struggled to make the difference clear, for 
example, between thinking about the effects of talking in a particular way about 
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something (e.g. the doctor as the ‘God in White’), rather than the effects of the 
phenomena itself. Had the researcher used a reflecting team this problem may have 
been much reduced – maybe they would not have needed to make the method so 
visible, as it would have allowed the participant to simply comment on the 
implications the reflecting team would have generated. It is clearly possible, however, 
that using such a team may have generated as many problems as it solved. 
Finally in terms of validation, Giorgi (2010:13-4) offers an alternative more modernist 
view in stating that “There is no reason to automatically assume that a layperson’s 
insight into a disciplinary meaning is equal to, or better than, that of a researcher who 
works within the discipline. It is obviously acceptable to give participants feedback 
concerning the study in which they participated, but not for purposes of validation”. 
He is therefore suggesting that validation is possible, just neither necessary nor 
desirable. Scheurich (1995:249) on the other hand represents a more postmodern 
view in suggesting that validation is simply not possible – “techniques like prolonged 
interaction or joint construction… will not lead to a more correct interpretation 
because …an indeterminate ambiguity, "a wild profusion," lies at the heart of the 
interview interaction”. 
In terms of the second potential purpose of the second interview, a joint construction 
of meaning, Scheurich (1995:243) goes on to suggest that, “Interview interactions do 
not have some essential, teleological tendency toward an ideal of "joint construction 
of meaning," no matter how Rogerian the researcher-interviewer might be. Human 
interactions and meaning are…a shifting carnival of ambiguous complexity, a moving 
feast of differences interrupting differences.” Might the best that can be hoped for 
from such an interview, therefore, be an exploration of ambiguity and change? This is 
closer to the researcher’s own experience in which the second interviews served to 
demonstrate how discourses change and evolve over time – the participant who 
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could no longer recognise her words as a disempowered trainee (B:1/329-31) from 
the first interview because she had changed status to a qualified counsellor in the 
interim would seem to once again illustrate Parkers’ (1998:2) stance of critical 
realism that “subjectivity is discursively reproduced within present social 
arrangements”(researcher’s italics). The researcher is reluctant to completely 
abandon the claim to some limited co-creation of meaning with participants even if it 
has emerged simply through a reduction in ambiguity and misunderstanding – it is 
too important when the researcher is attempting to give a voice to those who might 
otherwise not be heard. In this respect a final perceived benefit of the second 
interview was that as Hollway & Jefferson (2000:43) found “It also gave interviewees 
a chance to reflect” - participants therefore had a chance to tell the researcher how 
the research had already resulted in perceived changed thinking or action. 
Finally the researcher considers three potentially related criticisms of discourse 
analysis discussed by Burman and Parker (1993:156-160). The first is that from such 
a study one cannot make generalizations – “it is difficult to move from a specific 
text…to a wider context”. The researcher with any belief in postmodernism (as 
discussed in chapters one, two and three) must accept that the findings are local and 
relative. This is connected to a second potential frustration, that there is little 
“opportunity for consideration of large-scale political consequences of the repertoires 
in the material being studied” even though the discourses discussed are positioned 
as emerging from the wider social structure. As White and Epston (1990:29) highlight 
however, “This is not a political activity that involves the proposal of an alternative 
ideology, but one that challenges the techniques that subjugate persons to a 
dominant ideology”. Whilst this might be seen by some as a limitation, it is the fact 
that this research method is designed to expose such techniques and to highlight the 
operation of dominant discourses remains exactly why the researcher chose it for this 
study. The researcher must own, however, that this choice is at least partly rooted in 
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the researcher’s own prior studies in sociology (which in the 1980’s encompassed a 
lot of Marxist ideology) which left them with a tendency to look to social systems for 
explanations rather than to individuals. In training to become a psychotherapist, 
therefore, it has been necessary for the researcher to expand their conceptual model 
of the world (previously dominated by cultural and social influences) to one which 
places a greater emphasis on the role and dynamics of the individual psyche. It might 
be helpful for a reader to understand this, as, as a consequence, the researcher has 
tended to be drawn towards the political role of the dominant discourse of the 
biological approach to understanding human distress which, by de-emphasising the 
importance of meaning, denies an opportunity for alienation to be voiced within a 
capitalist society.  
There will also undoubtedly be readers who will find some of the views expressed by 
the research participants’ extreme (for example participants F & H and the discourse 
of the “Empire of the Medical Model”). Within that discourse, however, the researcher 
recognises the continued spirit of the anti-psychiatry movement. These participants 
are also in august company. Leader (2012:325) has recently discussed the dangers 
of where biological psychiatry can lead; in its attempts to identify “a healthy 'us' from 
an unhealthy 'them'” he recognises that “the rise of the biological approach has 
brought with it the spectre of the eugenics movement that had such devastating 
effects in the early twentieth-century and in the Nazi period” (Leader, 2012:325). As 
he goes on to note “Although we might like to think that such debates were suited to 
the climate of Nazi Germany, they were in fact rooted in British and American 
thought.” Something appears to be being said about the potential de-humanising 
impact of exclusively biological approaches. Participant F also speculated about the 
mental health of some psychiatrists with whom they had come into contact (one in 
particular who had been “outraged” that a client had asked to see my participant as 
an in-patient on “his” ward (F:1/343-4)). Interestingly House (2003:48) summarises 
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that “Buck (1992), Knight (2001), and Lowson (1994) have respectively coined the 
terms “Pervasive Labelling Disorder”, “Psychiatric Delusional Disorder”, and 
“Professional Thought Disorder” to describe [these] alienating diagnostic 
procedures”. This latter (PTD) is described as follows; “The major characteristic is an 
assumption of intellectual or moral correctness or superiority frequently held in spite 
of the presence of evidence to the contrary” (Lowson,  1994:29). Whilst the views 
expressed by participants are not the same as the researchers’ own equally the 
researcher has no desire to distance themselves from those views either. They 
discursively construct psychiatrists and the mechanisms of the control of those 
deemed mentally ill in such a way which fits broadly with the researcher’s own views 
about how the world can be seen to work when looked at in terms of social systems.  
Despite well-intentioned individuals within such systems, it is also the researcher’s 
experience that it has become the norm to  prescribe a course of ‘drug’ therapy 
(whether anti-depressants or return-to-work focused psychological therapy) rather 
than to acknowledge that something might be existentially wrong in someone’s world, 
and engage in the difficult work of helping them understand what that might be and 
what they might choose to do about it, or even less attractive, to recognise the social 
component of what might be causing them distress and working to address that too. 
A biological approach can perhaps safely allow the cause of distress to be located in 
the individual whilst neatly absolving them from blame for it. 
This brings the researcher to the third and final connected criticism, which Burman 
and Parker (1993:160) describe as “the perils of reductionism” and concerns how far 
individuals are seen as ‘subject to’ dominant discourses or invested with the power to 
resist; heteronomous or autonomous?  According to Leonard (1997:17), “Foucault’s 
perspective on the constitution of the subject reveals to us that the identity of the 
individual is a site of domination, but also an actual or possible site of resistance, of 
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political struggle”. This appears to be saying that whilst the individual is ‘subject to’ 
this is not the whole story, that at a local, individual level, resistance is not only 
possible but inevitable; quoting Foucault, Leonard (1997:47) reminds us that “where 
there is power there is resistance”.  According to Scheurich (1995:248), however, “to 
enclose social life within the dominance-resistance binary is but another prison house 
of language, meaning, and communication” – that for him this represents a 
reductionist approach. He proposes therefore that there should be an additional 
“open-ended space which I, with irony, call chaos… What I mean by "chaos/freedom" 
is everything that occurs that is neither dominance nor resistance; everything that 
escapes or exceeds this binary is chaos…and represents openness or freedom for 
the interviewer and interviewee”.  
Having reflected upon several key criticisms of the research method, the researcher 
will now consider what they have learned as a consequence of conducting this 
research and possible avenues for future research. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Foucauldian Discourse analysis “aims to produce knowledge about the discursive 
economy within which we find ourselves, how it got to be this way (historically) and 
what this means for us as human subjects” (Willig, 2008:125). The researcher’s 
starting point had been a wondering about whether other therapists who also rejected 
the medical model of psychotherapy experienced the same issues of felt 
encroachment by medicine’s own medical model on their work in both the GP 
surgery and in private practice. As Wampold (2001 : xii) suggests, “psychotherapy is 
a very personal and life changing experience, one that cannot be forced into a 
medical-like treatment without losing the essence of the endeavour”. It is the risk of 
therapy slipping unrecognised into the medical model that this research intended to 
explore because the researcher has come to believe that there are important 
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consequences attached to how therapists perceive human distress. Whilst we can 
appreciate that “medical models of emotional distress are powerful for many reasons, 
including the fact that they borrow credibility from the prestigious languages of 
science and medicine and receive strong support from the pharmaceutical industry” 
(Boyle 2006:199), the researcher tends to agree with those such as Sander’s 
(2005:38) who, when giving his reasons for promoting the options of refusal and 
principled opposition to the medical model, stated that “the metaphor for distress that 
we as therapists carry with us into our work influences every aspect of our 
relationship with our clients. If we think sick we will see sick”.   
Elkins (2009:76) suggests that as practitioners, “First, we must decide what our 
posture will be relative to the medical model. Making this decision is not easy.” In 
terms of impacts on practice, the researcher feels that this research serves as a vital 
reminder that the first requirement is, in fact, to remain awake to the idea that there is 
a choice to be made at all. In terms of resistance, therefore, one of the questions for 
this piece of research is how far is it possible for individual counsellors, working in a 
non-medical model way, to not only maintain that way of working potentially in the 
midst of a medical-model environment - to resist - but also to educate those around 
them about even the existence of their approach, and develop it further without it 
becoming, for those working in primary care, an employment threatening activity. 
There are those that believed this to be possible - House (2003:244-5) saw the GP 
setting as potentially one in which “postmodernist  deconstructionist views can sit 
quite comfortably”, providing it is able to hold its own against the “continual threat 
from the forces of modernity”. The researcher wonders how far counselling can still 
be said to be holding its own in this way in light of the increasing insistence via the 
‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT) programme on the use of only 
those therapies approved by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE). As NICE gives primacy to those therapies able to provide research evidence 
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based on the use of Randomised Control Trials (RCTs), a research methodology 
predicated on the medical model (Guy et al, 2012) it is arguably unlikely that primary 
care counselling in non-medical model modalities will survive on any scale in the 
NHS for much longer.  
There is still resistance going on – there are counsellors trying to find ways to get 
round the now mandatory requirement to record an ‘indicative diagnosis’ for example 
– but given the findings of this research, the researcher wonders how many more 
counsellors are simply uneasy about what is being asked of them without really being 
able to articulate why. Have our professional bodies done enough to try to co-
ordinate resistance, to sound the alarm to alert us to the need for action, or were they 
equally asleep to the eventual consequences of NICE’s approach to guideline 
development? Given such bodies represent those who do subscribe to at least a 
medical metaphor for psychotherapy as well as those that don’t, how able were they 
ever going to be to respond coherently to this threat? In the words of one research 
participant “what I'm really saying here is that we don't know how to support each 
other […] I’m not getting any sense of people working together, I get a strong sense 
of people shooting each other down…you have to do it on your own at this stage in 
the life of the profession” (F:2/1112-8). 
It can be argued, however, that whilst the findings of this research have been that the 
medical model was well-nigh invisible for the participants working in a medical 
setting, that the increasing roll out of IAPT and consequent squeezing out of 
traditional counselling services has served to re-awaken the profession to this battle. 
The fact that the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) launched a 
campaign looking into NICE’s methodology whose “guideline production process 
uses an overly medicalised perspective on emotional distress and treats 
psychotherapy as if it were a drug for research purposes” (UKCP, 2011) serves to 
 148 
illustrate this re-awakening. Despite this questioning, for the researcher, it has come 
too late. Whilst at the start of this research process it was their experience that there 
were still some pockets in which IAPT had been implemented in such a way as to not 
threaten either the delivery or ideology of non ‘NICE approved’ forms of therapy, by 
the end the grip had tightened to such an extent that the researcher chose to stop 
working in such a setting.  
Beyond the important decision of selecting the setting for therapeutic practice, this 
research has also highlighted another related implication for practice – that of how far 
it might be possible to reclaim notions of ‘health’ and ‘healing’ from the dominant 
medical model discourse for use in connection with the practice of therapy. Whilst 
intellectually we may understand that these terms are of longer standing than 
concepts of western biological medicine, are they inextricably linked in our minds and 
those of our clients? What do we open the door to when we call ourselves ‘health 
care providers’? (G: 1/196). If we are not concerned with health, however, what are 
we concerned with?  Heaton (1998:41) contends that “medicine inserts itself within 
the process of nature in so far as it seeks to restore a disturbed process but in such a 
way that ideally the art disappears once health is restored” – can psychotherapy 
perhaps also be regarded in this light, as equal but different to medicine? If this might 
be possible, it would seem that therapy can ill afford to borrow the trappings of 
medicine - almost especially those which might help create the illusion of a ‘safe’ and 
familiar environment for a client – if it wants to distinguish itself as a separate 
dialogical practice. 
The researcher had designed the original research question against the backdrop of 
wider debates then current in psychotherapy - about professionalization and the 
push, as discussed via NICE, for the generation of a preferably modernist evidence 
base for the efficacy of the different types of therapy – debates centred on some of 
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the key differences between modernism and postmodernism – about what 
constitutes knowledge and what is most likely to promote real ethical responsibility to 
the ‘Other’ of the client in the context of a post-existential view of practice (as 
touched on in chapter one). The actual findings have changed the researcher’s pre-
existing beliefs about the power of the medical model and its impacts on 
psychotherapy. On the one hand its invisibility and taken-for-granted nature to the 
participants working within a primary care setting was more severe than expected. 
On the other, it was discursively constructed as having less of a wide-ranging impact 
on the participants in private practice. Rather than seeking to ruthlessly identify the 
medical model in client work in order to automatically reject it, what the results have 
done is to enable the researcher to in some sense be more objective about it. 
Through understanding it in more depth and talking to people about it at length, the 
researcher is now perhaps able to consider the implications of medical model 
thinking in all its guises in their client work alongside other theoretical models within a 
broadly post-existential approach. It nevertheless remains important to remember 
that “there is one model which is more equal than the others; this is the medical 
model” (Siegler & Osmond, 1974:19). 
One final implication perhaps concerns the finding that it has been through their 
relationships with individual GPs and psychiatrists that participants’ have constructed 
the biggest impact of medical model discourse on their practice and perhaps more 
importantly on their clients. Rather than becoming overly embroiled in assigning 
personal psychological meanings when such difficulties arise perhaps a greater focus 
should be brought to bear on social structures which might better support clients 
working with both medical and psychotherapeutic professionals, (known in the 
literature as split treatment), not with the intent of simply understanding the issue but 
to bring about change – as Foucault  (1977a: 154) put in his maxim ‘knowledge is not 
made for understanding; it is made for cutting’.(Hook, 2005:8) 
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This has lead the researcher to consider areas of future research and what has 
emerged for the researcher as the most critical element of the medical model and its 
potential influence on the experience of therapy delivered is that of power. A 
research question more focused directly on power could be more openly inquisitive 
about the nature of power relations and practices in the therapy room and in the 
psychiatrists consulting room - how are they talked of? How are they constructed? 
What do therapists do or not do in relation to it, what struggles do they experience? 
How do clients experience it? Is it possible to ask? The researcher is particularly 
interested in the structural power inherent in the positions of GP and psychiatrist and 
how it might be possible for them to work alongside psychotherapists in support of 
their mutual patient/clients in developing truly therapeutic relationships. This perhaps 
would fit with an exploration of the phenomena of split treatment in the UK across all 
psychotherapeutic settings, as a cursory search has revealed no such work to date.  
Finally the researcher has wondered about the question of what ‘capacity to take 
action’ might have been generated for this study’s participants as subjects. The 
findings have illustrated that for four of the eight participants their talk suggested that 
they have integrated the medical model into their way of thinking, with only one of 
these able to articulate how this fitted with the philosophy of their original training. 
Two of them, however, were quite explicit that participating in the research had made 
them think more deeply about the medical model and how it impacted their work; one 
commented that “in just doing this research I've been changed in the way I think 
about things” (B:2/88-89) and had tried to make a change in her work set up as a 
result. The other participant who talked about the impact of the research mentioned 
having opened discussions with GPs and colleague counsellors on how far the 
medical model is actually dominant.  
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The local discourses seen in this small scale study reflect the real struggles going on 
at the front line of therapeutic delivery and are inevitably small scale and personal but 
as such reflect the local discursive economy. As well as giving a voice to the 
imagined marginalized and beleaguered non-medical model practitioners in private 
practice, however, has this research also given voice to an even more marginalized 
group of therapists - those for whom these issues are not visible and of little apparent 
relevance? They continue their work, striving to offer something of real value to their 
clients despite the system in which they work, silently, stubbornly, offering relational 
depth as best they can. 
It is possible that when this study is published to its small audience that it might again 
prompt therapist readers to think about where they stand on this issue and how that 
fits with their original training. The researcher appreciates that in terms of action 
research these are not large changes, but maybe small scale, local change is the 
only real change possible - as Parker (2005:123) says “all research is action that 
works for or against power”.  
 
 
 
